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1The plays of History
Irony and history seem to be curiously linked to each other.
Paul de Man1
In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and
“l’avenir.” The future is that which - tomorrow, later, next century –
will be … [b]ut there is a future, “l’avenir” (to come) which refers to 
someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me that 
is the real future … the coming of the Other when I am completely
unable to foresee their arrival.
Jacques Derrida2
The writing of history in postapartheid South Africa constitutes a crisis for the 
discipline of history as, I argue, it requires the discipline to confront its role in 
contributing towards the constitution of the condition of possibility of the discourse of 
apartheid. Stated differently, the relationship between the discipline of history and 
nationalist or identity politics, a relationship that is characterized by history 
performing the role of alibi, is highlighted as problematic within the question of the 
postapartheid. It is in this context that I want to broach the concept of the historical 
play as an antidisciplinary object that works to unsettle the discipline of history and 
thereby its role as alibi. Such an engagement with the historical play would, I argue, 
enable a progressive politics of the sort that Michel Foucault calls for.
In his essay ‘History, Discourse and Discontinuity’ (1972) which he wrote in 
response to a question posed to him of the possibility of resistance within the corpus 
of his work, Foucault argues that a progressive politics would be one that takes into 
account a discourse’s conditions of possibility – one that limits the claims of 
                                               
1 Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, in Andrzej Warminski (ed), Theory and History of 
Literature, Vol. 65, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p 184
2 Jacques Derrida in the opening moments of the film by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, 
Derrida, (Zeitgeist Films Ltd, 2002)
 
 
 
 
2discourses on life through defining their grammars, as it were.3 While this current 
study does not seek to, and also does not claim to, subject the discourse of history to 
such a critique (I am not proposing to investigate the emergence of the discipline), 
Foucault’s understanding of  a  progressive politics is especially significant to it. 
Particularly, rather than reading for the grammar of history – this has been done by 
others such as (but not limited to) Gayatri Spivak, Hayden White and Friederich 
Nietzsche and will be discussed later – this dissertation starts from the position that 
the discipline of history played (and plays) a fundamental role in establishing the 
conditions of possibility of the discourse of apartheid.4 This is not to argue that 
apartheid can be reduced to an outworking of nationalist history (apartheid as a 
discursive field, I would argue, draws much of its condition of possibility from what 
has been termed the enlightenment project) but rather that all history, not simply 
nationalist history, works as an alibi for its emergence. 
Rather than either accepting the politically untenable position of maintaining 
the discipline as it is or abandoning the discipline due to its complicity with something 
like apartheid, I want to argue that in order to have what Foucaul t terms a 
progressive politics it is necessary to engage with history in such a way as to 
problematise its position as alibi. By so doing, I would argue that we might disrupt the 
very condition of emergence of apartheid. Working with Paul de Man’s conceptual 
link between irony and history, and particularly recalling his understanding of irony as 
“the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes”5 (where parabasis denotes 
interruption and the allegory of tropes corresponds to disciplinary reason), I want to
posit the concept of the Historical Play as an object that works to disrupt the 
discipline’s repressed dynamic while not discarding the discipline as such. Similarly 
                                               
3 Michel Foucault, ‘History, Discourse and Discontinuity’, in Salmagundi, no. 20, (Saratoga 
Springs: Skidmore College and Saratoga Printing Company, 1972), pp 239 – 241
4 Leslie Witz’s, Apartheid’s Festival: Contesting South Africa’s National Pasts, (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, David Phillip, 2003), is a pertinent study in this 
regard as it delineates how the discipline of history emerges as that that might justify a
nationalist politics through denoting its arrival.
5 de Man, (1996: p 179)
 
 
 
 
3to John Mowitt’s formulation in his discussion of the socio-genesis of the text, the 
historical play works as an antidisciplinary object.6
The working of the concept of historical play as an antidisciplinary object is 
useful to the project of writing history after apartheid (a history that would resist its 
role in supplementing something like apartheid) in that it allows the strategic position 
of, in Spivak’s words, “learning to learn from below” (see Chapter 2). In other words, 
it operates according to what Spivak has termed a “textual politics.”7 As such, 
historical plays as antidisciplinary objects work to re-articulate the discipline’s relation 
to the subject. Put differently, it fundamentally impacts on the polit ics of 
representation in the discipline of history. This dissertation, then, will seek to engage 
with the historical play as object so as to elaborate its implications for the discipline of 
history. Importantly however, it is necessary to note from the outset that not all 
historical theatre operates as historical play: some theater reinforces the discipline 
while in other cases disciplinary demands are entirely done away with. Put simply, 
while the ‘historical play’ does have to do with theatre it is clearly not merely theatre –
this is a distinction that will be developed and explored in the latter part of the 
dissertation.
This dissertation is divided into two parts. In part one the problems of identity 
and nation in the discipline of history will be broached through engaging with 
questions of representation and, subsequently, textuality. The aim of this first part of 
the dissertation is to argue that the historical play, through making the discipline of 
history face up to its own textuality, might enable a productive engagement with the 
question of representation in the discipline and thereby problematising the 
discipline’s relationship to concepts of nation and identity. In the second part of the 
dissertation, I offer a reading of several historical narratives and plays that deal with 
                                               
6 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object, (Durham and London: Duke 
University press, 1992)
7 Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘From Haverstock Hill Flat to U.S. Classroom, What’s Left of Theory?’ in 
Judith Butler, John Guillory and Kendall Thomas (eds), What’s Left of Theory: New Work on 
the Politics of Literary Theory, (New York and London: Routledge, 2000: p 34)
 
 
 
 
4the Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856 – 7. Through this reading I hope to 
demonstrate the working of historical play as a mode that might allow a productive 
engagement with the question of representation, especially as it resonates with the 
problematic of dealing with the prophetic elements of the cattle-killing movement. In 
the final chapter of part two, I offer readings of Bhekizizwe Peterson and Derek 
Peterson’s work respectively. In so doing I hope to both distinguish the concept of 
historical play at work in this dissertation from that which is at work in their 
arguments, as well  as how their arguments might have benefited from an 
engagement with historical play along the lines argued for here. First, however, it is 
necessary to situate this dissertation within its present context.
A Present Politics
Recently, Moeletsi Mbeki (the brother of Thabo Mbeki, the President of the Republic 
of South Africa) delivered a commentary/critique of the current political situation in 
South Africa at the University of the Witwatersrand.8 His address sparked an 
exchange in a number of leading South African newspapers between Achille 
Mbembe and Xolela Mangcu, amongst others, and lends itself as a pertinent starting 
point for this dissertation through raising the question of the prophecy of 
Nongqawuse, a prophecy that many historians argue brought about the destruction 
of the independent Xhosa polity in the late 1850s, as a political issue of the present. 
While some might argue that the prophecy that brought about the Xhosa Cattle-
Killing Movement of 1856 – 7 is too painful an event to remember, the recent 
exchange between Mbembe and Mangcu places it at the heart of the current political 
discourse in postapartheid South Africa. In addition, the prophecy has been the 
                                               
8 Achille Mbembe, ‘Stirring a dark brew that echoes Nongqawuse’s fatal prophecy’ in Sunday 
Times, (4 June 2006), www.sundaytimes.co.za last accessed, 21/06/2006
 
 
 
 
5subject of much speculation by historians and playwrights alike and therefore 
provides a substantial body of work with which to engage.
Achille Mbembe, in his article ‘Stirring a dark brew that echoes Nongqawuse’s 
fatal prophecy’ argues that Moeletsi Mbeki equated the current political situation in 
South Africa as a whole to the political situation among the Xhosa around the time of 
Nongqawuse’s prophecies. In his reading of Mbeki’s speech, Mbembe argues that 
South Africa is awash with a “populist rhetoric and politics which advocates, uses and 
legitimises self-destruction, or national suicide, as a means of salvation”, in short he 
argues that South Africa is being engulfed by what he terms “the Nongqawuse 
syndrome”.9 Such a syndrome, according to Mbembe, is characterized by the 
presence of a false prophet that justifies their utterances through recourse to culture, 
tradition or ancestors, and draws on a level of mass hysteria. In addition the prophet 
always speaks of a new day, a resurrection of sorts, that will see the nation whole.10
Mbembe suggests that “the Nongqawuse syndrome” is becoming prevalent in 
South Africa due to the socio-economic condition of South Africa – one characterized 
by “purposeless wealth accumulation” and “unfinished transformation”11 – in other 
words, due to the failed promise of the new nation after apartheid. Through 
comparing the poor in South Africa today with the cattle of Nongqawuse’s time, 
Mbembe argues that the HIV/AIDS crisis could be likened to the lung-sickness that 
devastated Xhosa cattle before and during the Cattle-Killing Movement. Further, he 
suggests that “white denial of privilege” coupled with continuously high levels of 
crime and black poverty sets the tone for a return to “nativism”, something which he 
suggests the recent establishment of The Native Club is indicative of. This 
resurgence of nativism, Mbembe argues, allows the shift away from a rhetoric of non-
racialism to one premised on race. He suggests that the end result of this is a 
“situation where the language of racial destiny again becomes so all-encompassing 
                                               
9 ibid
10 ibid
11 ibid
 
 
 
 
6as to render impossible other ways of connecting the various fragments of the new 
nation.”12
Mbembe concludes his response to Moeletsi Mbeki’s speech by positing the 
dissolution of the tri-partite alliance (between the ANC, COSATU, and the SACP) and 
a constitutional reform that would make the president elected by the people not a 
party and MP’s be held accountable to their constituencies.13 While the tone of 
Mbembe’s article is favourable towards the current South African government – he 
characterizes Thabo Mbeki as “the most worldly, cosmopolitan and urbane political 
[leader] modern Africa has known.”14 The conclusion of his article clearly suggests 
that the entire current political order in South Africa needs to be fundamentally 
adjusted so as to avoid the pitfalls of “the Nongqawuse syndrome”.
It is the implicit support for Thabo Mbeki and the characterization of Jacob 
Zuma (the former Deputy-President of South Africa) as the prophet in Mbembe’s 
article that Xolela Mangcu objects to in his article ‘Nongqause comparison shirks 
analysis of political differences’. Mangcu suggests that Mbembe’s article is effectively 
a populist device that seeks to avoid engaging in a discussion of political differences 
through characterizing those that support Thabo Mbeki (the elite in Mangcu’s 
argument) as rational and urbane while characterising Jacob Zuma’s supporters as 
“no longer [being] political agents in a political debate but delusional mobs fitting the 
description of a millenarian, eschatological movement.”15 Having characterized 
Mbembe as a “rationalist scholar” using “populist devices”, Mangcu argues that 
Moeletsi Mbeki’s target in his speech was not Zuma but rather his older brother, 
President Thabo Mbeki. According to Mangcu, it is Thabo Mbeki’s failure of 
leadership on issues such as HIV/AIDS and poverty alleviation that likens the political 
                                               
12 ibid
13 ibid
14 ibid
15 Xolela Mangcu, ‘Nonqause comparison shirks analysis of political differences’, Business 
Day, (14 July 2006), www.busineesday.co.za, last accessed 21/06/2006
 
 
 
 
7situation in South Africa today to that of the Xhosa polity in the time of Nongqawuse’s 
prophecy.16
Following this, Mangcu suggests that Mbembe’s call for the dissolution of the 
tripartite alliance is simply a refusal to view the current divisions as being expressions 
of political debate, something that Mangcu suggests is perfectly healthy and should 
be encouraged. As such, he suggests that the challenge facing the ANC is to 
politically manage this debate so as to limit its potential damage.17 To conclude his 
critique of Mbembe’s article, Mangcu suggests that Mbembe is writing historical 
fiction not political analysis and that “public individuals” should “avoid labels and 
stereotypes, otherwise they become no different from nativist ideologues who silence 
debate with insults.”18 However, Mangcu ignores the fact that his article is littered 
with just such stereotypes.
Of course, both writers are doing very different things. On the one hand, 
Mbembe is using Moeletsi Mbeki’s speech as a platform from which to tackle what he 
views as the growing recourse to racial categories and populist agendas in politics. 
On the other hand, Mangcu is attempting to hold Mbembe to the original aim of 
Moeletsi Mbeki’s speech, namely the criticism of his older brothers’ government, and 
thereby is attempting to treat Jacob Zuma “fairly”.19 This disagreement is then more 
about positionality than anything else. However, the recourse to Nongqawuse as an 
allegory to understand our present raises the question of how else Nongqawuse 
might be read: this is a question that the present dissertation will seek to engage by 
way of a discussion of the historical play. 
Before moving into part one of this dissertation, however, it will be helpful to 
first read Friederich Nietzsche’s ‘On the uses and disadvantages of history for life’ 
                                               
16 ibid
17 ibid
18 ibid
19 ibid
 
 
 
 
8(1874)20 as a meditation that underscores and pre-empts many of the issues and 
debates surrounding what I have been terming the questions of representation and 
textuality in the discipline of history. More specifically, Nietzsche’s meditation brings 
into play precisely that which is elided in the disagreement between Mbembe and 
Mangcu, namely the discipline of history’s uses and liabilities. Through bringing to the 
fore the crisis of history by identifying its political uses and liabilities, Nietzsche’s 
essay necessitates, I would argue, a different engagement with Nongqawuse: one 
that problematises the uses of history rather than deploying it as an interpretive 
device. As such, Nietzsche’s essay resonates quite strongly with the project of both 
inhabiting and problematising the foundational concepts of western modernity. In 
other words, it resonates with much of what has been termed postcolonial criticism.21
Nietzsche’s Uses of History and its Liabilities
In his essay Nietzsche presents a discussion of history’s uses that calls into question 
and challenges the discipline’s political and scientific/empiricist uses. In presenting 
this argument, Nietzsche posits three different notions of history and how they each 
in turn may relate ‘to the living man’: they are the monumental, the antiquarian, and 
the critical, all of which are, according to Nietzsche, to some degree necessary for 
life. This argument constitutes something of an untimely meditation in the sense that 
it works against the dominant mode of the time.22 Writing against what he terms the 
excessive saturation of society by history, Nietzsche is asking the question ‘what is 
useful about history’, or, to put it in his terms: what are “the uses and disadvantages 
of history for life?” What is critical for Nietzsche is that, for a being to live, she both 
                                               
20 Friederich Nietzsche, ‘On the uses and advantages of history for life’ (1874) in Friederich 
Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, tr. R. J. Hollingdale, (Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 
pp 57 – 123 
21 see for example, Leela Ghandi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1998)
22 Nietzsche, (1983: 60)
 
 
 
 
9needs to be able to use history and forget the past. On the one hand, the past is 
necessary as Nietzsche argues that one of the major ways through which we live our 
lives is through engaging with the past. On the other hand, the ability to forget is 
necessary for action, otherwise, since everything has been done (by someone) 
before, there becomes no meaning to action.23 Considering both the necessity and 
the danger that is involved in history, Nietzsche’s question of ‘the uses and 
disadvantages of history for life’ becomes especially pertinent.
In order to effectively engage with this question it is first necessary to discuss 
what is meant by these historical senses, how they affect life and how, consequently, 
Nietzsche understands the role of history and the way in which it should be written. It 
is in this context of the role of history that, I argue, historical play should be viewed as 
an exceptionally productive manner through which to engage with this question. 
According to Nietzsche, all these different notions should be determined out of an 
individual’s present need. In other words, these notions are useful in the manner in 
which they are able to relate to and impact on our present lives.24 Nietzsche’s notion 
of monumental history operates through a semblance of faith in the sense that it 
necessitates the preservation of great things in the past in the hope that they may be 
possible again in the future. A burden of this form of history is that, in focusing on 
great events, it ignores how these events were constituted; it overlooks the 
individuals of, and the detail in, history. In this way monumental history effaces the 
link between cause and effect maintaining only the effect and thereby creating the 
possibility of establishing the status quo (‘great’ people/societies laying claim to 
‘great’ histories to maintain their present position).25
The antiquarian notion of history, which Nietzsche argues is viewed as the 
most valid in his time, views only the past as being worth knowing. Nietzsche 
suggests that for the antiquarian historian, the history of self becomes subsumed 
                                               
23 Ibid, p 63 and 67
24 Ibid,  p 72
25 Ibid, p 69 – 71 
 
 
 
 
10
within the history of his city. As such the antiquarian notion of history is not able to 
engender life; it only knows how to preserve it.26 In addition to this, through the 
manner in which it preserves the past, it becomes a contributor to the persecution of 
anything new or evolving and it restricts individuals’ ability to forget. 
Critical History is, for Nietzsche, a notion of history that allows a revision of 
the status quo. It maintains the notion that we are free from history and that we can 
make of it what we need for our current situation. However, Nietzsche does point out 
that, in his context, critical history was responsible for the destruction of what he 
termed “German unity” as it destroyed the antithesis between form and content.27 It is 
in response to this use of critical history that Nietzsche suggests that those that 
practice it are always endangered and living in endangered times, not least 
considering that he argues that critical history is practiced by those who suffer and 
seek deliverance from it.28 Interestingly, as we shall see later, Michel Foucault’s 
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971)29 is, in many ways, an attempt to refigure 
these in the light of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals.30
Much of what Nietzsche is writing against in ‘on the uses and disadvantages 
of history for life’ is that which he defines as a saturation of life with history. He claims 
that this is the result of a drive towards transforming history into a science that, he 
argues, has disrupted the link between history and life and perpetuated the 
prevalence of what he calls the historical sense in society.31 The consequences of 
such a move, which for Nietzsche removes the only proper use of history, are 
manifold. As a science, history emerges as a source of knowing the past in its 
entirety (history becomes a phenomenon of knowledge, a notion that Nietzsche 
                                               
26 Ibid, p 73 – 75 
27 Ibid, p 82
28 Ibid, p 69 and 76
29 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971) in Paul Rabinow (ed), The 
Foucault Reader, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp 51 – 100.
30 Friederich Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ (1887) in Walter Kaufmann (ed. and tr.) 
Basic Writings of Nietzsche, (New York: Random House, 1974)
31 Ibid, p 77; Hayden White (1982) is very close to Nietzsche’s critique of the transformation of 
History into science, however he swings his critique in a different direction, to a different tune.
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refers to as “childish”32) and about the construction of laws that govern the past so 
that we can understand how things unfolded and, consequently, how they will unfold. 
Effectively, history as a science carries a promise to know life.33
The problem of scientific approaches to history is that the notion of objectivity 
becomes a factor of critical importance. It is the assumption of the ‘objective’ subject 
position that allows the modern historian to stake out a claim to truth in her writing of 
history.  Consequently, through utilizing the claims of truth within history, society (or a 
demagogue for that matter) is able to assert its actions as being just within the light of 
that truth. However, the claim towards objectivity that enables this sense of truth 
actually, according to Nietzsche, removes the historian’s ability to judge and 
therefore her claim to being just. Put simply, Nietzsche argues that “objectivity and 
justice have nothing to do with each other”34 as justice carries with it an obligation to
judge, to decide between, to name one thing as more important than another, which 
true objectivity denies us the ability to do. He argues that this can be clearly seen in 
the way that the historian of his time can be identified as being tasteless, as she 
simply attempts to represent everything as though there were no difference between 
them.35
In addition to this criticism of the place of objectivity within history as science, 
Nietzsche argues that the promise of a scientific history that we may know life
through interacting with the past as a whole phenomenon of knowledge disallows us 
the possibility of forgetting, and in so doing, denies us the ability to act in the sense of 
doing anything new. Consequently, Nietzsche calls for this pervading sense of history 
to be resisted as it removes the possibility of both justice and life. Rather, he argues, 
                                               
32 Ibid, p 83
33 Ibid, pp 67, 83 and 92 
34 Ibid, p 91: A further criticism of this scientific sense of history includes the notion that 
science robs man of his foundations and that, in a historical culture of this sense, man 
becomes a machine and philosophy has no rights if it wants to effect any form of change (pp 
84 and 121).
35 Ibid, pp 85 – 98 
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man should first learn to live and then learn how to use history to the advantage of 
life.36
Nietzsche locates this pervading sense of history as science (what he terms 
the “historical sense”, which he holds in opposition to the “unhistorical” – the view of 
life within a bounded horizon – and the “suprahistorical” – the claim that there is no 
historical process and, as such, the placing of a focus on living rather than the past –
both of which he argues are cures to the all pervading “historical sense37) within the 
domain of Hegel’s understanding of history. He argues that Hegel’s understanding of 
history leads to an idolatry of facts that in turn leads to an unmitigated submission to 
power of any form and the celebration of rational success; in short, it leads to the 
exclusion of life.38 Rather, Nietzsche posits that the question of the moral (we might 
say, following Spivak, the ethico-political) is the true realm in which to engage with 
history.39
Recalling the productivity of the historical play through its operation as a 
textual politics for the writing of history, I argue that through its ethico-political 
dynamic the historical play provides just such a moral engagement with history that 
Nietzsche calls for. As such, the historical play as an object that makes available a 
study of that which history represses through its disciplinarity (particularly in its 
relation to the prophetic as it is explored in this dissertation), works as a space 
clearing gesture towards a real future which, as Derrida phrases it, is characterized 
by the arrival of the other when we least expect them. 
                                               
36 Ibid, pp 114 – 116 
37 Ibid, pp 66 and 120
38 Ibid, pp 104 – 105 
39 Ibid, p 108
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Brief Chapter Outline
This dissertation will be divided into two parts. In the first part questions of 
representation and textuality in the discipline of history will be explored with the aim 
of positing the historical play as productive for the writing of history after apartheid. 
The first chapter, titled ‘On Representation’, looks at the problems of identity and 
nationalism in the discipline of history. Through reading a number of engagements 
surrounding these questions, particularly interventions by Gayatri Spivak, Michel 
Foucault and Achille Mbembe, alongside a play by the South African playwright Brett 
Bailey, called iMumbo Jumbo, into a debate between Jeff Peires and Clifton Crais, 
two notable Eastern Cape historians, in this chapter I posit the argument that Crais 
and Peires would be better positioned to deal with the question of writing history after 
apartheid through dealing with the problem of representation in the discipline through 
the mode of a strategic essentialism rather than simply reducing it to a question of 
the colonial archive.
Chapter 2 extends this through arguing that the moment in Bailey’s iMumbo 
Jumbo that utilizes a strategic essentialism also causes the discipline of history to 
confront its own textuality. Through offering a critical reading of what have been 
termed the linguistic and the literary turns in history, in this chapter I argue that the 
historical play operates a “politics of textuality” that, through dealing with the problem 
of representation along the lines called for in chapter one, allows the discipline of 
history to be subjected to an antidisciplinary critique.
In the second part of the dissertation I attempt specify the implications of this 
critique for the discipline of history through reading a number of historical narratives 
and plays together. In Chapter 3 I argue, through reading Jeff Peires’ The Dead Will 
Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing of 1856-740, that the historical 
                                               
40 Jeff Peires, The Dead will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing of 1856-7, 
2nd Edition, (Jeppestown: Johnathon Ball Publishers, 2003)
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play is already latent within the discipline and I explore the implications of this 
through reading H. I. E. Dhlomo’s ‘The Girl Who Killed to Save’ and the Community 
Arts Project’s ‘Nongqawuse’. The fourth chapter then looks at how something 
resembling but ultimately not fulfilling a textual politics has been attempted in the 
writing of history through reading Clifton Crais’ The Making of the Colonial Order: 
White Supremacy and Black Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1770 – 1865.41 In 
addition, in the same chapter I attempt to specify the difficulty that historical plays 
present for the discipline as well as to demonstrate how the historical play might lend 
itself to a textual politics, as well as the productivity of this. In the final chapter of this 
dissertation, chapter 5, through reading the work of Bhekizizwe Peterson and Derek 
Peterson respectively, I will distinguish my argument on the historical play from that 
which is contained in their work. Finally, I will provide a brief conclusion to the 
dissertation.
                                               
41 Clifton C. Crais, The Making of the Colonial Order: White Supremacy and Black Resistance 
in the Eastern Cape, 1770 – 1865, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992)
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On Representation
History is therefore not a temporal notion, it has nothing to do 
with temporality, but it is the emergence of a language of 
power out of a language of cognition.
Paul De Man1
The recent debate between Clifton Crais and Jeff Peires in the South African 
Historical Journal conveys a sense of the crisis in the discipline of History in South 
Africa.2 The locus of the disagreement is Peires’ recent review of Crais’ The Politics 
of Evil: Magic, State Power and the Political Imagination in South Africa.3 In it Peires 
charges Crais with being both methodologically weak (allegedly Crais did not do 
enough fieldwork) and empirically unsound.4 In addition Peires enters into an 
etymological discussion of a particular word, umguya, utilizing it to unsettle the 
empirical basis of Crais’ account. He also faults Crais for not relying totally on the 
archival – or, at the very least, the oral – record and, rather, reading interpretations 
into what Peires dismisses as ‘mimicry’.5
Crais’ rebuttal caricatures Peires as “a neurotically jealous and territorial 
academic egotist,” as well as arguing that Peires has emphatically missed the point.6
According to Crais, the main aim of his book has to do with calling into question 
notions of “context, culture and rationality, and the politics of South African history” in 
an effort to “bring into dialogue the issue of meaning with the process of colonial 
                                               
1 Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, in Andrzej Warminski (ed), Theory and History of 
Literature, Vol. 65, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p 133
2 The two articles in which this disagreement takes place are Jeff Peires, ‘Frankenstein Visits 
the Eastern Cape’ in South African Historical Journal, vol. 51, 2004; and Clifton Crais, 
‘Frankenstein Visits the Eastern Cape: A (Brief) Reply’, in South African Historical Journal, 
vol. 52, 2005.
3 Clifton Crais, The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power and the Political Imagination in South 
Africa, (Cambridge: University Press, 2002)
4 Peires, (2004: p 224)
5 ibid, pp 224 – 228; in fact, towards the end of his review Peires effectively accuses Crais of 
having an over active imagination and inventing his own history (see p242).
6 Crais, (2005: pp 243 – 245); the words in quotations have been brought together from 
across these pages. 
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state formation.”7 As such, Crais’ project needs to deal critically with the colonial 
archive and the concepts of identity and nation that are at work within it, and, 
subsequently, within much South African historiography. Crais argues that, through
relying apparently unquestioningly on this tainted archive as though it speaks the 
truth of the past, Peires is utilizing an approach that is philosophically and 
historiographically unsound and that Peires’ approach is “intolerant of difference and 
ultimately colonialist.”8 Apart from laying bare the nature of academic bonds in 
Eastern Cape historiography, this argument between Peires and Crais is useful in 
that it highlights the highly contentious crisis surrounding problems of identity and 
nation – and concomitantly that of the colonial archive – within South African history 
and therefore, as Crais would have it, the discipline globally.9
This disagreement between Peires and Crais is not simply a minor 
disagreement between two leading Eastern Cape historians; rather, intrinsic to it is a 
crisis of representation about who specifically speaks for South African pasts. It is 
disheartening to see, in the exchanges between Peires and Crais, how easy it is to 
resort to concepts of identity and nation in the process of advancing academic 
critique. This stands in strong contrast to, say, the tenor of the critique that Gayatri 
Spivak makes of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze in her essay “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” Not only is this latter critique exemplary as a form of scholarly exchange –
because Spivak takes the t ime to demonstrate the pract ice of  reading 
deconstructively – but it also holds forth the intricacies of how difficult it would prove 
to forego the concepts of nation and identity in postcolonial criticism. At stake in 
Spivak’s critique of Foucault and Deleuze is the difficult question of a postcolonialism 
that comes after, or at the limit of, the critique of humanism.
                                               
7 ibid, pp 245 and 247
8 Ibid, p 246
9 See p 248 where Crais argues that South African history is a microcosm of the discipline 
globally.
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In this chapter I will turn both to the critique of humanism and the elaboration 
of postcolonial criticism by focusing on writers such as Foucault, Spivak and 
Mbembe.10 In the process I want to argue that the debate between Peires and Crais 
both obscures and reveals the crisis of history. From the outset, the argument is 
necessarily slow as I wish to highlight the issues that have been avoided in the 
vitriolic exchange between Peires and Crais. The difference between the exchanges 
is, I hope to show, only slight if we consider that both ultimately have something to 
say about the question of representation. But Peires and Crais may be better placed 
to address the rewriting of South African history if they heed the problem of 
representation in history raised by Spivak in her critique of Foucault and Deleuze.
Foucault’s Genealogy
Almost one hundred years after Nietzsche offered his untimely meditation on history 
Michel Foucault revisited some of these thematics in his ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History’ (1974). Here Foucault explores the question of why Nietzsche utilizes the 
notion of genealogy to write about morals, rather than plotting it in a single linear 
series of events. For Foucault, the answer lies in the interplay between Nietzsche’s 
understanding of genealogy and of history: according to Foucault genealogy is not 
opposed to history but is rather not concerned with a pursuit of origins by which he 
suggests traditional history – Nietzsche’s historical sense – is subsumed.11 This 
difference is crucial to Foucault as the pursuit of origins is, in his view – and taking 
his cue from Nietzsche – problematic in a number of ways: Firstly, the pursuit of 
                                               
10 Following from Michel Foucault’s ‘What is an Author’ these names are not approached in a 
traditional sense whereby the meaning of the text is derived by an engagement with the writer 
(envisioned as a unified subject) whose proper name it holds. Rather, these names – as 
figural indicators – serve to situate various discourses in relation to each other and to the 
problems being discussed. For an explication of this argument see Michel Foucault, ‘What is 
an Author’ in Paul Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 
especially pp 115 – 118.
11 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971) in Paul Rabinow (ed), The 
Foucault Reader, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p77
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origins is an attempt to capture the true essence of a thing, whereas Nietzsche 
argues that at the heart of a thing lies only disparity: there is no constituted whole to 
refer to. Secondly, the notion of the origin is often considered as being an idyllic 
instance, a time before the fall, whereas Nietzsche argues that beginnings are 
accidental as well as lowly and that they undo these fallacies of the origin. Finally, 
Nietzsche and Foucault are both suspicious of the pursuit of the origin as it opens up 
a whole discourse whose purpose it is to maintain the claim of an originary truth. 
Foucault seems to argue rather that the true state of the origin is perhaps closer to 
the Lacanian model of the dislocation of the subject.12
If we focus the preceding discussion more explicitly on the problems of writing 
history in postapartheid South Africa, it becomes clear that this notion of genealogy 
raises a number of important consequences, epistemological and political, for the 
writing of that history. While genealogy both utilizes and focuses on notions of race 
and identity, it does so in such a way as to call into question the very identity of that 
which is being examined. In this sense, genealogy does not allow the essentialising 
of identity. Rather, it exposes identity as being internally disassociated and located in 
“a network that is difficult to unravel”13 – in other words, genealogy exposes the 
textured nature of identity.14 In addition to its effect on identity, genealogy is also not 
interested in the erection of foundations but rather in tracing descent through time. 
Through maintaining ‘historical events’ in their proper dispersion (as opposed to a 
unified form), genealogy unsettles foundations and highlights the effects of history on 
the body.15
While genealogy does not interest itself with the uncovering of origins, it does 
tackle the problem of the emergence of things. It deals with the questions of when 
                                               
12 Ibid, pp 77 – 80 
13 Ibid, p 81
14 For an interesting and I think crucial discussion of the etymological link between text, 
texture, and textile see John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object, 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992), especially the introduction and first 
chapter.
15 Ibid, p 82 – 84 
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things arose, but not in a particularly conventional historical sense. According to 
Foucault, emergence always takes place in what he calls “the interstice” between 
different forces that are never equal and, as such, sites of emergence always 
designate a place of confrontation. So, while on the one hand genealogy is 
concerned with descent – with tracing “the strength or weakness of an instinct and its 
inscription on the body”16 – on the other hand it is concerned with emergence as 
designating sites of confrontation which allow for either new modes of interpretat ion 
or the maintenance of old modes. These moments of emergence then become 
characterized by what Foucault terms the “relationship of domination” that imposes 
certain rights and obligations on to those it dominates, which, in turn, are also the 
marks by which it can be identified on the body.17
In short, Foucault is arguing that the history of man is constituted out of a 
series of interpretations, where interpretation designates the violent appropriation –
and then enforcement – of a system of rules (emergence) as opposed to the patient 
exposure of meaning in the origin (traditional history/metaphysics). This 
understanding of history moves in opposition to a prevailing sense where events are 
constituted as having their appropriate place on the stage of historical process. This 
process whereby history introduces discontinuity into our sense of being, that 
recognizes that the body and instinctual life are not stable but are rather inscribed by 
a variety of regimes, is what Foucault refers to as “effective history”. For Foucault, 
the difference between traditional and effective history can be identified in their 
respective handling of the event: Traditional history constitutes the event as 
continuity whereas effective history constitutes the event as the re-alignment of 
forces that allows for the appearance of the other, though masked.18
                                               
16 Ibid, p 84
17 Ibid, p 85
18 Ibid, pp 86 – 88; in positing this understanding of history Foucault is quite close to the 
understanding of history contained in the epigraph with which this chapter began.
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Aligning himself with Nietzsche’s critique of the objectivity of the historian, 
Foucault further argues that the modern historian’s mistake is lack of taste (the ability 
to distinguish) which is the mark of objectivity (which is in turn the mark of traditional 
history) and that, through this objectivity, the historian in fact becomes the mirror 
image of the demagogue.19 Having investigated the effect of genealogy on history, he 
then moves to refigure Nietzsche’s three notions of history in the light of this effect. 
For Foucault, Nietzsche’s notion of monumental history becomes figured as the 
parodic, which works in a similar way to Nietzsche’s monumental history except that 
the parodic multiplies these great moments/identities to such a degree that their 
validity becomes farcical, thereby exposing its charade. A disassociative history 
comes in the place of Nietzsche’s antiquarian notion of history. In this refiguring, 
Foucault argues that the disassociative works in an opposite way to the antiquarian 
in that, instead of persecuting the new, disassociative history – through linking with 
genealogy – dissipates the foundations of things and affirms why we are not able to 
speak of identity in the proper sense. Finally, Foucault argues that Nietzsche’s critical
notion of history comes to be a sacrificial one. He makes this argument by pointing 
out that history has always operated out of a will to knowledge that actually sacrifices 
that same subject of knowledge. In this manner, Nietzsche’s critical history results in 
the destruction of the subject that seeks knowledge rather than revealing new 
unexpected and uncomfortable originary truths.20 What is clear from the above is that 
Foucault develops the critique of the subject by pursuing the critique of humanism 
and inviting us to consider the productivity associated with the representational 
structure of the discourse of history.
                                               
19 Ibid, pp 91 – 92 
20 Ibid, pp 93 – 96 
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But Can the Subaltern Speak: Spivak after Foucault
Having briefly examined some broader questions of the writing of history – as a way 
of highlighting Foucault’s critique of the subject through the productivity of historical 
discourse – it is now necessary to shift our focus more explicitly to the question of 
identity within historical/intellectual discourse. A useful opening for this discussion, 
due to its explicit engagement with questions of identity and history, is Gayatri 
Spivak’s essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988).21
 In ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ Spivak asks the question of the representation 
of the subaltern within intellectual discourse. For Spivak, an approach to this problem 
must first contend with the nature of representation within the western intellectual 
traditions. Taking her cue from a conversation between Gilles Deleuze and Michel 
Foucault22 she investigates how the intellectual’s role in the pluralisation of the 
subject in fact entrenches (and unifies) the western subject. Spivak locates the scene 
of this contradiction in the moment where Foucault and Deleuze valorise the concrete 
experience of the oppressed while they ignore the role of the intellectual and her 
responsibility to the institution. In short, this contradiction arises due to a lack of self-
reflexivity (and, as we shall see, an apparent misreading of representation) in their 
discussion.23 According to Spivak, what accentuates this problem reflected in the 
conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is the use and reliance on concepts of 
power, desire, and interest, where interest always follows desire and desire is never 
deceived (a reliance on an unfractured subject). Spivak argues that this formulation 
                                               
21 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988) in Patrick Williams and 
Laura Chrisman (eds), Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A reader, (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, Cambridge University Press, 1993)
22 See the conversation in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
essays and interviews, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, (New York, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977), pp 205 – 217 
23 Spivak, (1993: p 69)
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leads Foucault and Deleuze to posit a highly mechanical opposition between interest 
and desire, which she finds to be unproductive.24
The handling of the concept of representation has, according to Spivak, often 
been continued on a far too simplistic level by western intellectuals, here typified by 
Foucault and Deleuze. For Spivak there are two forms of representation that are 
always at work: the f i rst is vertreten and the second is darstellen:  Vertreten
corresponds to the rhetoric of the trope; it is located within the political sphere and 
operates through, what Spivak refers to as, “the law of the father”. On the other hand, 
darstellen, as a form of representation, corresponds to the economic context and is 
concerned with signification and staging.25 Criticizing Foucault and Deleuze for, in 
her reading, conflating these two forms of representation in their invocation of a 
totalizing power and an undeceivable desire, Spivak argues that a more productive 
formulation for how the subject is constituted within intellectual discourse can be 
found in the way that these two forms work on each other: “The staging of the world 
in representation – its scene of writing, its darstellung – dissimulates the choice and 
need for heroes, paternal proxies, agents of power, vertretung.”26 Here Spivak clearly 
sets these two forms of representation against each other, the one form of 
representation, darstellen, is liberating while the other, vertreten, is associated with 
that which dominates and speaks for. What these differing notions enable in Spivak’s 
discourse is precisely what Foucault and Deleuze’s understanding of the subject, and 
more importantly the intellectual’s role in constituting it, disallows. She argues that in 
Foucault and Deleuze’s formulation the intellectual’s role in the constitution of the 
other is elided, or more precisely, made transparent – and, as such, the other can 
never actually be available to Foucault and Deleuze as subject.27 In her formulation, 
                                               
24 Ibid, pp 68 – 69 
25 Ibid, pp 71 and 73
26 Ibid, p 74
27 Ibid, pp 75 and 78
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however, the intellectual is viewed as a bearer of representation, vertreten, which 
must be contended with.28
Having argued that Foucault and Deleuze employ an unfractured 
understanding of the subject (the subject’s desires are what they are and its interests 
follow) and that this allows for an elision of the role of the intellectual in the 
constitution of the other (the intellectual can simply represent how the other chose to 
act – the other is free to act and therefore speak at will), she then moves to examine 
how the subaltern might be defined. At this juncture Spivak relies heavily on the work 
of the Subaltern Studies Collective and, more particularly, on that of Ranajit Guha.29
Following Guha’s argument, Spivak points out that the subaltern becomes defined as 
difference, or, as she argues in a more recent essay with regard to the term 
‘subaltern’, as “the name of the space of difference inhabited by those who have no 
access to the lines of mobility within a society.”30 As such, Spivak argues that while in 
Foucault’s discourse the postrepresentational language actually masks an 
essentialist agenda; in Subaltern Studies the claims to essentialism always denote 
heterogeneity.31 Later Spivak wi l l  argue that this holding of an essentialist 
understanding of subaltern consciousness is a strategic, deconstructive move on the 
part of the Subaltern Studies Collective.32 In this paper, however, Spivak views this 
as being somewhat problematic. She argues that a way out of the bind that Foucault, 
                                               
28 Ibid, p 84
29 Spivak is specifically drawing on the following: Ranajit Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies I: 
Writing on South Asian history and society, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982); 
Ranajit Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies II: Writings on South Asian History and Society, (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); and Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant 
Insurgency in Colonial India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).
30 Ibid, p 79; see Gayatri C. Spivak ‘From Haverstock Hill Flats to U.S. Classroom’, in Judith 
Butler et al, What’s Left of Theory?: new workon the Politics of Literary Theory, (New York; 
London: Routledge, 2000)
31 Ibid, p 80
32 See for example: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography’ (1985), in Landry, D. and Maclean G. (eds), The Spivak Reader: Selected 
Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (New York: Routeledge, 1996), this will be discussed in 
more detail later.
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Deleuze, and Guha find themselves in (the problem of a unified subject) is a theory of 
ideology, and, more particularly, a strategy for the reading of “ideological refusals”.33
  Spivak posits the notion of “measuring silences” as the most useful strategy 
for reading these refusals. Drawing on Guha’s concept of “the prose of counter 
insurgency”34 she argues that insurgency for the subaltern may be construed as a 
type of articulation as it is implicitly represented within the discourses of the elite, or, 
in the postcolonial setting, within the colonial archive.35 In presenting this reading 
Spivak is not far from Foucault’s notion of the other that becomes apparent, though 
masked, within a field of emergence. However, rather than pursuing these two 
notions together, in what in my view would be a productive manner, Spivak joins with 
what she terms Derrida’s critique of Foucault by declaring that the latter’s project is 
subsumed within a nostalgia for lost origins.36 Although Spivak effects this critique in 
a strategic move to both defend Derrida and posit deconstruction as a useful tool for 
engaging the subaltern, this critique hinges, in my view, on a misreading of 
Foucault’s understanding of emergence as denoting origin. Foucault, however, 
understands it as a conflictual interstitial space in which it may be possible to see a 
beginning but, and this is crucial, not an origin as origins denote the essence of a 
thing – which emergence does not. Despite this (strategic) misreading,37 Spivak’s 
                                               
33 Spivak, (1993: pp 81 and 82); interestingly, both Deleuze and Veyne argue that this lack of 
ideology is precisely the point. They argue, though differently and with different ends in mind, 
that Foucault’s notion of power, genealogy, and apparatus allows him to engage with life (and 
the past) without deferring to ideology and repression: Deleuze supplements Foucault’s 
refrain of “no ideology, no repression” by positing notions of lines of flight and 
deterritorialisation in order to account for desire and the possibility of resistance to power 
while Veyne emphasizes Foucault’s understanding of genealogy in such a way as to argue 
that Foucault is in fact a typical historian, just more articulate. For these two thought 
provoking essays see Paul Veyne, ‘Foucault Revolutionizes History’, tr. Catharine Porter, (pp 
146 – 182) and Gilles Deleuze, ‘Desire and Pleasure’, tr. Daniel W. Smith, (pp 183 – 192) 
both in Arnold I. Davidson (ed), Foucault and His Interlocutors, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997)
34 Ranajit Guha, ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’ in Ranajit Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies II, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp 1 – 42 
35 Spivak, (1993: p 82)
36 Ibid, p 87
37 See Mieke Bal, ‘Three-Way Misreading’, in Joan R. Resina (ed), Diacritics, volume 30, no.1 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Spring 2000) for a discussion of how Spivak 
effects strategic misreadings (and invites them) in order to create effective openings.
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argument that Foucault, due to his assertion of the subject as unfractured, slips from 
the making visible to the making vocal (because we can see the other it can also 
speak) is, in my view, crucial for postcolonial history in general.
In utilizing Derrida’s deconstructive strategies to examine the constitution of 
the subaltern, Spivak argues that what is necessary is not an ideological 
demystification but rather the realization that the European subject constitutes its 
other in an effort to preserve its own subjectivity, its inside. As such, Spivak suggests 
that while Derrida does not point out how to critique the constitution of the other, he 
does point out that this is a European problem, not a global one.38 In this regard 
Foucault’s project remains useful to Spivak in the sense that his analysis of 
disciplinisation and institutionalization is, in effect, an analysis of the constitution of 
the colonizer – the European whose problem this supposedly is.39
Furthering her discussion of the constitution of the subaltern subject, Spivak 
asks the question ‘what of the subaltern woman?’ Engaging with this question, she 
posits that there is something that occurs in the constituting of the third-world woman 
as subject that disrupts the dominant western discourses around the history of 
sexuality. It is not simply about causing the woman to lose her voice, to disappear 
into silence, but rather that, caught between tradition and modernization, the third-
world woman (read subaltern subaltern) faces “a violent aporia between subject and 
object status.”40 Spivak asserts that the subaltern (especially the third-world woman) 
cannot speak, and that intellectuals, in order to engage with the subaltern, need to 
unlearn representation (vertreten) and learn to represent (darstellen) ourselves to the 
other.41 In other words, we are being urged to learn to make our interests known in a 
politically scrupulous sense.
                                               
38 Spivak, (1993: p 89)
39 Ibid, p 90
40 Ibid, p 102
41 Ibid, p 104
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Along these lines, the recent play iMumbo Jumbo by Brett Bailey42 provides 
an interesting return – which will be threaded through the rest of this chapter – to the 
Crais/Peires affair with which this chapter opened. In this play a characterization of 
Jeff Peires – who it appears is here possibly representative of historians in general –
is kept in the background for the first three introductory scenes of the play. However, 
as the play begins to gain momentum, Peires is removed to the side of the stage and 
kept hidden under a red shroud. 
The contestatory nature of this particular historical enactment becomes even 
clearer when Peires interrupts the proceedings of the play in defence of an empirical 
history.43 This is an interruption in which the character of Peires is made to argue, 
effectively, that the “facts” of history, which are plain to anyone that can read, are 
what makes history – not the writer who in this case would be the character of 
Gcaleka. This intrusion is allowed but simultaneously rejected through the removal of 
Peires from stage in an act that, I would argue, strategically situates this historical 
enactment along the lines of what Spivak calls for above and therefore at the heart of 
what is missing in the Crais/Peires affair. Of course, this needs to be argued further 
and, as such, will be returned to later in this chapter and the next.
The Crisis of History and the Postcolonial Question
In positing her critique of Deleuze and Foucault and in extending her discussion of 
subalternity to that of the third-world woman, Spivak drew strategically from the work 
of the Subaltern Studies collective, particularly that of Ranajit Guha. In order to 
extend our discussion of the problem of identity and the writing of history to include 
that of the question of nationalism, it is necessary to return to the work of the 
                                               
42 The play forms part of a trilogy that can be found in Brett Bailey, The Plays of Miracle and 
Wonder: bewitching visions and primal high-jinx from the South African stage, (Cape Town: 
Double Storey, 2003)
43 See Bailey, (2003: p 117)
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Subaltern Studies collective, particularly an interlocutor and contributor to the 
collective’s work, Qadri Ismail. In ‘Constituting Nation, Contesting Nationalism’ 
(2000)44 Ismail is attempting to posit a critique that may assist in transcending 
something like nationalism or the larger national question. Ismail is synthesizing and 
taking further the work of Guha, Chatterjee, and Spivak, amongst others. While his 
critique of nationalism, and particularly the nine claims that he makes with regard to 
it, is especially pertinent to our current discussion, it is also necessary to place it 
within a slightly wider intellectual framework – in other words, to momentarily digress. 
Here, Frederic Jameson’s arguably unfortunate essay ‘Third-World Literature 
in the Era of Multinational Capitalism’ (1986) is particularly useful. In this paper, 
Jameson is engaging – at least on the surface – with the question of the re-
formulation/re-working of the Cultural Studies curriculum. Arguing that rethinking 
Cultural Studies necessitates an engagement with the West’s Other, namely the 
Third-World, Jameson posits the notion that this engagement should be conducted 
on the level of literature as, according to him, the very question of something like 
World Literature arises out of the breakdown of Cultural Studies.45 Importantly, 
Jameson also views the settling of this question as an opening that may allow the 
rescuing of Cultural Studies from Postmodernism. While this move allows Jameson 
to remain within the confines of his discipline, he employs a highly essentialist 
understanding of the Third-World, where Africa is “tribal” and Asia is “bureaucratic”, 
to create this opening.46 This move, however, is not all that makes his contribution 
unfortunate.
Having posited the above theory, it then becomes necessary for Jameson to 
ask the question ‘what constitutes Third-World Literature?” His response is that the 
                                               
44 Qadri Ismail, ‘Constituting Nation, Contesting Nationalism: The Southern Tamil (Woman) 
and Separatist Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka’, in Partha Chatterjee and Pradeep Jeganathon 
(eds), Subaltern Studies XI: Community,Gender and Violence, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000)
45 Frederic Jameson, ‘Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism’ in Social 
Text, No. 15, Autumn, (Duke University Press, 1986), pp 67 – 68
46 Jameson, (1986: 66 and 68)
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Third-World (and therefore Third-World literature?) is distinct from the West in a 
number of ways. One of the major distinctions is what Jameson identifies as the 
blurring between the public and private spheres, by which he means that all 
acts/writings/thinking are public and therefore political, whereas in the West this is 
apparently not the case.47 Jameson then suggests that psychology (libidinal 
investment) in the Third-World must therefore not be understood in subjective terms 
but rather in political ones. 
By positing the notion that all life, even unconscious life, is political, Jameson 
concludes that all politics in the Third-World are nationalist as a result of what he 
refers to as “the poisoned gift of independence.”48 As such, nationalism is something 
that we cannot escape in the Third-World and, according to Jameson; literature (as 
an expression of the self?) in this context becomes a form of political medicine. In 
short, Jameson argues that Third-World literature is always a form of nationalist 
(political) allegory (medicine). The insertion of allegory here, alongside nationalism, is 
important for Jameson as he contends that allegory is inherently discontinuous which 
corresponds to the reality of our “fractured selves” – a theoretical posturing that 
places him quite close to Spivak, at least briefly for the purposes of this exposition.49
Jameson doesn’t argue that no Western literature can be marked as national 
allegory, rather, he argues that Third-World literature is overtly and consciously 
nationalist allegory whereas that within the West is unconsciously so, if ever, as 
according to Jameson the West has largely done away with nationalism.50
What is important in this formulation for the purposes of this discussion is that 
it is clear that the national question is something that needs to be contended with 
(both from within and without the postcolonial third-world) in any engagement with 
the postcolonial subject. Jameson’s claim that all Third-World literature is national 
                                               
47 Ibid, p 69
48 Ibid, pp 69, 72, 81
49 Ibid, pp 69 and 73
50 Ibid, p 65
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allegory, although severely critiqued by scholars such as Aijaz Ahmed, may yet prove 
useful in highlighting a common view of the Third-World and its nationalisms (as well 
as the difficulties inherent in disciplinary reason when it comes to contending with the 
West’s other). The implications of this may best be understood by reading Jameson 
alongside Ismail’s critique.
 Ismail situates his essay explicitly along the trajectory of critical history by 
citing Guha’s notion that any critical history should include the history of the subaltern 
as the basis for the type of history being written.51 Ismail is attempting to posit a 
critique that might assist in transcending what has been termed the national question. 
The reality of the role that nationalism has played and does play in the Third-World is 
something that, I think, both Jameson and Ismail agree upon. However, whereas 
Jameson contends that this is essentially so and that the Third-World should 
therefore be viewed in these terms, Ismail argues that nationalism, always but 
particularly in the postcolonial Third-World52, is marked by a failure of promise and 
needs to be contended with. He thus commences by arguing that while it is generally 
accepted, after Anderson, that nations – and thereby nationalisms – are imagined, 
they are largely viewed as being constant once imagined. This is the notion that he is 
attempting to critique.53
For Ismail there are nine precepts or theoretical observations about 
nationalism that need to be realized as part of a critique that contends with the 
national question, a number of which will be examined here. The first, according to 
Ismail, is that nationalism is a “conservative ideology and politics”. This is not to say 
that nationalism (by which he means the process through which a citizen becomes a 
                                               
51 Ismail, (2000: p 212)
52 Importantly, drawing from Partha Chatterjee, Ismail argues that both postcolonial and 
anticolonial nationalisms share the need to emerge under serious opposition and that, as 
such, they are markedly different from European nationalisms, see pp 244 – 245 in the paper 
under discussion for more on this.
53 Ismail, (2000: p 214)
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national54) is constant but that – following from Chatterjee and Guha – nationalism is 
being constantly imagined and is in fact a “tissue of contradictions.”55
Alongside his argument that nationalism is always a conservative ideology 
and politics, Ismail suggests that nationalism can never (and never does) take its 
subjects for granted and, following from this, that the appearance of nationalism 
changes from conjuncture to conjuncture. Simply put, Ismail’s second proposition is 
that all those who are to become nationals (or who have been interpelated as such) 
are never plainly known; they must first be specified as such. Remaining within the 
logic of nationalism, considering that specifying one group must imply the non-
specification of another group, those that are specified as belonging to the nation can 
be changed according to political necessity: those that were included could be 
excluded and those that were excluded could be included. In other words, not al l 
groups within a nation are equal and those outside a nation may, according to 
political necessity, be granted equality within it.56 This logic of nationalism, outlined in 
the three precepts above, leads Ismail to state that “nation be read situationally 
[because at different moments/conjunctures nations will take on different 
appearances] and dynamically [nation can only be understood as those mobilized by 
nationalism]”.57 A key element of this situational and dynamic reading that Ismail calls 
for is Edward Said’s notion of contrapuntal reading – where opposite texts are read 
against each other and texts of a similar texture.58
What this understanding of the working of nationalism allows, according to 
Ismail, is the possibility of its subversion. If the logic of nationalism can be identified 
as a process of specification, inclusion, and exclusion, working at various 
conjunctures (in other words, as a disciplinary logic), then by focusing on how 
                                               
54 Ibid, p 230
55 Ibid, p 214; for a further discussion of this see Ranajit Guha, ‘Discipline and Mobilise’ in 
Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey (eds), Subaltern Studies VII, (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1992)
56 Ibid, p 215
57 Ibid, p 216
58 Ibid, p 244
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excluded groups intersect with the nation or, alternatively, how included groups 
become excluded allows the unraveling of something like nationalism and the 
enabling of a critique of nation.59 In this vein the inability of women to find a home in 
the nation (although Spivak disagrees with Ismail on this point)60 and the inability of 
nationalism to fulfil its promise (of freedom and equality to all) due to the fact that this 
would mean an end to exclusion and thereby an end to nationalism itself,61 both 
become key areas in which the concept of nation can be unsettled.
A crucial aspect of Ismail’s critique for our discussion of the writing of history 
is the link that he draws between nationalism and narrative, not simply as a formative 
relationship but crucially as one that is continually at work on past events. According 
to Ismail, narrative forms an integral part in the outworking of nationalism as it is 
through narrative that nationalism manages to establish its story as truth (nationalism 
always narrativizes its existence – narrative is not, however, always nationalist).62
Importantly, Ismail argues, nationalisms always seek to legitimate themselves 
through their age – as opposed to their youth – and as such History as narrative 
becomes an integral part of the working of nationalism. It is at this point that it 
becomes possible to speak of History as nationalist alibi, as the foundational 
narrative on which nations are premised. In the words of Ismail, “nationalism, and 
here it is no different to disciplinary history, continuously renarrativizes the past to 
suit the present.”63 This linking of the operation of nationalism with that of history 
where we find that history becomes one of the key vehicles whereby the above 
                                               
59 Ibid, p 216 – 217; this possibility becomes particularly interesting in our discussion as it 
shares with what John Mowitt (1992) terms an antidisciplinary critique founded on the notion 
of the working of text, which we will touch on briefly later.
60 Ibid, p 218; Spivak’s disagreement is, in my view, more semantic than anything else. She 
argues that the nation is precisely too much like a home and that it is too enabling, see 
Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘Discussion: An Afterword on the Subaltern’, in Partha Chatterjee and 
Pradeep Jeganathon (eds), Subaltern Studies XI: Community,Gender and Violence, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000)
61 Ibid, p 219; in keeping with this line of thought, Ismail later argues that, in fact, nationalisms 
can never be taken at their word, including the word of their archival record, see p 243
62 Ibid, p 221
63 Ibid, p 257 emphasis added; within this understanding all history – not just nationalist 
histories – becomes complicit, in some way, with nationalism.
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processes of nationalism are affected, is of crucial significance for the writing of 
history. According to Ismail nationalism cannot take its hegemony over its nationals 
for granted, they continually need to be interpellated by its ideology. One of the chief 
ways in which this continued hegemony (re-interpellation) is achieved is through the 
continuous narrativization of events. This constant narrativization is, importantly, not 
the rewriting of the events themselves but, rather, the rewriting of the meaning of the 
events, which Ismail argues is always done within ideological parameters.64 The 
importance of history in this scenario is simply that it becomes the ideological vehicle 
through which events are given their meanings; in short, History becomes the tool of 
domination. When Ismail is referring to history in this scenario he links it together with 
nationalism, making them complicit with each other in their mobilization of a sense of 
nostalgia, a sense which he argues no nationalism is able to escape.65
If we return to Nietzsche’s breakdown of the types and uses of history, it is 
only the monumental and the antiquarian modes of history that mobilize a sense of 
nostalgia, while the critical mode seeks to challenge this nostalgia in an attempt to 
unsettle the status quo. The strategic alignment with critical history effected by Ismail 
allows us to argue that the critical use of history – and this would include Foucault’s 
understanding of genealogy and emergence as they dissipate any quest for the origin 
– is the most useful for writing postcolonial histories as it lends itself to the critique of 
nationalism.  
Finally, in positing this notion of history being utilized to continuously re-
interpellate citizens into the nation, Ismail steers clear of establishing this process as 
a totalizing power against which there can be no resistance. Rather, he argues that 
there are always multiple interpellations at work, not simply the re-interpellation of 
citizens as nationals, but the interpellation of citizens/people as resistant to becoming 
nationals. According to Ismail, a notion of performativity (role playing/darstellen) is 
                                               
64 Ibid, pp 254 and 257
65 Ibid, pp 251 and 280 – 282 
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useful for engaging with these multiple interpellations as, he argues, performativity 
flouts nationalism.66
In the argument thus far I have looked at both the broader implications of how 
history runs up against a problem of representation and, more specifically, on the 
problems of identity and nationalism. It is perhaps necessary to briefly present an 
overview of this argument before we move on. In Foucault’s reworking of Nietzsche’s 
argument in the light of his Genealogy of Morals, we saw that Foucault argues that 
genealogy is the type of history that allows for tracing the effects of power on the 
body and for tracking the emergence of regimes – a process through which one 
could observe, though masked, the presence of the other. 
Spivak’s response to Foucault’s position was then highlighted by engaging 
with her argument that the nature of representation in Western intellectual traditions 
is responsible for the inability of these same traditions to access the other as such. 
Focusing on a discussion between Deleuze and Foucault, Spivak argued that 
through their reliance on an unfractured subject, they conflate the difference between 
vertreten and darstellen and claim that since the other/subaltern can be seen, it can 
also speak. Spivak contests this notion arguing that it is a misunderstanding of 
representation and the nature of the subject and suggests that a theory of ideology 
and, specifically, a strategy for reading ideological refusals could be a possible 
solution to Foucault, Deleuze, and Guha’s dilemma. Shifting focus slightly, 
Jameson’s view of the third-world, and particularly his essentialised understanding of 
third-world literature as nationalist allegory, was brought into play with Ismail’s 
understanding of nationalism, recently outlined above. In his article Ismail examined 
the logic of nationalism, presented a number of intriguing insights/precepts for 
understanding and critiquing nationalism, and then presented a number of strategies 
for reading nation – namely, contrapuntal reading and paying attention to what he 
terms “performativity”.
                                               
66 Ibid, pp 239 and 279
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It is now necessary to turn to some strategies for writing history that attempt 
to approach the process in such a way as to contend with these problems outlined 
above. A strategy of writing the history of specifically postcolonial Africa that I would 
argue, through the utilization of the concept of a self-styling subject, is located 
between Ismail and Jameson, is that of Achille Mbembe.67 His strategy sets itself up 
in opposition to much poststructural work for ignoring the materiality of discourse and 
thereby reducing the majority of struggles in Africa to problems/struggles over 
representation. In setting out his argument Mbembe begins by positing the notion 
that Africa represents the problem of the other for the west and that, as such, it is the 
foil through which the west’s identity is constituted. According to Mbembe, Africa 
fulfils this role of ‘the foil’ through embodying everything that the west is not, in other 
words, through becoming the negative of the west – what he terms the embodiment 
of its fascination with nothingness – and thereby being equated with nothingness 
itself.68 In situating his argument in this way Mbembe argues that the real problem for 
writing history, specifically in postcolonial Africa, is that Africa is entrapped within this 
web of nothingness, which first needs to be contended with before any fruitful work 
on postcolonial Africa can be done.69
A crucial factor in contending with this web of nothingness, according to 
Mbembe, is that African subjects must be recognized as both performing meaningful 
acts and as constituting the social relations that attribute meaning to them. As such, 
a key factor in his project – and indeed in his book – is the identification of sites 
where meaning is imbued and identifying where/how meaning is constituted.70
Although an integral part of his project is the contestation of the way in which many 
disciplines write Africa, disciplines which he argues mainly arose out of Western 
Modernism, Mbembe does not view Western Modernism as the focus of his dispute 
                                               
67 Achille Mbembe, On The Postcolony, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp 5 
– 6 
68 Mbembe, (2001: pp 3 – 4)
69 Ibid, p 4 – 6 
70 Ibid, p 7
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but, rather, he argues that the dispute must l ie with the promises of the 
Enlightenment and what it claims to give us, an argument that places him quite close 
to much poststructural theory and specifically to Foucault.71
In order to tackle these problems (of the Enlightenment and nothingness), 
and so as not to act as though the 19th century hasn’t taken place, Mbembe argues 
that, firstly, Africa needs to be approached within a global perspective and that a 
critical reading of western history is required and, secondly, that one must not ask the 
question of what it means to be African – as this immediately sets one outside of the 
dominant discourses. Finally, Mbembe argues that “Africa must be viewed as an 
entanglement” (caught in a web of times, disciplines, philosophies, and differing 
metaphysical understandings) which forms the time in which the African subject 
lives.72 Having posited this theory of entanglement – which immediately makes it 
impossible to speak of anything like an essentialised African subject – Mbembe then 
continues to argue for a different understanding of time within this entanglement, 
where time itself is entangled in a web that may allow for its own reversal. Interesting 
and productive as these questions are, Mbembe’s reliance on a self-styling subject (a 
subject that exists in this web of entanglement but as separate to it) places his 
argument in close proximity to that of Deleuze and Foucault earlier and therefore 
susceptible to Spivak’s critique that was brought into play above.
Furthering this discussion it is useful to turn once again to Spivak’s 
interventions, specifically her engagement with the work of the Subaltern Studies 
collective, as it will allow us to both specify a different strategy for writing history as 
well as to provide a strategic reading of Bailey’s play that was briefly discussed 
above. In her highly influential paper ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography’ (1985) Spivak reflects on the work of the Subaltern Studies collective 
in an effort to demonstrate its deconstructive nature and to thereby open up a 
                                               
71 Ibid, pp 9 and 11; on his proximity to Foucault on this point see Michel Foucault, ‘What is 
Enlightenment’ in Paul Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, (London: Penguin Books, 1984)
72 Ibid, pp 9 and 14
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possible strategy for, in a sense, righting the place of women in dominant historical 
discourse – a move that, according to Spivak, the collective falls short of.73 In staging 
this reading of the collective’s work, Spivak first discusses the collective’s reading 
strategy. According to Spivak the collective’s project could be defined as being “a 
theory of reading in the strictest sense”, where history or the social -text – which 
Spivak argues does not amount to the reduction of life to a leaf in a book – is viewed 
as a continuous sign chain that, as such, can therefore be broken.74 In other words, a 
theory of reading that utilizes a concept of text and parabasis.75 Although the
collective do not articulate their work in this manner – they state that they are working 
on a theory of subaltern consciousness – Spivak argues that this is a useful way to 
think of the “discursive displacements” which the group focus on in their reading (for 
example, Guha’s prose of counter insurgency) as it allows one to view the 
Collective’s work as constituting a theory of change that brings “hegemonic 
historiography to crisis.”76 Of course, it also allows Spivak to situate the collective 
within a poststructural vein of theory. 
Aligning the collective with poststructuralism becomes especially useful to 
Spivak when she focuses on the collective’s deployment of subaltern consciousness. 
Although the collective claims to simply use subaltern consciousness (it is there, it is 
not fractured), Spivak argues that there are elements in their work that indicate 
otherwise. One of these elements, according to Spivak, is the collective’s 
engagement with subaltern consciousness as a “political species of consciousness”, 
one that is only available as a trace – as a negative consciousness that is always 
                                               
73 Spivak, (1985: 227)
74 Ibid, pp 206 – 207 
75 Gayatri C. Spivak’s, ‘From Haverstock Hill Flat to U.S. Classroom, What’s Left of Theory?’ 
in Judith Butler, John Guillory and Kendall Thomas (eds), What’s Left of Theory: New Work 
on the Politics of Literary Theory, (New York and London: Routledge, 2000) and John 
Mowitt’s, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object, (Durham and London: Duke 
University press, 1992) are useful engagements with reading within these and will form a 
central line of argument for the following chapter.
76 Ibid, pp 206 – 208 
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skewed and partially unavailable.77 As such, Spivak argues, subaltern consciousness 
is only available through the text of elite consciousness, in other words, the tracking 
of subaltern consciousness becomes the tracking of a subaltern subject effect (as 
opposed to a wholly constituted subaltern consciousness) within the narratives of the 
elite. The alignment that Spivak proposes is not simply of strategic importance to her; 
rather, she argues that if the collective’s use of subaltern consciousness is not 
deconstructive then, through deploying the notion of subaltern consciousness 
literally, the collective is merely replicating the dominant hegemonic historiography by 
objectifying the subaltern.78
Spivak suggests that the collective draws much of its energy from the 
European critique of humanism and, especially, from the work of Foucault, 
Nietzsche, and Barthes – although she argues that the subaltern studies collective 
departs from this movement by strategically relying on a whole subject, which the 
European critique challenges.79 Focusing specifically on Foucault’s work, she argues 
that although it is limited to the European subject, and in fact insulates it, his work is 
useful in opening up possibilities for postcolonial, feminist, subaltern studies when we 
realize that a form of the powers that Foucault identifies are also at work in the 
postcolonial world.80 Having made this argument, Spivak argues that through 
refusing to effect an abdication in terms of representing the subaltern through 
remaining “committed to the subaltern as the subject of his history”, the Subaltern 
Studies Collective manages to reveal the limit of the European critique of 
humanism.81
Operating strategically then, it becomes possible to re-read Bailey’s iMumbo 
Jumbo in a more interesting and political light than viewing it as simply effecting a 
                                               
77 Ibid, p 211
78 Ibid, pp 210 and 217
79 Ibid, p 210; this despite the fact that earlier in ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’ Spivak criticized 
Foucault for relying on a whole subject.
80 Ibid, p 219 – 221 
81 Ibid, p 218
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refusal/rejection of history that uses essentialist depictions of Africans and African 
pasts.82 Rather, reading the treatment and ultimate removal of Peires in the play as a 
kind of self-conscious internal parabasis – in other words, as a deliberate interruption 
of the form by the meaning – it is possible to view the play as operating a strategic 
essentialism of the kind that Spivak calls for above which may allow an alternate 
rendering of history that deals with subjects as fractured (the subjects in the play are 
not unified, there are competing interpellations taking place) and thereby offers a 
resistance to the dominant modes of writing history. This reading will be taken further 
in the following chapter, particularly in relation to Mowitt’s understanding of the text 
and with a further reading of the concept of parabasis.
Coming back to what I have termed the Peires/Crais affair in the light of the 
above, it is possible to argue that the debate is symptomatic of the crisis within the 
discipline of history on a number of levels. One level at which this debate is 
symptomatic is in the reduction of the problem of writing history in postapartheid 
South Africa that is guided by the authority of the archive. Through attempting to 
reduce the problem in this way, as opposed to engaging with it as Spivak does, both 
Crais and Peires fail to recognize and contend with the politics of representation. A 
further level on which this debate is symptomatic – although on a more implicit level –
is the manner in which it perpetuates the pervasive notions of South African 
exceptionalism, a perspective that is reinforced through Crais’ notion that the 
discipline of history in South Africa is a microcosm of the discipline globally.
More importantly, through neglecting the politics of representation both Crais 
and Peires serve to simultaneously entrench the unified subject of the intellectual as 
well as the disciplinary mode of writing history whereby the subaltern is maintained 
and excluded as such. In other words, by attempting to reduce the problems to 
                                               
82 This was argued by Helen Bradford, ‘Review’, in Andrew Bank (ed), Kronos: Journal of 
Cape History, vol. 30, November 2004, Special Issue: Eastern Cape
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simply that of the archive both Peires and Crais can be said to (in Crais’ words) “miss
the point”. 
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On Textuality
Academic discourse … possesses an extraordinary ability to 
absorb, digest, and neutralise all of the key, radical, or 
dramatic moments of thought, particularly, a fortiori, of 
contemporary thought.
Julia Kristeva1
Irony is not just an interruption, it is … the ‘permanent 
parabasis’ …. irony is the permanent parabasis of the 
allegory of tropes.
Paul de Man2
The removal of a proxy of the historian Jeff Peires in Brett Bailey’s widely acclaimed 
iMumbo Jumbo sparked a heated review of Bailey’s collection of plays by another 
historian, Helen Bradford.3 Bradford expresses disdain at the treatment of Peires and 
reads this as an example of Bailey’s at best indifference if not outright hostility to 
what she terms “professional historians”.4 What is intriguing in this review is the way 
in which Bradford clearly feels obliged to read The Plays of Miracle and Wonder as 
constituting an attack on or, perhaps more pointedly, a dismissal of the discipline of 
history as such. However, if we place this review in the context of an earlier critique 
that Bradford levelled at a plethora of Eastern Cape historians, particularly Jeff 
Peires,5 then we might be able to offer a different reading. It would require us to ask 
why Bradford characterises Bailey’s plays in this particular way rather than reading 
them into her own critique. Bradford’s earlier critique is both relevant to the current 
                                               
1 Julia Kristeva, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Polis’ tr. Margaret Waller, in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed), 
The Politics of Interpretation, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 
p 83
2 Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, in Andrzej Warminski (ed), Theory and History of 
Literature, Vol. 65, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp 178 –
179
3 Helen Bradford, ‘Review’, in Andrew Bank (ed), Kronos: Journal of Cape History, vol. 30, 
November 2004, Special Issue: Eastern Cape, pp 230 – 234 
4 Bradford, (2004: p 230) 
5 This critique can be found in Helen Bradford, ‘Women, Gender, and Colonialism: Rethinking 
the History of the British Cape Colony and Its Frontier Zones, C. 1806 – 70’ in The Journal of 
African History, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1996), 351 – 370. 
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discussion and pertinent to the following chapters and therefore needs to be looked 
at more seriously before an answer to the above question can be suggested.
In ‘Women, Gender, and Colonialism: Rethinking the History of the British 
Cape Colony and Its Frontier Zones, C. 1806 – 70’ Bradford argues for a “rethinking” 
of history that incorporates the broadly ignored or knowingly elided (through a 
conceptual denial) category of women. She argues that this should be done not 
simply through an inclusion (writing about women) but rather through a process of 
utilising gender as a key concept for understanding history – a process that she 
argues could have great potential in altering our view of the past.6 The works of Jeff 
Peires, Clifton Crais and Noel Mostert form the basis of Bradford’s critique as it 
pertains to Eastern Cape history in general. But she treats Peires’ work on the so-
named “great Xhosa cattle-killing” (which both Jeff Guy and Bradford argue is a 
particularly androcentric and misleading term7) as symptomatic of ‘androcentric’ 
tendencies in South African historiography.8 In these histories Bradford argues that 
“men are largely [represented as] gender neutral, conceptualised not as men but as 
people, linked with categories like economics, politics or race. On the other hand, 
women are [represented as] gendered beings, with an implicit or explicit emphasis on 
their sexual attributes and their familial relations with men.”9 In other words, women 
are not absent as figures; they are absent as agents.
Utilising The Dead will Arise to set to work, Bradford embarks on her critique 
through offering a re-reading of the role of Nongqawuse in the ‘cattle-killing’ episode. 
In her reading Bradford argues that Nongqawuse’s prophecies need to be 
                                               
6 Bradford, (1996: pp 351 – 353)
7 See Jeff Guy, ‘A landmark not a Breakthrough’ in South African Historical Journal, 25, 
(1991), pp 229 - 231
8 Bradford, (1996: p 353 and pp 360 – 368); the key texts that Bradford critiques are Jeff 
Peires, The Dead will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing of 1856-7, 
(Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1989); Clifton Crais, The Making of the Colonial Order: White 
Supremacy and Black Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1770 – 1865, (Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1992); and Noel Mostert, Frontiers, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1992)
9 ibid, p 356
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understood as gendered entries into an “era of gender and generational turmoil”.10 In 
other words, Nongqawuse’s prophecies are significant in that they mark the nature of 
relations between genders and generations at that time and in that they could be 
read as constituting an entry, an enactment, of women’s perspectives on these 
issues. According to Bradford, however, Peires deliberately removes gender as a 
basis for analysing this history and thereby makes the story into one of “a black 
man’s oppression by the colonial order.”11 The key to Peires’  move is  h is 
understanding of Nongqawuse’s uncle Mhlakaza as being one of the central actors in 
the ‘cattle-killing’, which is, according to Bradford, premised on Peires’ assertion that 
Mhlakaza and a certain William Goliath (an Anglican convert who worked with the 
Archdeacon Merriman) are in fact the very same person. This assertion, which Peires 
presents as incontrovertible, is in Bradford’s view based on unsubstantiated 
conjecture – even though it is uncritically replicated in the work of Mostert and 
Crais.12 More than this, Bradford argues that the manner in which Peires (and Crais 
does not escape this criticism) does characterise Nongqawuse amounts to what she 
terms a reproduction of “rape myth in scholarly form”.13
Jeff Peires added an ‘afterword’ to the reissue of The Dead will Arise in 2003 
in which he addresses some of the criticisms levelled at it. Responding to Bradford’s 
critique, Peires argues that the sources which Bradford utilises are not that reliable –
either being oral evidence collected 30 years after the event or having been recorded 
in official depositions that had explicit political ends – and he argues that she is not 
interested in the facts, which he claims the historian should interpret objectively, but 
rather in applying a modern ideological perspective – that of feminism – to the past. 
                                               
10 ibid, p 362
11 ibid, p 365; Jeff Guy argues a similar point to that of Bradford, see Guy, (1991: p 230)
12 ibid, p 365; importantly, Bradford is not alone in her critique of Peires on this point. See N. 
C. Tisani, ‘Peires, Pathbreaker’, p 235 and Andrew Manson, ‘An Imaginative Exploration of 
the World of the Xhosa’, p 241, both in South African Historical Journal, Vol. 25, (1991). See 
FN 100 on p 367 in Bradford’s essay for her argument that Crais and Mostert uncritically 
assimilate this link.
13 ibid, p 367; in FN 101 on this same page Bradford implicitly implicates Crais alongside 
Peires in reproducing these myths.
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In short, Peires makes light of her critique by dismissing it as being historically weak 
and, somewhat unqualified, as feminist.14
Returning to Bradford’s critique of Bailey’s plays, it is noteworthy that 
Bradford chooses to read the removal of Peires from stage as an act of dismissing 
the discipline of history rather than as an act of removing that very notion of history 
that she so vehemently critiqued and which she made Peires representative of only a 
few years earlier. While the source of this may well lie with Bradford’s broader 
reading of the anti-woman overtones in the first of Bailey’s plays in this trilogy, I 
would like to argue that there may be more to it. Particularly, I would argue that what 
occurs in these plays – in part through the dismissal of Peires – is that the difference 
between the disciplines of history and literature is being made indeterminate while 
simultaneously denying the reduction of the one to the other. In other words, what is 
occurring in these historical plays is that the discipline of history is being made to 
contend with its own textuality. It is this unsettling effect that Bradford responds to so 
vehemently as, I would argue; it threatens history’s very disciplinarity. 
In the previous chapter, the possible productivity of the theory of the text was 
broached in relation to questions of the representation of the subject and the crisis of 
history. Here the textuality of history has been brought into focus as something that, 
at least to Bradford, constitutes a problem for the discipline. Considering that the 
question of representation has been dealt with at length in the first chapter, I will here 
focus particularly on history’s relation to textuality, later affecting a return to discuss 
the productivity of the theory of text for the question of representation. This is not a 
new question for the discipline of history – it has manifested in what I would call 
history’s linguistic and literary turns. However, both these lines of inquiry have 
                                               
14 see Jeff Peires, ‘Afterword’ in The Dead will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa 
Cattle-Killing movement of 1856-7, (Jeppestown: Jonathon Ball, 2003) pp362 – 363; Peires in 
fact refers to Bradford as “the feminist” in his response to her. Interestingly in the light of the 
disagreement between Crais and Peires discussed in the previous chapter, Peires finds it 
bizarre that Bradford would take him to task on an etymological point with regard to the Xhosa 
language – a move that he clearly considers to be petty and pointless.
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faltered on the question of representation through their respective withdrawals into 
disciplinarity. As such, I will first examine these two and their critiques before positing 
what I think to be a more productive understanding of text for the question of 
representation.
History’s Linguistic Turn
According to John Toews the ‘linguistic turn’ in history occurred during a shift from 
‘ideas’ to ‘meaning’ in the domain of intellectual history.15 Toews argues, drawing 
heavily on Bowsma, that this shift was made necessary as rational consciousness 
was no longer viewed as the pinnacle of human thought. It was also argued that this 
shift could allow a transcending of the polar divide between thought and reality, a 
consequence of which would be the end of feuds between different specialisations 
and disciplines as well as requiring the emergence of a dialogic relationship with 
other disciplines. Of course, the suggestion that all this would place the intellectual 
historian at the centre of academic work was an influential factor. According to 
Toews, this shift required a ‘linguistic turn’ of the sort initiated by the rise of 
semiotics.16
While Toews indicates that this shift resulted in a greater confidence within 
the specialisation of intellectual history, he argues that this did not result in the 
ending of disciplinary feuds but merely in their shifting according to the type of 
linguistic turn that was affected. In the discipline of history, he argues, the linguistic 
turn resulted in a split between, on the one side, those that take the semiotic and 
symbolic nature of the turn to its extreme and, on the other, those that do not take it 
                                               
15 John E. Toews, ‘Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and 
the Irreducibility of Experience’, in American Historical Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, October, 1987, 
p 879; what makes Toews’ article particularly useful is that it is written in the form of a review 
of many of the major works associated with the linguistic turn in history.
16 Toews, (1987: pp 879 – 881) Toews draws specifically from William J. Bowsma, 
‘Intellectual History in the 1980s: From History of Ideas to History of Meaning,’ in Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, No. 12, (Autumn 1981)
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that seriously. The effect of the former, according to Toews, for the discipline of 
history is that “historiography [is] reduced to a subsystem of linguistic signs 
constituting its object, ‘the past’, according to the rules pertaining in the ‘prison house 
of language’ inhabited by the historian”.17 Having clearly taken his cue from Jameson 
in his criticism of the former Toews argues that the majority of historians tend to opt 
for the latter and rather historicise the past, thereby making it (apparently) irreducible 
to language. This is a pertinent discussion that will be returned to later in the chapter; 
first however, it is necessary to briefly indicate the implications of the linguistic turn as 
Toews sees it.
The first implication of the linguistic turn is the re-evaluation of what Toews 
terms the “text context problem”. He brings this problem into relief through an 
engagement with La Capra’s and Chartier’s proposed revision of the ‘Annales 
School’ (what Toews refers to as “socio-cultural history”), principally with their 
argument that historical evidence is not reducible to socio-economic models.18 Here 
Toews suggests that La Capra and Chartier are arguing for a mode of reading that is 
both a critical and a creative action, in other words, a mode that engages with a 
reading as text (a reading that has the residue of other readings and their meanings 
in it, both explicitly and as a trace) and a mode that multiplies meanings without ever 
‘arriving’ (a continuous play of meaning). What this mode of reading would allow for 
La Capra and Chartier is the deconstruction of “creation-reception” and “production-
consumption” binaries that, in turn, necessitate a questioning of the “binary 
opposition between elite and popular culture”.19 This, Toews suggests, would amount 
to a fundamental critique of socio-cultural history.
At this point Toews does not have a problem with La Capra and Chartier as 
he reads them as redefining what meaning is and how it is arrived at. It is when La 
Capra and Chartier take their reasoning further that Toews becomes uncomfortable.  
                                               
17Toews, (1987: p 882)
18 ibid, p 883
19 ibid, pp 883 – 885
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For La Capra and Chartier the above also necessitates a critique of the opposition 
between representation and reality. They argue that in socio-cultural history meaning 
is derived from an extra-linguistic reality whereas, in their view, meaning in fact 
constitutes reality.20 An implication of this – of context being a particular type of text 
as it is constituted out of “complex relations of signifying practices”, as is a text21 – is
that historical evidence, as that which is used to make meaning, must be viewed as 
being both “documentary” (it is imbued with meanings) and as “work-like” (it also 
gives/makes meanings).22 Toews suggests that this would amount to a semiological 
history.
This “semiological history” may make it impossible, according to Toews, to 
avoid what he calls the “pitfalls of representation” without in fact doing away with 
history. In other words, Toews argues that this theory of the “linguistic density” of 
historical evidence has outlived its usefulness, as it seems to problematise the very 
foundations of the discipline.23 Instead of relying on semiotic theory to such an extent 
(and to such an end) he suggests that what is needed is an understanding of the 
“complexity of mediated connections between [individual] experience and meaning” 
that would allow an engagement with the new analysis of meaning construction while 
allowing the “cultural sphere” to be “set aside as autonomous”.24 According to Toews, 
this could be achieved through an effective use of the concept of discourse, thereby 
bringing us to what he views as the second implication of the linguistic turn for the 
discipline of history, namely, that discourse becomes the organising term for the 
conception and practice of history.25
While Toews acknowledges that a form of discourse based, at least loosely, 
on Foucault was made available to the American academy by Mark Poster he 
                                               
20 ibid, p 885
21 ibid, p 886
22 ibid, p 885
23 ibid, p 886
24 ibid, p 888
25 ibid, p 889
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suggests that a more productive understanding of discourse than Foucault’s –
particularly to the ends outlined above – can be found in the work of J. G. A. Pocock, 
in which three elements of discourse are identified.26 The first of these is that 
discourse contains a structural dimension that is stable and constituted out of a 
number of “languages” (these “embody the rules that … [determine] what counts as 
reality and [limit] the possible ways in which realities can be connected”27) that can 
be operating at any one time. For Toews, the historian’s task then becomes the 
identification of these “languages” so that they can be applied to all texts and 
contexts. A second factor of discourse, according to Toews’ reading of Pocock, is 
that of speech acts by which he means those events in language that manipulate the 
structural dimension of discourse so as to transform it. It is this interplay between 
form and speech (“structure and action”) that Toews argues is actually the mark of 
discourse.28 Thirdly, Toews suggests that for Pocock discourse can only be 
understood within a concept of the relationship of language and experience where 
language is understood as “an inherited inventory of constituted patterns of meaning” 
and where experience is viewed as being situated within its own history. In other 
words, discourse (and Toews finds this particularly useful) needs to be viewed as the 
primary operating element in the interaction between meaning and experience.29
Understanding discourse in this light is useful for Toews in that it allows him 
to argue, drawing on Martin Jay’s discourse analysis of western Marxism, that 
historical understanding needs to contend with both meaning and experience; in 
                                               
26 ibid, pp 890 – 892; Toews’ dislike for Foucault’s understandings of discourse follows from 
his reading of Allan Megill’s Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) where Megill argues that their theories are 
incapable of engaging with the real world and that to take them literally would be madness. 
This criticism, Toews argues, hinges on experience – something that he thinks should be a 
key element of historical understanding. See Toews, (1987: pp 893 – 897) for his reading of 
Megill.
27 ibid, p 891
28 ibid, p 891
29 ibid, p 892
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other words, it needs to contend with the “everyday lived individual”.30 More than this, 
it also allows history to be situated – to some extent – at the centre of academic 
inquiry, as discourses cannot be understood separate to the historical constructions 
of meaning and experience that they negotiate. Toews argues that the historian 
should be viewed as the empiricist who can moderate theory. He argues this by 
reading Skinner’s The Return of Grand Theory as an indication of the consequences 
of theory and Hollinger’s In the American Province as providing a strategy through 
which the historian can moderate this effect.31 This strategy requires the historian to 
hold on to a number of key principles in the face of theory, namely: that thinking is a 
historical act that takes place within events and structures that are mediated by 
discourses, that the articulation of arguments is historically significant, and finally that 
the historian’s voice becomes distinct and meaningful within a specific community of 
inquiry.32
In short, for Toews, the ‘linguistic turn’ is useful to the discipline of history in 
that it allows a rethinking of the concept of meaning. However, before the unsettling 
effects of history’s textuality – which it is forced to face through the ‘linguistic turn’ –
can be brought to bear on the discipline, discourse – as that which operates the 
space between meaning and experience – needs to be included as a primary 
interpretive category in historical inquiry. According to Toews, this allows the 
maintenance of the individual as the true object of history and it situates the historian 
at the centre of critical academic inquiry. This shift to experience as a foundational 
category for history is not unique to the North American context in which Toews is 
writing; it also lies at the core of much radical social history in South Africa from the 
mid-70s to the present. This vein of writing history can, I think, generally be viewed 
                                               
30 ibid, p 897; importantly, this “individual” is to be understood as free and able to act. While 
Toews does seem to argue that this individual is caught within a web of meanings and 
experience, he nevertheless works on the assumption that this individual is unproblematically 
there and can speak – an understanding that an encounter with the problem of representation 
in postcoloniality, as was indicated in the previous chapter, quickly unsettles.
31 Ibid, pp 898 – 905; 
32 ibid, p 904
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as the dominant mode of writing history in this country and therefore deserves some 
comment.
Belinda Bozzoli and Peter Delius’s ‘Radical History and South African 
History’33 provides an overview of the emergence of what has been termed “radical 
history” in South Africa. What is of particular interest in this piece is the manner in 
which the category of experience is utilised as a bridge that makes possible the 
synthesis of leftist work in the academy and ‘popular’ uprisings in the 70s and 80s.34
In constructing this history, Bozzoli and Delius place a strong emphasis on the impact 
of what they term the “indigenous left” on the development of radical history as well 
as forwarding the category of experience as allowing the historian access to this 
newly “re-emergent” expression of human agency.35
A mode of historical writing that, according to Bozzoli and Delius, began its 
rise to credency during that time is that of the biography.36 Ciraj Rassool, in his PhD 
dissertation The individual, auto/biography and history in South Africa (2004) argues 
how this actually comes to constitute what he refers to as a “biographic order” that 
has set the tone for the writing of history in a postapartheid South Africa.37 While 
these histories tend to focus on leading figures such as Oliver Tambo or Nelson 
Mandela; Charles van Onselen, in his The Seed is Mine (1996)38, has written what 
might be construed in social history terms as a biography from below. Although the 
book’s framing leaves us with little doubt that it is also to be read as a history of van 
Onselen as historian39, it is an intriguing (though sometimes narratively painful) telling 
                                               
33 Belinda Bozzoli and Peter Delius, ‘Radical History and South African History’ in Josh Brown 
et al (eds), History from South Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices, (Philadephia: Temple 
University Press, 1991)
34 Bozzoli and Delius, (1992: p 21)
35 ibid, pp 12 – 13 and 21 – 23
36 ibid, p 19
37 Ciraj Rassool, The individual, auto/biography and history in South Africa, PhD Thesis, 
Department of History, University of the Western Cape, 2004 (unpublished)
38 Charles van Onselen, The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African 
Sharecropper, 1894 – 1985, (Cape Town: David Phillip, 1996)
39 See particularly the ‘Preface and Acknowledgements’ (v – xi) and Kas’ funeral on pp 531 –
532, for this framing. This interpretation also allows a different reading of the main title “the 
seed is mine”.
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of the events that surrounded and constituted the life of Kas Maine. For its flow of 
narrative this book has relied explicitly on the category of experience as its 
evidentiary resource (and the historian’s apparently unproblematic ability to reflect 
this) and on the enforcing of the distinction between history and historiography 
(practice and theory) that the work of someone like Dominique LaCapra has 
consistently sought to collapse.
This reliance on the category of experience for the writing of history, both in 
how it has been utilised by Toews above and in the South African context, has been 
criticised in recent years. Particularly, the notion that the category of experience fixes 
the identity of those being represented has been at the centre of these criticisms. 
Joan Scott, in a discussion of ‘Experience’,40 provides a lucid reading of the role of 
experience in the writing of what she calls “histories of difference”. Scott argues that 
generally within these histories – and particularly in her discussion of Delaney – the 
making visible becomes privileged as it is thought to break the silence of previously 
excluded subjects and, following this, writing becomes the scene of this production of 
visibility.41
This inclusionary process, according to Scott, which is heavily reliant on 
experience for its validity, has genuinely amounted to a critique of what she terms 
“normative history”. This move towards experience has generally been well received 
in the discipline due to its reliance on experience as an ultimate referential form of 
evidence, in short, due to its affirmation of history’s claim to represent reality – the 
task that Toews puts it to in his article discussed above. However, it is this very 
reliance on experience that, for Scott, removes the critical dimension of these 
histories of difference, as experience becomes the fact of difference and its 
                                               
40 Joan W. Scott, ‘Experience’ in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize 
the Political, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) pp 22 – 40; for a pertinent discussion 
of the problematic use of the category of experience in radical history in the South African 
context, see Nicky Roussea, Popular history in South Africa in the 1980s: The politics of 
production, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of the Western Cape, 1994, 
particularly chapter 3 (unpublished)
41 Scott, (1992, p 24)
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construction is elided.42 As such, “the evidence of experience, whether conceived 
through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as 
transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems”.43 Therefore, 
Scott argues that our focus should rather be on how subjects are constituted through 
experience; we should explain experience, not use it as a basis for explanation.44
Simply indicating the difficulties with the category of experience for the writing 
of history is, for Scott, not adequate. Rather, considering that history can be 
construed as a foundational discipline par excellence, it is necessary to investigate 
how experience operates as a foundation.45 In other words, it is necessary to ask 
how experience is used and to what ends it is used as a basis for the writing of 
history. According to Scott, experience establishes the prior existence of individuals 
thereby making them into the starting point of knowledge. As such, it operates within 
an ideological system that “naturalises difference” and, through operating as a 
foundation, makes history into a system of the same.46 The uses to which the 
category of experience is put in the writing of history are manifold: Firstly, one of the 
primary uses according to Scott is that experience serves to specify the limit of what 
she calls “post-structural histories” (the manner in which Toews utilises experience in 
his ‘Intellectual History’ is characteristic of this); Secondly, following from 
Collingwood’s The Idea of History, experience is used to separate the historian from 
her work, thereby guaranteeing the notion of her objectivity and grounding the 
researcher’s identity as a historian; and finally, following from Scott’s reading of E. P. 
Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class, experience is used to grant 
agency to individuals which is expected to result in social class.47
                                               
42 ibid, pp 24 – 25
43 ibid, p 25
44 ibid, p 26
45 ibid, p 26
46 ibid, p 27
47 ibid, pp 27 – 30
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Scott critiques the latter, arguing that the notion of the subjection of human 
agency is not taken into account in the concept of experience. She also argues that 
experience masks both how identities are constituted and its own discursive nature.48
In critiquing the first use of experience, she turns to a reading of John Toews’ 
‘Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn’. 
Scott argues that in Toews, the linguistic turn is reduced simply to the study of 
meaning and that the discipline of history is taken to be concerned with explanation. 
In other words, the discipline of history cannot be fundamentally shaken by the 
linguistic turn, as its field of interest is broader than that which Toews argues the 
linguistic turn is limited to.49 As I argued earlier, Toews understands the broader 
concern of history to be the relationship between meaning and experience that he 
argues is mediated through discourse. Scott critiques this formulation by Toews on 
the basis that in attempting to protect experience from what he would term relativism, 
he refuses to define experience, thereby masking its constituted nature and 
establishing it as a foundational concept. This, according to Scott, works to mask the 
historian’s role in the production of knowledge, thereby securing the historian as a 
unified subject while obscuring her role in the constitution of other subjects.50
Furthermore, in Toews as in Collingwood, experience serves as a guarantee of 
objectivity. A consequence of this is that experience works as a starting point for 
historical inquiry and as a kind of pre-made interpretation that works to fundamentally 
limit what can be said in history.51
Scott demands that we historicise experience in a manner that transforms the 
manner through which the category is constituted into the actual object of historical 
inquiry. For Scott this would amount to a “reading for the literary” where all categories 
(whether class, race, or gender) need to be viewed as being “contextual, contested, 
                                               
48 ibid, pp 30 – 31
49 ibid, p 32
50 ibid, p 32; At this point Scott’s critique of Toews is very close to Spivak’s critique of 
Foucault and Deleuze in the previous chapter.
51 ibid, p 33
 
 
 
 
54
and contingent”.52 Thus Scott argues that the focus of history should be on the 
history of foundationalist concepts which, she argues, is what Foucault argues for in 
his ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. In other words, in order to write a non-
foundational history, Scott suggests that “the study of experience … must call into 
question its originary status in historical explanation.”53 Although she suggests that 
her argument does not “undercut politics”54, the emphasis on the making visible in 
Scott’s argument places it in close proximity to that of Foucault and Deleuze 
(discussed in the previous chapter) and may make it susceptible to Spivak’s critique 
of the latter. In any case, Scott’s critique of Toews and the use of experience makes 
it clear that the restriction of the linguistic turn to meaning and the defensive embrace 
of the category of experience is not useful for writing postcolonial histories.
White’s Literary Turn
In the discussion of Toews’ paper, it was noted that his restriction of the ‘linguistic 
turn’, through the utilisation of the category of experience, was effected in response 
to another unfolding of the ‘linguistic turn’ in history; a thread that was developed by 
those who Toews argues take the semiotic and symbolic nature of the turn to its 
extreme. The work of Hayden White has been most strongly associated with this 
second thread and will form the basis for my discussion here. White’s work, though 
not expressly presented in this manner by him, can be viewed as forming two 
strategic approaches to what can be loosely referred to as the problem of history’s 
textuality – the pivot point between the two being the critique aligned with the 
holocaust that his approach was subjected to.55
                                               
52 ibid, p 36; the destabilising effect of the linguistic turn for the discipline of history is here 
perhaps contained within the domain of literature.
53 ibid, p 37
54 ibid, p 38
55 Hayden White, Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in 19th Century Europe, (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) and Tropics of Discourse, (Baltimore and 
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White bases his earlier approach to this question on the notion that the 
discipline of history was facing a crisis, namely, that of the loss of its identity as the 
mediator between the arts and the sciences.56 He formulates this argument by 
suggesting that much of what constitutes the arts and the sciences is now very 
different to that which was prevalent during History’s inception as a discipline in the 
19th century. According to White, history fails in the view of both of these ‘disciplinary 
paradigms’ (of science and art) due to what he construes as a “moral failure”. 
Particularly, he argues that the sciences fault the historian for a “failure of method or 
intellect” (the criticism that he views to be the most sympathetic to the modern 
historian) and that “the artist indicts him [sic] for a failure of sensibility or will”.57 This 
crisis, for White, necessitates that the discipline of history historicise its own 
disciplinisation in order to gain an identity that is neither art nor science (while 
simultaneously updating its notion of these) and that can address the problem of 
freeing the present from what he calls, following Nietzsche, “the burden of history.”58
 The above requires, according to White, a re-evaluation of the modes in 
which history is written. Specifically, while White argues that there are some theorists 
who would attempt to reconstitute history as a science through objectivity,59 he 
rejects what he terms the “Rankean innocent eye hypothesis” (the claim that the 
historian can represent history neutrally and thereby that history is a science) and 
rather suggests that interpretation is crucial to all historical representation.60 White is 
not arguing that the majority of historians do not acknowledge the role of 
interpretation in historical work; rather, he contends that in the writing of history the 
                                                                                                                                      
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) – both collections of previously published 
articles – are representative, I would argue, of the first engagement and Hayden White, 
Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999) is his primary work that I would associate with the second 
engagement. I have used his articles as they were published rather than these books.
56 White, (1978: p 28)
57 ibid, pp 29 – 35
58 ibid, p 41
59 Hayden White, ‘Interpretation in History’ in New Literary History, Vol. 4, No. 2, On 
Interpretation: II, (Winter, 1973), p 286. 
60 White, (1973: p 284)
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centrality of what he terms “the politics of interpretation” is generally elided through 
the manner in which this question is resolved. For White, the way in which the 
question of interpretation (its politics) is resolved is through a process of narrative 
emplotment.61
Narrativity, White suggests, is particularly important to the writing of history in 
that it is the way through which historical events become transformed into reality. In 
other words, narrativity provides the reality effect that he argues historians try to 
engender through their writing.62 In this argument narrative emplotment is crucial to 
the writing of history as it is the means through which both the question of 
interpretation is resolved and the effect of the real is produced in historical 
production. Considering that White argues that “interpretation [always] presupposes 
politics”, a further use of narrative emplotment as a process through which 
interpretation is achieved is that it makes available a limited number of possible 
political positions that define the type of history that is being written.63 In other words, 
it makes available the possibility of specifying how politics might inform historical 
writing and how history might be written in such a way as to conform to his desire for 
a history that is not ideologically determined/determining.64
The above posits the notion that a key element in the interpretive work of a 
historian is the choosing of a plot-structure; a process that, according to White, 
operates on three equally important levels, namely the aesthetic, the epistemological, 
and the ethical.65 The aesthetic here has to do with the type of narrative strategy 
employed by the historian (i.e. Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, Satire), the 
epistemological has to do with the choice of explanatory paradigm used (i.e. 
Idiographic, Organicist, Mechanist, Contextualist), and the ethical has to do with the 
                                               
61 Hayden White, ‘The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and Sublimation’ in 
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 9, No. 1, The Politics of Interpretation, (September, 1982), pp 113 – 114
62 Hayden White. ‘The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’ in Critical Inquiry, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, On Narrative, (Autumn, 1980), p 9 and p 23, see also White, (1982: p 116)
63 White, (1982: p 114)
64 ibid, pp 118 and 120; see also White, (1973: p 314)
65 White, (1973: pp 297 – 307)
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ideological positions that determine the choice of the former two (i.e. Anarchist, 
Conservative, Radical, Liberal).66 The link between these three is more of an 
“elective affinity” than a “dictated relationship”; nevertheless, White argues that they 
work together to decide on the trope that will inform the writing of a specific history.
As such, White argues, all history is written along a metaphoric, a 
synechdochic, a metonymic, or an ironic trope. While the correlation between these 
tropes and the different modes of interpretation specified above is always really one 
of, again, “elective affinity” (in other words, White cannot conclusively say that the 
following formulations are inevitably bound together), White suggests that they can 
be placed into relatively predictive groupings. Accordingly, the metaphoric trope 
corresponds with a romantic emplotment, utilises an idiographic mode of explanation 
and stems from/makes available anarchic implications; the synechdochic trope 
corresponds with a comic emplotment, utilises an organicist mode of explanation and 
stems from/makes available conservative implications. The metonymic trope, for 
White, corresponds with a tragic mode of emplotment, utilises a mechanistic mode of 
explanation and stems from/makes available radical implications; and, finally, the 
ironic trope corresponds with a satirical mode of emplotment, utilises a contextualist 
mode of explanation and stems from/makes available liberal implications.67 White 
arrives at the correlation between these tropes and their various levels of 
interpretation through a reading of a number of different histories of the French 
revolution that, he argues, relate very different articulations of the same series of 
events due to the trope along which they are written.68 An important consequence of 
this (tropological history) is that it allows White to argue that when a historian relates 
                                               
66 ibid, p 307
67 ibid, pp 307 – 312; LaCapra’s argument that the invoking of these tropes comes from 
White’s reading of Vico and that they usher in “through the back” door what White tries to 
usher “out through the front” is interesting reading in opposition to this claim. See Dominick 
LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), pp 76 – 77 for this argument.
68 ibid, pp 294 – 307
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a moment of history, she doesn’t relate the story but only a sense of the types of 
emplotment that could be undertaken.
It is at this point that White’s notion of the literariness of history69 impels him 
to engage with the debate surrounding the revisionist histories of the holocaust. The 
response to these histories utilised the experience of the holocaust as something that 
specified the limit of what could be said in history. In ‘The Politics of Historical 
Representation,’ White argues that there is nothing intrinsically wrong, in terms of 
historical writing, with the revisionist historians’ accounts of the holocaust – just as, 
he argues, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the histories that the Palestinians 
and the Israelis produce. The question is not one of facticity but of politics.70 The 
logic of this argument, building on the notion of tropological history, can perhaps be 
best viewed in White’s discussion of ‘historical pluralism’. 
In his 1986 paper of the same name,71 White responds to W. J. T Mitchell’s 
critique of “pan-textualism”, namely “a political ideology” that “reads the entire fabric 
of nature and culture as a network of signs”. While Mitchell concedes that this pan-
textualism was a critical development, he argues that it suffers from what he terms a 
“deficient historical consciousness of a ‘sense of history’”.72 Mitchell’s invocation of a 
‘sense of history’ as a baseline for what is permissible in the writing of history is 
effected, according to White, as literary pluralists need the discipline of history to be 
free from contestations, to be fully constituted, in order to be able to operate 
effectively as a discipline and so as to “check [literary pluralism’s] fall into ‘radical 
relativism’”.73  
                                               
69 He has already abandoned the discipline of history for that of literature rather than pursuing 
the unsettling effects of history’s textuality on itself, as will be made clearer shortly.
70 White, (1982: 135 – 136)
71 Hayden White, ‘Historical Pluralism’, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Spring, 1986); 
Importantly, the ‘pan-textualists’ discussed here are not the revisionist historians mentioned 
above.
72 White, (1986: pp 480 – 481); La Capra and Chartier, as discussed above in the review of 
Toews, would fall under this categorisation by Mitchell.
73 Ibid, p 484
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Pan-textualists, of which Derrida, Barthes, and Foucault are brought forward 
as exemplars by White, in their writing problematise the very notion of a historical 
sense by arguing that history has to do with language rather than the reporting of 
facts. In other words, according to White, pan-textualists view history as both being 
subject to many readings and as being an absence that is only accessible through 
texts that need to be rewritten. As such, they bring the notion of a ‘sense of history’ 
into question and a critique from that angle seems to be nonsensical 74. In short, 
White argues that Mitchell misunderstands that “what is at issue is not the 
interpretation of facts but the nature of historical factuality itself”.75
Having established the above, White then interrogates what would constitute 
something like ‘historical pluralism’, a category into which he would place his own 
writings. This investigation leads him back to the notion of tropological history, 
specifically the aspect of narrative being an interpretive mode (it imbues meanings 
into events) as opposed to the explanatory mode (it extracts meaning from within an 
event) that literary pluralists identify it as.76 This is crucial to White as it allows him to 
argue both that the emplotting of history (the meaning it is given) must be culturally 
specific and that there can be as many emplotments of history as that society will 
recognise to be valid as stories (so the pluralist can escape to cultural determinism to 
avoid relativism). It is here that we see the full implications of White’s theory: all 
histories that are properly narrativised are equally valid as histories no matter how 
reprehensible they might be to us (this is effectively what White said about revisionist 
histories); we might reject them politically, but that does not reduce their validity. And 
the only discipline that is properly placed to decide what a valid emplotment is, is the 
one that knows what emplotments are valid to what culture, namely, literary studies.77
                                               
74 ibid, p 486
75 Ibid, p 483; White, importantly, does not view himself as a pan-textualist.
76 ibid, p 487
77 ibid, p 488 – 489; here history becomes subsumed in the literary.
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Unfortunately for White, presenting his theory as pluralist allows his critics to 
simply nod their heads, as it were, and move on: if it is simply one theory among 
many theories that are all equally valid, then there is no need to linger on it. However, 
White re-addresses the problem that the holocaust poses for his theory in his 1996 
essay “The Modernist Event’78 in which he re-evaluates the status of the holocaust as 
event. Importantly, this constitutes an attempt to reinstate his theory for the writing of 
history, not his position on the revisionist histories of the holocaust. White’s argument 
here is that the dissolution of the “trinity of event, character, and plot” in modernist 
literature and art has been extended to the writing of history.79 The dissolution of 
character and plot do not seem, at least to White, to be as important for the writing of 
history as the dissolution of the event. Significantly, this dissolution of the event in 
modernism is the modernist event itself. In other words, the modernist event is an 
event dissolved. What White means by this is that the sheer magnitude of these 
events and their effects, combined with the sheer volume of documentary evidence 
(photos, films, etc.) that attests to them and that seems to portray the objective truth 
of these events, makes them almost incomprehensible and somehow resistant to 
traditional historical narrativisation.80 This resistance, according to White (and here 
he is specifically speaking of the Holocaust), is due to the fear that to narrativise may 
mean to humanise, to make whole, to “enfable the event” which our understanding of 
the event denies.81 This, however, does not make the event unrepresentable.
White argues that, while the modernist event makes it very difficult – if not 
impossible – to narrativise it traditionally, it is possible to represent it in a narrative of 
a modernist type, what White calls an “antinarrative nonstory”. In these modernist 
narratives (of which White takes Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts (1970) as the pre-
                                               
78 Hayden White, ‘The Modernist Event’ (1996), reprinted in Hayden White, Figural Realism: 
Studies in the Mimesis Effect, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999)
79 White, (1999: p 66)
80 ibid, pp 72 – 74
81 ibid, p 81; here we see explicitly that the historical narrativisation of an event is decided 
politically in our present. 
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eminent example), the events flow out of their outlines, into each other, thereby 
losing their distinctness and any pretence to meaning that might be artificially 
attached to them.82 For White this mode of narrativisation that is made necessary by 
the modernist event tends towards an aesthetic of the sublime and disgusting, a 
tendency that, he argues; only histories written along an ironic trope can achieve.83
In presenting the ironic as the most productive trope for the writing of history, 
White’s position comes close to Spivak’s essay ‘From Haverstock Hill Flat to U.S. 
Classroom, What’s Left of Theory?’84 with one (there are more, but one is crucial) 
distinction: White seems to view irony as imbuing meaninglessness into history 
whereas Spivak views irony as a “constant parabasis” – the continuous interruption 
of the form by its content.85 Rather than imbuing meaninglessness, this makes 
possible, for Spivak, a mode of engaging with the postcolonial subaltern subject that 
she specifies as “the infinite unguaranteed patience to learn to learn from below”86 or, 
as she formulated it in ‘Deconstructing Historiography’ (discussed in the previous 
chapter), a strategic essentialism that brings into relief – and therefore into play – the 
limit of the European critique of humanism. 
This becomes particularly important when we recall the opening scene of this 
chapter: the removal of Peires from the stage of representation in Bailey’s play, 
‘iMumbo Jumbo’. This moment which I argue causes the discipline of history to face 
its own textuality, is also the very moment that – as was discussed in the previous 
chapter – brings into play a strategically essentialist enactment that may allow an 
engagement with the postcolonial subaltern subject in the manner that Spivak calls 
for above.
                                               
82 ibid, p 81
83 White, (1982)
84 Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘From Haverstock Hill Flat to U.S. Classroom, What’s Left of Theory?’ in 
Judith Butler, John Guillory and Kendall Thomas (eds), What’s Left of Theory: New Work on 
the Politics of Literary Theory, (New York and London: Routledge, 2000)
85 Spivak, (2000: p 31); LaCapra is more blunt and argues that White’s notion of irony protects 
him from the destabilising effects of the ‘other’, see LaCapra, (1983: p 78)
86 ibid, p 34; Spivak marks this possibility as “the impossible solution”, nevertheless, it is the 
only ethical position to take in relation to the subaltern.
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While it is important to critique the constitution of subjects, it is, we can 
deduce from the preceding argument, also imperative to engage with the subaltern 
‘other’. Through a substantial lack of a theory of the subject in his notion of the writing 
of history (or even of the problematic nature of the archive87) White does not address 
the latter. Spivak, in her reading of the text of a symposium on interpretation in her 
essay ‘The Politics of Interpretation,’88 provides a substantial critique of White on this 
point. He fails here, according to Spivak, mainly due to his lack of a concept of 
ideology as being both larger than and dependent on the individual subject (which 
Spivak views as crucial for any engagement with the subaltern) and he rather 
engages in the ideology of disciplinary privileging by maintaining literary criticism as 
the key to historical writing.89 The narrow understanding of ideology that White 
utilises (ideology that pertains only to an individual) betrays, Spivak argues, the 
operation of a notion of the freely choosing subject (one might as well say European) 
in White’s theory; a notion that a broader understanding of ideology would dispel.90
Spivak prefers Booth’s notion of language to that of White’s as his is much 
closer to what she calls Bahktin’s notion of the “dialectical hinging of subject and 
language in/of ideology”. She refers to this as “the politics of textuality” by which she 
means “seeing that the network of politics-history-society-sexuality [amongst others] 
defines itself in ideology by acknowledging a textual or weblike structure.”91 Finally, 
Spivak critiques White on the very terminology that he uses to specify his ideal type 
                                               
87 White views the archive as “an unprocessed historical record”, a chaos that the historian –
through narrativity – imposes a formal order on to. This notion, LaCapra argues, simply “gives 
rise to [an] avoidance of the problem of interplay between structure and play in the text and in 
one’s relation to it” – in other words, it avoids the linguistic density of the archive. White does 
sometimes articulate a different notion of the archive that, according to LaCapra, unsettles 
White’s reliance on the four master tropes. See LaCapra, (1983: pp 79 – 81), particularly FN 2 
for this argument.
88 Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘The Politics of Interpretation’ in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed), The Politics of 
Interpretation, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983)
89 Spivak, (1983: p 351); Leela Ghandi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998) presents a useful discussion of the disciplinary 
privileging of Literary Studies in the humanities, see particularly Chapter 3 ‘Postcolonialism 
and the new humanities’, especially pp 45 – 46.
90 ibid, p 352
91 ibid, p 352
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of history – one that operates an aesthetic of the sublime as opposed to the beautiful 
– namely, meaninglessness. Spivak argues that White assumes the claim of 
meaninglessness too quickly/easily, that he does not engage with the density of this 
term and that he therefore deprives it of its theoretical value.92 The notion of a politics 
of textuality that Spivak broaches above may offer a strategic ability to engage 
productively with the problem of representation through its opening of the possibility 
of, what John Mowitt might call, traversing disciplinarity (in other words, it attempts 
not to be subsumed within a particular discipline). It is with this possible productivity 
in mind that it is now necessary to investigate precisely what might entail a politics of 
textuality in the discourse of history.
The Politics of Textuality
As was mentioned earlier in the discussion of Spivak’s critique of White, the moment 
in Bailey’s play where the discipline of history is made to face its own textuality is 
also the moment where it becomes possible to engage with the subject in what 
Spivak would term a politically scrupulous way. As such it is through a fundamentally 
disruptive engagement with its own textuality – through working in the space that is 
cleared by this – that it might be possible to write an effective (following Foucault) 
history after apartheid. It is in this vein (one which goes further than both Toews and 
White in that it does not withdraw into a protectionist disciplinarity) that a discussion 
of the politics of textuality must be situated. Of course, textuality has not always been 
credited with such a politics and it is necessary, therefore, to situate the ensuing 
discussion in relation to these other politics of textuality, of which perhaps Frederic 
Jameson can be made an exemplar. 
Jameson, in his ‘Figural Relativism; or, The Poetics of Historiography’ (1976), 
engages with White’s tropological method for understanding history (both in writing 
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and reading) on a somewhat different level than that of Spivak above.93 While 
generally sympathetic in its tone, Jameson argues that White’s method is incomplete 
in its investigation (or lack thereof) of the relationship between the four master tropes 
and the other codes through which meaning is constructed.94 More importantly for 
Jameson, White’s theory hinges on a cyclical understanding of history whose 
meaning is effectively relative. This is unacceptable, in his view, as it cuts across his 
Marxist understanding of history as a progression with real referents; one might say 
here that Jameson finds White’s method to be ideologically inadequate.95 Although 
useful in its brief discussion of the central tenets of White’s method, Jameson’s 
critique is perhaps more useful in how it reveals the formative effect of his 
political/ideological position on his reading.
This political/ideological investment is precisely what underscores Jameson’s 
investigation of what he terms “the Ideology of the Text” in his 1976 – 78/88 (his 
dating) essay of the same name.96 Situated as a response to the proliferation –
particularly on ideological terms – of disciplinary shifts to the postmodern (shifts that 
he views to be incomplete as they do not take into account postmodernism as a part 
of monopoly capitalism), Jameson’s essay seeks to engage this sense of change 
through an examination of something that he views as central to it across the 
disciplines, namely, textuality.97 Constituting what Jameson views as a useful 
strategy for cutting across the subject/object divide and thereby implicating the 
intellectual as both reader and interpreter, textuality denotes, he argues, objects of 
study that are constituted out of many texts that we “decipher” and “interpret” but do 
                                               
93 Frederic Jameson, ‘Figural Relativism; or, The Poetics of Historiography’ (1976), in Frederic 
Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971 – 1986, Volume 1, Situations of Theory, 
(London: Routledge, 1988)
94 Jameson, (1988: pp 159 – 161)
95 ibid, p 167
96 Frederic Jameson, ‘The Ideology of the Text’ (1975-76/86), in Frederic Jameson, The 
Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971 – 1986, Volume 1, Situations of Theory, (London: 
Routledge, 1988)
97 Jameson, (1988: pp 17 – 18)
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not “know”.98 As such textuality cannot simply be reduced to the literary realm, 
although Jameson does confine it there while simultaneously highlighting its 
problematic implications for literary studies.
Jameson considers textuality as being “problematic” for literary studies as it
invokes a somewhat Derridean notion of the scene of writing. He finds textuality’s 
separation of the form from its (total) meaning through its focus on “meaningful 
fragments” to be particularly unsettling as it effectively equates to what he views as 
an avoidance of the political – of which he views Barthes’ S/Z as characteristic.99
According to Jameson, Barthes’ reading of Balzac’s Sarrasine, through his 
line-by-line analysis of it in S/Z, is an attempt to find the text in Balzac’s writing.100
Barthes brings into play his five codes of narrativity that are woven together – “like a 
tissue” – to form the narrative of a story.101 It is in the proairetic code that he argues 
Barthes identifies the text – the point where Barthes argues the meaning interrupts 
the form – in Balzac. However, Jameson argues that this identification actually 
necessitates the abandonment of textuality as it implies the destruction of narrative 
(its parts disrupt its whole, the narrator does not imbue meaning into it) resulting in a 
rendering meaningless of the literary text; in short, he argues that textuality smashes 
the literary text to pieces.102
He moves to contain this crisis for literary studies that the concept of textuality 
implies through calling attention to a “stable historical context” and individual 
                                               
98 ibid, p 18
99 ibid, pp 20, 22 and 30
100 ibid, p 24
101 According to Jameson these codes are divided into two parts by Barthes: On the one 
hand, there are the “indexes” such as the code of the person, the code of knowledge, and the 
code of the symbol, and, on the other, there are the “irreversible” codes, such as the 
hermeneutic and proairetic codes. The former group give a sense of the reality (naturalness) 
of the subject while eliding its historical construction (these are read through the proper 
name); the latter constitute the “readerly eye”, and, specifically, the proairetic consists of 
reading at the folds where these names (constituted by the former group) can be seen to 
intersect. See Jameson, (1988: pp 25 – 31).
102 Jameson, (1988: pp 36 and 44 – 45)
 
 
 
 
66
experience,103 notions that he argues Barthes’ code of the person makes available 
for the restringing of the literary text. Specifically, for Jameson, it is the narrative form 
(hence the necessity for it to remain intact) of the literary text that allows its meaning 
to be made plain as it is the text’s narrative form that can be made to correspond with 
a Marxist understanding of development.104 As such, Jameson argues for an 
interpretation of Barthes’ proairetic code as a “historical force of disjuncture” which 
relies on the framing structure of the difference between the “scriptable” and the 
“legible”,105 in other words, as requiring a master narrative that in turn imbues 
meaning.
This move allows him to declare that what is at work in the concept of text, its 
ideological backdrop, is precisely postmodernist theory (something Jameson views 
as being particularly weak in its arrival106) which corresponds with what he calls the 
third stage in capitalist development, namely, multinational capitalism. In other words, 
by labelling the concept of the text as postmodern, Jameson attempts to make it 
interpretable/understandable through the lens of Marxist literary criticism. Recalling 
Jameson’s stated aim at the beginning of his essay, namely to identify the underlying 
episteme (ideology) of textuality (postmodernism), the tautological nature of his 
argument becomes especially clear if we select to rephrase its guiding assumption: 
the underlying ideology of postmodernism is postmodernism, or stated differently, the 
underlying episteme of textuality is textuality. In any case, what is clear from the 
above is that Jameson dismisses the concept of the text (and thereby the notion of 
the politics of textuality) as it unsettles literary studies and consequently unsettles 
Marxist claims to imbuing meaning and resistance.
                                               
103 ibid, p 41; Clearly, Jameson would fall prey to Joan Scott’s critique of experience and 
Hayden White’s critique of a “historical sense” outlined above.
104 ibid, p 51; here Jameson’s critique of textuality is very close to his critique of Hayden White 
above.
105 Ibid, pp 54 – 55 
106 ibid, p 63
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The attempt to uncover what could be termed “the text ’s pol i t ical 
unconscious” is, according to Paul Smith, a characteristic move of Jameson’s which 
he argues amounts to an attempt to break the “distorting mirror of ideology”, where 
the text is taken as “the agent for the reproduction of ideology”.107 This strategy, 
which is central to much Marxist literary criticism, reduces the concept of human 
agency to practical non-existence as the role of the subject/individual in this 
reproduction of ideology is elided or, at best, viewed as trivial. In his evaluation of the 
shortcomings of Marxist literary criticism (which does not amount to an abandonment 
of Marxist theory) Smith suggests that Eagleton may be viewed as presenting a more 
productive understanding of the literary text as he views it as a “production of 
ideology” as opposed to an expression of it.108 Despite this, Smith suggests that all 
the modes of Marxist literary criticism that he has discussed (i.e. Macherey, 
Jameson, Eagleton) reduce the literary text and its workings to the level of the 
imaginary and therefore have no sense of “the anchoring of the text in the person 
who reads it” – without which it cannot be ideological as the ideological must lodge 
itself in a subject.109
It is this question of the subject at which ideology is aimed, in other words the 
question of the interpellation of the subject, that interests Smith in his discussion of 
the importance of human agency.110 Smith finds the publications of the journal 
Screen in the 1970s a useful starting point for engaging with this question as they 
view, drawing from Lacan, the subject as being produced in language. This is useful 
for Smith (although he argues that Screen makes a rather problematic leap from the 
subject being produced in language to it being made susceptible to ideological 
                                               
107 Paul Smith, Discerning the Subject, Theory and History of Literature, Volume 55, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p 28
108 Smith, (1988: p 29); principally, Smith argues that the reduction, characteristic of critics 
such as Jameson, of all contradictions in the literary text to class struggle (as being caused by 
it) actually misunderstands Marx’s argument that class identity is in fact formed in struggle.
109 ibid, p 29
110 ibid, p 24; importantly, for Smith the text is not contained within the literary, rather, it 
extends to and incorporates the scenes of writing.
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interpellation) as it allows the suggestion that, if the subject is an effect of language, 
then its interpellation must be various.111 As such, the subject cannot be the 
equivalent of the individual as it is often taken to be in Marxist literary criticism, rather 
subjectivity should be construed as a series of moments constituted out of conflicting
interpellations. Thus, Smith convincingly argues, a person’s history is the 
accumulation of differing interpellations into varying subject positions; in other words, 
their subjectivity is not always already there.112 Smith suggests that in order to speak 
about the subject without cerning it or subsuming it within a single discipline it is 
necessary to both take into account a person’s own history (their subjectivity) as well 
as to historicise the modes through which the subject becomes interpellated.
Having clearly argued for a difference between the physical person (the 
“actual human agent”) and its subject positions (constituted out of conflicting 
interpellations), Smith then suggests that ideological interpellation is never total. In 
other words, not all the positions that a text (whether literary, filmic, or otherwise) 
prescribes will necessarily be assumed as not all interpellations are equally 
effective.113 This understanding of the subject as a momentary effect that is 
constituted through multiple interpellations that may or may not work, brings about a 
contradictory and interstitial space in which it becomes possible to view the 
emergence of the human agent as a concept that can resist certain ideological 
interpellations.114 This is not to argue that a person can simply select various subject 
positions in order to resist interpellation; rather, Smith argues that this very resistance 
to interpellation needs to be viewed as an effect of interpellation itself. In other words, 
                                               
111 ibid, pp 30 – 32; Stated differently: Language is in essence various, since the subject is the 
effect of language it too must be various; consequently, a various subject must be variously 
interpellated.
112 Ibid, p 33
113 ibid, p 35
114 ibid, p 37
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Smith argues that resistance is produced by and in ideology as precisely where a 
subject is interpellated there too agency and resistance become enabled.115
Hence the question of ideology is not, according to Smith, really about the 
subjection of the subject but rather about the subjection of human agency. It is the 
concept of the text (though Smith looks beyond it) through its bringing into play the 
scene of writing that allows Smith to bring human agency and the possibility of 
resisting interpellation to the fore. As such, whereas Jameson wants to disregard the 
text as it unsettles Marxist literary criticism, Smith argues that it is precisely this 
unsettling effect that makes it possible to speak of a textual politics.
Importantly Smith doesn’t abandon the subject in search of the agent, rather –
and this is where his politics lies – he argues that an examination of how the subject 
is cerned (literally both enclosed and inherited in a disciplinary context) removes it as 
an alibi for the lack of “disciplinary self-reflection” and makes it possible to see how 
agency arises out of a conflict of interpellations. In other words, as John Mowitt 
argued in his foreword to Smith’s book, the project of discernment allows the 
separation of the agent from the “shadow of the subject” which makes it possible to 
view the object.116 Smith does not specifically examine the implications of this –
although he does argue that feminist theory through its double strategy of 
essentialism and difference is probably the best example of his demand for criticism. 
However, Mowitt suggests that it is possible to take Smith’s argument further 
by focusing on the disciplinary object (by which he means a “regulative fiction that 
orients research in a particular field”, something that is not necessarily real but has 
real effects117) rather than on how the subject deflects disciplinary self-reflection.118
Through invoking the object here Mowitt does not mean an investigation of its status 
                                               
115 ibid, pp 38 – 40
116 John Mowitt, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, foreword in Paul Smith, Discerning the Subject, 
Theory and History of Literature, Volume 55, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), p XII
117 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object, (Durham and London: 
Duke University press, 1992), p 27
118 Mowitt, (1988: p XVII)
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but rather an investigation of the discipline’s inability to theorise its relation with it. He 
argues that this would allow a critique of the subject and discipline from the place of 
the object.119
In his Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object Mowitt quite clearly 
sets out his understanding of the above and its possible politics. Starting from a 
reading of Roland Barthes’ essay ‘From Work to Text’ Mowitt sets out to argue how 
text, as a disciplinary object, is in fact antidisciplinary.120 By denoting the text (the text
is per definition ambiguous for Mowitt as it both functions as an object and unsettles 
its own function as such: it functions less as an object and more as a methodological 
field121) as an antidisciplinary object Mowitt does not argue that disciplines as such 
need to be done away with. Rather, he argues that the text needs to be seen both in 
the light of its interdisciplinary character as well as its function in constituting a 
critique of “the enabling conditions of disciplines as such.”122 In other words, as 
Mowitt has said elsewhere, the text can be viewed as traversing the field of 
disciplinarity – both disrupting disciplinary boundaries by stepping into each and
keeping them in place through transgressing them (both interdisciplinary and 
antidisciplinary). More explicitly, the “slide” that occurs from (literary) work – the 
object of the discipline of literary studies – to text problematises the very techniques 
through which literary studies decides on its interpretative practice and moves 
beyond the literary (it cannot be contained there) to unsettle disciplinary reason as 
such.123
By insisting on the importance of Barthes’ line “perhaps even violently, via the 
jolts of fashion” in ‘From Work to Text’ Mowitt suggests that the text should not be 
viewed simply within the domain of academic disciplines. Rather, its moment of 
                                               
119 ibid, p XVII
120 The essay can be found in Roland Barthes, Image-Music-Text, tr. Heath, S. (London: 
Fontana Press, 1990); Mowitt, (1992: pp 18 – 21)
121 ibid, see the introduction ‘The Two Texts’, particularly pp 6 – 8 and p 46
122 ibid, p 25
123 ibid, pp 28 – 29
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emergence in conjunction with social events marks its effects as not simply relevant 
to the academy but to society generally. Here Foucault’s understanding of 
disciplinarity is indispensable for Mowitt as it allows him to argue, quite convincingly, 
that the “subjection of human agency” – through the organisation of social knowledge 
around the institutionally/disciplinarily understood subject – might both be understood 
through and unsettled by the text.124 In other words, since society is ordered through 
a disciplinary logic, the same logic that text unsettles, text might allow a fruitful 
engagement with the subject without reifying its own procedures in doing so (through 
its constant unsettling of itself).125 Principally this effect of text is registered through 
its unsettling effect on our (disciplinary) ways of knowing (interpreting) that clears a 
space through which the ‘other’ might make their interpretation known.126
In short text, as an antidisciplinary object that both specifies and unsettles 
how we know things disciplinarily, clears a space in a manner that constitutes a 
critique of the academy and society (both as disciplinarily regulated spaces). This 
space clearing gesture may allow the ‘other’, who we have been terming the 
subaltern subject in the previous chapter and above, to inscribe her own meanings 
onto things. This would amount to an interruption of our selves, the results of which 
we cannot now fully know, but it may amount to a learning to learn from below. 
Following this, in the removal of Peires from the stage of representation, discussed 
above, the way in which the discipline of history knows its subjects/object is 
problematised in such a way as to allow an alternative enactment of a different 
meaning.
The previous two chapters have functioned to stage the discipline of history’s 
double crisis – that of representation and that of its textuality – in such a way as to 
argue that it may be possible, through utilising Mowitt’s concept of the text, to write a 
                                               
124 ibid, pp 48 – 60; particularly, Mowitt argues that the Text arose as a response to the 
advances of mass culture on the academia.
125 ibid, pp 36 – 39
126 ibid, p 46
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history that creates a space for the unexpected arrival of the other. The remaining
chapters will attempt to specify the implications of this.
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Part Two
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The Prophetess as Sign
For long the veld was strewn with bones bleaching in the 
sun.
H. I. E. Dhlomo1
Whereas the previous two chapters in this dissertation sought to deal with the 
questions of representation and, subsequently, textuality in history through a rigorous 
reading of what have been labelled by some as being somewhat more “theoretical 
texts that one sort of breaks one’s head against once and then leaves”2; the following 
three chapters will attempt to, in a sense, provide a more thorough ‘reading out’ the 
implications of these in the discipline of history. This will be done through reading a 
number of historical works – by which I mean works done within, and subsumed by, 
the discipline of history – alongside a few historical plays that all deal with the same 
constellation of ‘events’, namely the Xhosa Cattle-Killing episode that has been 
alluded to throughout this dissertation. Before embarking on this reading and 
indicating precisely where this chapter lies within it, I think it will perhaps be helpful to 
briefly delineate the main moves that have been made to bring the dissertation to this 
point.
If we consider the problem of representation in the discipline of history, and 
particularly in western intellectual thought, the first chapter looked at how questions 
of representation have featured in a number of academic ‘exchanges’ – the most 
notable of these being Spivak’s critique of a dialogue between Foucault and Deleuze 
and her reading of the work of the Subaltern Studies collective. Here it was posited 
that one of the most effective ways in which to engage with the ‘other’ was through 
                                               
1 Nick Visser and Tim Couzens (eds), H. I. E. Dhlomo: Collected Works, (Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, 1985), p 4
2 This was a comment that was made by a faculty member during the discussion of a version 
of my first chapter that I presented in the History and Humanities Seminar held weekly in the 
CHR at UWC.
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operating a strategic essentialism (the method deployed by the Subaltern Studies 
collective) which might clear a space in which the other might “arrive”, in a Derridean 
sense of the word. This strategic essentialism works, it is argued in the second 
chapter, in a manner akin to that of parabasis.
Furthering the critique of representation and identity to that of nationalism –
understood as an operation of a disciplinary logic – and the discipline of history’s 
relation to it, it was argued that it may be possible to interrupt the discipline of history 
– and thereby its action as nationalist alibi – by utilizing a similar strategy as was 
proposed for dealing with representation. It was along this line that the discussion of 
history’s relationship with textuality and something like a textual politics was deployed 
in the second chapter. Through reading Bradford’s critique of a number of Brett 
Bailey’s plays, but specifically iMumbo Jumbo, into the above argument it was 
suggested that the very moment that enabled such a strategic essentialism in his 
play also necessitated that the discipline face up to its own textuality. Here, rather 
than move towards an understanding of history’s textuality in such a way as to either 
reject the unsettling effects of this textuality through a recourse to experience or 
through subsuming it within the discipline of literature studies – both of which proved 
not to be useful when it came to the problem of representation – an understanding of 
textuality that draws from Mowitt’s notion of text as an antidisciplinary object was put 
forward. This notion of textuality was then understood as allowing (or coming from) a 
textual politics – following Spivak’s formulation – as it works along a similar line to 
that of the trope of irony, in other words and paraphrasing De Man, it works as a 
permanent parabasis of disciplinary reason. 
The historical play then allows a strategic use of parabasis which works to 
create a space for the unexpected arrival of the other and, in so doing, effects a re-
articulation of the discipline of history. This chapter then, through reading the work of 
a prominent historian alongside two different plays on the same event, will begin to 
seek to engage with the working of this re-articulation.
 
 
 
 
76
A History of Purpose
Jeff Peires, who has featured quite prominently in many of the readings already 
hosted in this dissertation, has produced what must be considered to be one of the 
most extensive discussions of what he terms the Xhosa Cattle-Killing episode of 
1856 –7. His account, which tries to address the various dominant discourses 
surrounding the episode, also – I would argue inadvertently – allows us to see how 
the stage, or the historical play, is always already contained within the discipline (a 
kind of internalized parabasis). As such, it is necessary to introduce and critique 
Peires’ version of events as well as to examine how the play can be seen in his 
writing before looking at the effects of this on the discipline.
In his The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing of 
1856-73 Peires sets out to address and, to a certain extent but not absolutely, resolve 
the mysteries and theories that have sprung up around the somewhat controversial 
story of Nongqawuse and her prophecies. Peires begins his narrative with a 
discussion of what he views as one of the key roots of Nongqawuse’s prophecies, 
namely colonial dispossession and specifically the War of Mlanjeni or, as he titles the 
chapter, “Riverman’s War”.4 I t  is here that Peires f inds a (not the) root for 
Nongqawuse’s prophecies on a number of levels: Firstly, Peires argues that it was 
most likely during this war that Nongqawuse was orphaned.5 This allows him to offer 
an explanation of how she ended up living in Mhlakaza’s household as well as to 
depict Nongqawuse as a young (she would have been an orphaned child only three 
years earlier) impressionable and emotionally traumatised girl, who could be easily 
manipulated by her uncle.6 Of course, it is this very same scenario that allows 
Bradford – as discussed in the previous chapter – to suggest that Nongqawuse may 
                                               
3 Jeff Peires, The Dead will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing of 1856-7, 
2nd Edition, (Jeppestown: Johnathon Ball Publishers, 2003)
4 Peires, (2003: pp 23 and 55)
5 Ibid, p 327
6 Ibid, p 110
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actually have been a victim of rape or abuse and that, as such, her prophecies 
should be read as a gendered entry into the crises of society. 
Furthermore, it was as a result of this war that Sir Harrismith was recalled 
from the Cape and replaced by Sir George Grey, a move that would turn out to have 
dire consequences for the Xhosa – even though, accepting Jeff Guy’s critique of 
Peires (discussed in the previous chapter but basically that it is useless to criticise a 
colonial official for being precisely that), it is not certain that Harrismith would have 
acted any differently to Grey in the circumstances. The war of Mlanjeni was also, 
according to Peires, indicative of and, to some extent, constitutive of “a great 
upheaval” in the region.7 He argues that one of the most important consequences of 
this upheaval was the collision of traditional Xhosa and traditional Christian belief 
systems – personified for Peires in Mhlakaza – which formed a central element in the 
mechanism of the prophecies.8 However, as will be discussed in a bit more detail 
later, Julian Cobbing in his review of The Dead Will Arise argues that this upheaval 
may be the cause of the disaster and that the prophecies might only have been a 
side issue; something which Peires, in his attempt to maintain some form of Xhosa 
responsibility for the catastrophe, according to Cobbing’s argument, does not 
adequately consider.9
The final move that Peires is able to extract from his prefixing of the war of 
Mlanjeni to the 1856 – 7 catastrophe is his argument that Mlanjeni should, effectively 
though not in Peires’ words, be viewed as the father of Nongqawuse’s prophecies. 
Apart from the arguments already drawn from the results of Mlanjeni’s prophecy, it is 
in his purported last words that Peires finds the seed of Nongqawuse’s prophecy. 
Mlanjeni was reported as saying, shortly before he died of TB, that he would rise up 
again and would come from the West bringing with him all the warriors that had been 
                                               
7 Ibid, p 57
8 Ibid, pp 63 – 64 and 159 – 164
9 Julian Cobbing, ‘Book Review’ in Journal of Southern African Studies, June 1994, Vol. 20, 
Issue 2, pp 337 – 339
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slain.10 Inside Peires’ argument, i t  was most l ikely the similarity between 
Nongqawuse’s prophecy and Mlanjeni’s last words that lent credence to her 
prophecies. While the similarities, in some aspects, seem quite obvious, the final 
effect of Peires’ rooting of Nongqawuse’s prophecies in the events surrounding 
Mlanjeni is the removal of any independent agency from her; she simply becomes a 
tool that was put to use by men and, i t  seems, for Peires this was done 
unproblematically. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Peires defends his 
argument by suggesting that the ‘facts’ of history limit what can be said. In other 
words, to “read against the grain” (in Stohler’s formulation) would not be history in the 
proper sense as it would not be true to the facts. However, I would argue that this 
formulation not only falls prey to the critiques surrounding issues of representation 
that were broached in part one of this dissertation, it patently seeks to avoid any 
engagement with them at all.11
A key element of the above mentioned move effected by Peires is the person 
of Mhlakaza. According to Peires, Mhlakaza was not simply the uncle of 
Nongqawuse through whom she managed to obtain the ear of the king – though he 
does fulfil this role in Peires’ argument. More importantly, however, Peires argues 
that Mhlakaza was in fact the apprentice of the Archdeacon Merriman, an Anglican 
and a preacher of the Christian doctrine of resurrection.12 He makes this argument, in 
the first edition of his book, by drawing on a number of somewhat unconvincing 
documentary proofs, namely: baptismal and marriage records where dates and 
names seem to be a little conflicting; a letter from Merriman’s wife where she denies 
that the prophet was her former servant; and a number of obtuse allusions in official 
correspondence to the link between the Merriman’s and the prophet.13 The objections 
to this connection have already been addressed in the previous chapters and will not 
                                               
10 Peires, (2003: p 57)
11 In the previous chapter, Bradford’s critique of Peires along these lines was dealt with quite 
extensively and, therefore, it will not be repeated here. 
12 Peires, (2003: pp 57 – 64)
13 Ibid, pp 60 – 62; see particularly FN 109 and FN 111.
 
 
 
 
79
be discussed here again. Interestingly, in his response to these criticisms – contained 
in the afterward to the second edition – Peires presents a few more pieces of 
evidence which, I think, do make the link a little more probable;14 however, even after 
Peires’ response, this connection must remain viewed as one of open conjecture 
rather than as incontrovertible.
The immediate effect of establishing this connection between Mhlakaza and 
Wilhelm Goliath for Peires is that he can then claim, due to the vulnerable and 
impressionable state that Nongqawuse apparently was in, that Mhlakaza/Wilhelm 
was actually behind the prophecy.15 This is not to argue that Peires does not think 
that Nongqawuse had a vision but, rather, that the content and interpretation of that 
vision was due to Mhlakaza. There are two consequences that follow from this 
assertion in Peires’ argument. The first is that in the person of Mhlakaza, Peires can 
make plain the collision and blending of traditional Christian and traditional Xhosa 
belief systems – which he views as crucial to any understanding of them – and the 
second follows from this; namely, that the seemingly overt Christian influence in the 
prophecies (particularly the notion of resurrection) is simply an indication of 
Mhlakaza’s influence over them, and not of colonial interference by Grey – either 
directly or indirectly. 
While Peires discounts the validity of what has been termed “Grey’s Plot”, he 
also argues that Grey should bear the brunt of the responsibility for transforming this 
event into a catastrophe.16 According to Peires, it was Grey’s imposition of 
magistrates onto the Xhosa chiefs in 1855, who Cobbing calls “Africa’s first native 
commissioners”,17 which operated as one of the sparks for the adoption of the 
prophecies by the chiefs, as well as for their perseverance.18 One of the key 
examples that Peires discusses in making this claim is that of Major Gawler and 
                                               
14 Ibid, p 361
15 Ibid, p 328
16 Ibid, p 336
17 Cobbing, (1994: p 337)
18 Peires, (2003: pp 88 – 93 and p 137)
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Chief Mhala. In his discussion, Peires highlights the nature of the contestation 
between the two – attempts by Gawler (Mhala’s magistrate) to usurp Mhala’s 
influence and authority and Mhala’s attempts to maintain it – it becomes apparent 
that Mhala’s support for the prophecy and its dictates was largely associated with a 
defiance of Gawler and Grey’s colonial policy, which Peires argues Gawler was 
simply implementing.19 This relationship/contest culminated in a six month long police 
action by Gawler, ostensibly in the interest of the “unbelievers”, of which Peires finds 
it difficult to reckon whether it was starvation or the police action itself that “broke the 
back of the Xhosa”.20
Apart from creating conditions in which it became necessary – either due to 
political expediency or desperation – to support Nongqawuse’s prophecies, Peires
argues that it was also due to the nature of Grey’s response to the Cattle-Killing that 
it resulted in such a catastrophe. Towards the beginning of the movement, Grey 
largely ignored what was happening – an action that Peires argues, along with the 
imposition of a magistrate, caused Sandile to adopt the prophecies – and towards the 
end he proceeded to turn the tables, as it were, to his advantage.21
Grey achieved this through, firstly, limiting the amount of non-governmental 
aid that was available to those who were entering the colony in search of 
assistance.22 In addition, he also imposed strict conditions under which those seeking 
aid could receive it, namely: they had to sign labour contracts within the colony and 
as soon as they were healthy enough they had to earn their keep.23 Secondly, Grey 
initiated what has become known as the chiefs’ plot – something that Peires strongly 
refutes.24 The ‘Chief’s plot’ effectively consisted of a rather thinly veiled “legal cloak” 
                                               
19 Ibid, pp 207 – 239
20 Ibid, p 235
21 Ibid, p 133
22 Ibid, pp 266 – 277; a key example of this is Grey’s efforts (and success) in shutting down 
the operations of the “Kaffir Relief Committee”.
23 Ibid, p 287; Peires suggests that an incredible 87% of all those who sought aid ended up as 
labourers in the colony.
24 Ibid, pp 184 – 190
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which could serve as a pretext for Grey’s arrest and detention of the chiefs as well as 
the invasion of Gcalekaland and the annexation of two thirds of it for European 
settlement.25
Effectively, Peires argues that there were two main causal contributions (and 
one central attitude, which will be discussed below) on which the Cattle-Killing 
hinged, namely: the effect of a collision and enmeshing of traditional Xhosa and 
traditional Christian beliefs that was personified in Mlanjeni and, particularly, 
Mhlakaza; and the actions and non-actions of Grey. Here we might learn to read the 
proper name ‘Nongqawuse’ in the title of Peires’ book as a signifier of absence rather 
than of agency. Of course, this is an oversimplification of Peires’ argument, for 
example, he does spend quite some time discussing why individual chiefs (including 
Sarhili) supported the prophecies and he does mention the effects of drought and 
lung-sickness as influencing factors. However, the latter tend to lurk in the 
background of Peires’ text – as contextual information rather than as explicit causes; 
and the former is, I would argue, outweighed by what Peires presents as the single 
most important factor in determining why people either believed or didn’t. For Peires, 
this can be attributed to an attitude of social class.26
Peires builds this argument through engaging in an etymological discussion of 
the words used in Xhosa to designate those that supported the prophecies and those 
that did not, namely, believer and unbeliever. Peires suggests that the literal 
translation of these terms results in a division between people who, on the one hand, 
are “soft” – as in able to deny themselves and to submit – and, on the other, those 
who are “hard” – as in either disloyal or stingy.27 Placing this within a context where, 
according to Peires, there has been “a general weakening of the pre-colonial order 
since the 1800s”, he argues that there was effectively a class battle looming where 
                                               
25 Ibid, pp 240 – 256; quite clearly, as Peires also points out, the charges were ‘trumped up’ 
and, in one instance, were even rejected by one of Grey’s own tribunals.
26 Ibid, p 206
27 Ibid, p 198
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the councillors tended to be the “monied elite” and the chiefs represented the “old 
order” (the one exception being those councillors who were made wealthy by their 
chief and tended to remain loyal to their chief).28 In short, Peires argues that in terms 
of this attitude (which he says is the only consistent one) the Cattle-Killing was the 
battle ground upon which this “class conflict” unfolded, in which the chiefs 
propagated the Cattle-Killing in order to save the old order for the “national good”, as 
he argues later:
…there is every sign and indication that the cattle-killing was national in 
character, driven by Sarhili and the believing chiefs as custodians of the
national good, and intended not to destroy the old order but to restore it
in all its pristine glory.29
And, it is within this Marxist interpretation of the Cattle-Killing where one assumes 
(one can only assume as Peires does not make this clear) that Peires situates the 
responsibility of ‘the Xhosa’ in the unfolding of these events.30
It is perhaps useful here to recall Bradford’s critique of Peires – discussed in 
the previous chapter – where she argues that Peires’ analysis is characterised by a 
deliberate elision of women as agents from the “Cattle-Killing” – and therefore, within 
the argument of the first part of this dissertation, fails to even begin to contend with 
what we might call the subaltern in Eastern Cape history. Another interesting critique 
of Peires’ work is found in Julian Cobbing. In his review of Peires he argues that what 
Peires has left in the background, namely the spread of lung-sickness and drought 
and the environmental impact of the frontier wars, should be viewed as the major 
catalyst in the ‘Cattle-Killing’.31 Cobbing suggests that Peires has spent so much time 
trying to portray the cattle-killing as a national suicide that he has missed the more 
                                               
28 Ibid, pp 198 – 204
29 Ibid, p 383
30 Ibid, p 336; interestingly, in his afterward Peires feels the need to “come out of the closet” 
and to declare his Marxist intentions and politics in his reading of history, see p 381.
31 Cobbing, (1994: p 338)
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obvious causes for the disaster, namely: the destruction of crops and the loss of male 
labour through the war of Mlanjeni; the effect of the Ngiqa being evicted from their 
most fertile lands after the war; and that the rains had been at best poor in the 1854 –
55 season and had failed completely at the end of the 1855 season, resulting in a 
much reduced harvest in 1856. In addition, Cobbing suggests that the killing of cattle 
may have occurred as a quarantine measure in order to curb the spread of lung-
sickness.32
Finally, Cobbing makes the somewhat startling assertion that it may be 
possible to think of the prophecies surrounding the cattle-killing less as the 
constitutive force behind the catastrophe and more as the “distorted explanations [put 
forward] by the contemporary white magistrates and their repetition by later South 
African historians.”33 While this dismissal of the prophecies does seem somewhat 
hasty, Cobbing’s criticism of Peires in relation to the subordinate influence of lung-
sickness and war in Peires’ analysis does, I think, hold some weight.
Having, in the above discussion of Peires’ work, looked principally at his 
arguments surrounding the cattle-killing and at a number of critiques of those 
arguments, it is now necessary to look at the manner in which Peires’ work is written. 
The historical play can be seen as lying latent within Peires’ work in two main ways –
through its function as a script and through the orchestrated nature of Peires’ writing. 
The Dead Will Arise opens, after a brief discussion of etymology, with a list of the 
main characters and their significance in the ‘story’ (mostly in terms of whether they 
believed or didn’t). This list is entitled ‘Dramatis Personae’ and is divided, for a 
reason that is not made clear but which one assumes reflects the period in which the 
book is written, between ‘black’ characters and ‘white’ characters. Interestingly this 
list is prefixed with a short paragraph in which Peires asserts that History is different 
                                               
32 Ibid, p 339
33 Ibid, p 339
 
 
 
 
84
to fiction in that it cannot control the number of sub plots or characters that are 
involved in the story.34 These words haunt the remainder of Peires’ book.
Throughout the rest of The Dead Will Arise Peires is at pains to distinguish 
his book from works of literature. It is littered with short asides, such as “[t]his history 
is not, unfortunately, a fiction…”,35 where he divulges what he views to be the 
constraints of writing a historical work as opposed to a literary one. However, no 
matter how hard pressed Peires feels in writing a history, it is also equally clear from 
his book that he is not simply writing one either. At a variety of moments Peires 
explains to his reader that what he is about to do is, in his view, actually quite boring 
historical work and, if the reader wants to remain within the narrative, she should skip 
straight on to the next chapter.36 And later, worried that his reader might not have 
managed to ascertain the finer points of his argument due to the strength of the 
narrative, Peires devotes a whole chapter to answering “probable questions” that a 
reader might have.37
Peires is not only aware that the writing of history works more like the writing 
of literature than the writing of a textbook; he writes his history through the allegory of 
a theatrical play. Beginning, as has already been noted, with a list of characters 
(racially defined) for his drama, Peires then introduces a number of these characters 
as though they are entering into a play – for example, on p 74 Peires introduces 
Grey’s work in South Africa in this manner. Peires also “takes pauses” in his “drama” 
to deal with changes of scene and changes of “characters in the … drama”38, a 
narrative technique that could be likened to a directors note or a short interlude in a 
performance that is aimed at ensuring a clean and clear change of scene. This notion 
of Peires as the director of the drama/play that he is writing is reinforced throughout 
                                               
34 Peires, (2003: pp 17 – 20)
35 Ibid, p 342
36 See for example the comments he makes shortly before discussing the finer details as to 
why certain people believed the prophecies and others did not, (Peires, 2003: pp 145 – 146).
37 Ibid, p 327
38 Ibid, p 88
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the book by his continuous attempts at directly addressing his reader (as was 
mentioned above, telling them which parts of the book to read when), culminating in 
the final paragraph of the afterward where Peires makes the reader responsible for 
the survival of the book.39
This discussion of the elements of the play in Peires could proliferate 
substantially – the footnotes, for example, contain many instances where Peires 
acknowledges “tak[ing] liberties with historical fact” in order to write a flowing 
narrative and, conversely, where he has refused to because, after all, he is writing 
fact not fiction.40 It is sufficient to assert here, however, that elements of the theatrical 
play as well as of literature are continuously at work within Peires’ text; undermining 
and at times altering the meaning of his “factual” narrative. Returning briefly to the 
opening statement with which Peires prefixed his character list, it is clear not only 
that he effectively attempts to control the characters and plots in his history (this is 
made especially clear through the critiques of both Bradford and Cobbing) but, 
perhaps more importantly, Peires in fact attempts to adjudicate these characters and 
plots as well.
Dhlomo: Suicide or Cure?
From the above discussion of Peires, it is clear that at work within his analysis is both 
the unsettling effect of the historical play – in terms of disrupting the truth claims that 
his narrative makes – and what I have termed a purposeful history. This purposeful 
history seems to work towards placing a national responsibility on the Xhosa that 
hinges on Peires’ notion of class conflict lying at the heart of the division between 
believers and unbelievers in the catastrophe. Of course, as was argued above, 
Peires does not place culpability for the death of so many thousands of people and 
                                               
39 Ibid, p 391
40 See for example, Ibid, p 126 FN 8 and p 342
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cattle at the feet of the Xhosa nation – this culpability is reserved, I think correctly, for 
the colonial administration and particularly George Grey – however, it allows Peires 
to implicitly constitute a consciousness for the Xhosa nation of Marxist class struggle, 
in other words, to mark the nation as deeply modern.
Writing approximately a half a century before Peires, H. I. E. Dhlomo also 
engages with questions surrounding the 1856 – 7 Xhosa Cattle-Killing catastrophe 
and Xhosa nationalism. Dhlomo in many ways held a quite complex political position 
for his time – though he would fall under the weight of critic ism in the previous 
chapters for being both Eurocentric and essentialist – which can be seen quite clearly 
in the majority of his writings, including his plays.41 According to Bhekizizwe 
Peterson’s reading of his writings, Dhlomo was an architect and spokesperson of a 
pan-African nationalism, one that was fashioned on the values of a western 
humanism.42 According to Peterson, Dhlomo held this view as he believed that not all 
members of a nation necessarily represented that nation’s enlightened qualities. This
valorisation of the individual, while concomitantly advocating the good of the nation, 
is a seeming paradox that, according to Peterson, is evident in the majority of his 
works that we still have today; not least in ‘The Girl Who Killed to Save’.43
Dhlomo held strongly to the promise that he perceived in nationalism, namely 
that those that made themselves worthy would be assimilated into European 
civilisation. According to Couzens and Peterson, Dhlomo held this view throughout 
his known life; however, they both note that there is a marked shift between the type 
and tone of the nationalism in Dhlomo’s earlier work and that of his later.44 It was as 
                                               
41 The majority of the biographical information that I use is drawn from Tim Couzens, The 
New African: A Study of the Life and Work of H. I. E. Dhlomo, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 
1985) and Bhekizizwe Peterson, Monarchs, Missionaries and African Intellectuals: African 
Theatre and the Unmaking of Colonial Marginality, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University 
Press, 2000).
42 Peterson, (2000: pp 177 and 223)
43 Ibid, p 198
44 Interestingly, Couzens puts this shift down to the obvious set back that the 1936 Native Bills 
presented to the promise Dhlomo perceived in nation, whereas Peterson seems to argue that
this more pessimistic nationalism was always latent within Dhlomo’s work – see Peterson 
(2000: p 195) and Couzens, (1985: p 50).
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a result of the conviction that Dhlomo held with regard to the usefulness of 
nationalism that, according to Peterson, he worked to produce what he viewed as a 
national literature – he felt that all nations had enlightened individuals and a body of 
literature that reflect the nation; in other words, the nation works as the condition of 
their possibility.45 Here Dhlomo, in his understanding of literature, is very close to 
Jameson’s notion of Third-World literature as being inherently nationalist, discussed 
in chapter one.
In addition to his commitment to the ideal of nation, Dhlomo was also very 
involved in the current politics of his time – most particularly through his journalistic 
work.46 According to Couzens, Dhlomo developed what he terms an “Africanist 
aesthetic” in his art/literature which often worked to inform party political ideology, 
something which would seem to corroborate Peterson’s assertion that Dhlomo was 
interested in drama as a specific mode of interpellation (though, of course, it was not 
articulated in this manner by Dhlomo).47 Despite the political significance of both 
Dhlomo as an individual – as he would like it – and his work, his early works did not 
sell very well and he died an alcoholic; a state that Couzens suggests Dhlomo fell 
into due to the failure of the promise of nation.48
If we take Peterson seriously when he outlines the manner in which Dhlomo 
understood the three-way working of individual-nation-literature, it opens the 
possibility to think of Dhlomo not as an author per se, but rather as an integral part of 
a generic ‘black’ nationalism itself (although at times this manifested as a Zulu
nationalism).49 The ambiguity of Dhlomo’s position with regard to the nation here – he 
is writing to try and constitute such a nation while writing as a response to the 
position that that nation situates him in – also marks the central (or, as will be shown 
                                               
45 Peterson, (2000: p 188)
46 Couzens, (1985: pp 275 – 276)
47 Ibid, p 263 and Peterson, (2000: p 190)
48 Ibid, pp 177 and 241
49 Ibid, p 356
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below, slightly off-centre) character of his play ‘The Girl Who Killed to Save’, namely: 
Nongqawuse.50
The play, which is subtitled ‘Nongqawuse the Liberator’, begins with a short 
note on the History of the event that it contends with. This history is presented 
somewhat formulaically even though it is written in a very descriptive prose: it makes 
mention of some of the key moments of the Cattle-Killing; draws attention to the 
magnitude of the catastrophe and to the fact that Nongqawuse survived it; and 
makes absolutely no mention of the colonial role or response to the Cattle-Killing. In 
short, it works as a backdrop against which the play is set (off). The play is divided 
into five scenes, the most important being, in my view, the third as it operates as an 
interpretive hinge for the whole episode.
The third scene of the play is set inside Commissioner Brownlee’s home and 
it deals with a number of the major perspectives on the catastrophe of 1856 – 7. The 
scene opens with Charles Brownlee and his wife (she is left unnamed throughout the 
play) holding a discussion about Nongqawuse’s prophecy in which Charles puts 
forward the notion of the chiefs’ plot (that the chiefs orchestrated the prophecies so 
as to starve their people and cause them to attack the British).51 However, as he is 
explaining the theory two other people arrive, they are a missionary and Hugh 
Brownlee – Mrs Brownlee’s brother. These two posit a different way of looking at the 
prophecy and its results, although they do this from two different perspectives. Hugh 
argues that “[n]ew ideas, opinions and institutions can be built only on the ruins of the 
old” and that, as such, the catastrophe should not be viewed as a “national suicide” 
but rather as a “process of metamorphosis” or “childbirth”.52
This process, according to the character of Hugh, will unfold along a process 
of evolutionary theory, particularly the survival of the fittest. He argues that those that 
survive this catastrophe will be the more intelligent and less superstitious individuals,
                                               
50 Visser and Couzens, (1985: pp 3 – 29)
51 Ibid, pp 15 and 16
52 Ibid, p 18
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people who could become part of a more modern nation. The missionary argues a 
very similar point; however he suggests that the process will be more spiritual. He 
suggests that in the point of despair, when the prophecy has failed and the Xhosa 
are starving, they will be forced to turn to God for guidance and that at that moment 
the Xhosa nation will be saved.53 In both arguments, the price of the catastrophe is 
not considered to be too high as the result will be a people who trust in Western 
Science and the Christian religion, becoming modern through throwing themselves 
on to the mercy of the colonial administration. In other words, it is suggested that the 
Cattle-Killing should not be viewed as a national suicide (we might read this as self 
inflicted genocide) but rather as a much-needed cure that would ensure the health of 
the nation. It is in this discussion that the shift is also made from Nongqawuse as the 
main character to the nation as main character.
In the first scene of the play we meet the character in whose name it has 
been written. Nongqawuse is presented as an incredibly beautiful young woman who, 
through her beauty, has many of the chiefs – including Sarhili – believing her 
prophecy. This presentation of the belief in Nongqawuse’s prophecy in this way is in 
keeping with the general tone towards women in the play – where they are significant 
only as mothers, wives, or those that lure men.54 Through exposing Nongqawuse’s 
inner turmoil, the play gets to the heart of one of Dhlomo’s chief pillars of the nation, 
namely the individual. Nongqawuse is torn between, on the one hand, her love for 
Mazwi – an unbeliever – and her responsibility towards the nation – which she 
describes as being loved by everyone and therefore by no-one.55 In the end, she 
decides to deny herself her own love so as to fulfil the love of the nation, to make 
                                               
53 Ibid, pp 18 – 19
54 Ibid, p 5; see also the general attitude towards Brownlee’s wife – from scene three onwards 
– and the other female helpers in the play.
55 Ibid, pp 5, 7 and 9
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herself a great individual so as to make the nation great.56 The second scene of the 
play continues with this theme.
This scene is set at a meeting between the chiefs, Sarhili, and his councillors 
at a large kraal. In this scene, the question is broached as to why the prophecies 
have not yet been fulfilled. It is in this context that Sarhili’s chief councillor argues that 
the “race suffers through the sins of its highly-placed leaders”, by which he means 
those that have not slaughtered their cattle.57 Guided by the notion that the “sins of 
great men become the sins of the race they represent” Sarhili (called Kreli in the 
play) instructs Mhlakaza to divine who is responsible, with the result that he declares 
that the chiefs that have not slaughtered are the reason why the prophecy has not 
been fulfilled. The scene closes with Sarhili declaring that individuals, by whom he 
means the other chiefs but it resonates with Nongqawuse’s dilemma earlier, must 
“lose themselves in the race”.58 In other words, whereas Nongqawuse became a 
great individual through denying her own desires and fulfilling those of the nation, the 
chiefs who did not slaughter maintained their own desires and thereby – in the eyes 
of Sarhili and others – sacrificed the nation. Of course, in the light of the third scene, 
whereas Nongqawuse and Sarhili both thought that they were either preserving the 
nation in its current state or returning it to its former glory, in reality they were curing it 
through purging it of the elements that resisted progress, namely superstition and 
tribalism – the nation would not be the same again.
In the fourth scene we see the relief effort underway: Mr and Mrs Brownlee 
and Hugh are providing material assistance and the missionary is providing 
assistance on a spiritual level. The clear result of the catastrophe is that the Xhosa 
people are becoming entirely dependent on the colonial administration, both for 
physical and spiritual well being. People are beginning to reject their old beliefs as 
superstition due to the prophecies not coming true. In the midst of this scenario the 
                                               
56 Ibid, p 11
57 Ibid, p 13
58 Ibid, p 15
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missionary and Hugh begin to have a discussion about whether or not there should 
be variety in life – a very thinly veiled discussion of whether the Xhosa should 
become exactly like the British or if they should maintain some sort of difference –
which is not resolved.59 In the final scene (set a few months later) we see the long 
term benefits of the prophecy being lived. There are a number of conversations 
occurring around the question of death – the scene focuses on an old man that is 
dying – and how, after Nongqawuse, death no longer needs to be feared because 
there now (through converting to Christianity) is a hope of resurrection. A key 
element in this scene is the number of hints that occur to indicate that not all have 
abandoned the traditional Xhosa customs, particularly when it comes to medicine. 
However, the scene abruptly ends with the old man having a vision and then
promptly dying. In the vision he states that those that died as a result of the 
catastrophe are in fact grateful to Nongqawuse because she saved the nation from 
their superstitions and tribalism.60
It is interesting that this occurs during an attempt to heal the sick – and a 
discussion of the correct medicines to do this – as it returns us to the question at the 
heart of the play, namely, whether the catastrophe was a national suicide or a cure. 
In the final moments of the play, when the elderly man is having his vision, 
Nongqawuse is presented, drawing from Catholic theology, almost as a Mary figure 
as those around her refer to her as their liberator – this is marked in the scene by the 
arrival of Tiyo Soga (considered by Dhlomo as a father of the African nation) at the 
house of the dying man.61 Although Nongqawuse declares in the old man’s vision 
that she was well meaning but misguided, Dhlomo’s notion of the “new African” 
allows a different reading. As both Peterson and Couzens have argued, the new 
                                               
59 Ibid, p 25
60 Ibid, p 29
61 Peterson, (2000: p 197)
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African in Dhlomo’s writing is strikingly similar to the new people from Nongqawuse’s 
prophecy.62
A Play called Nongqawuse
The above discussion on Dhlomo’s play is interesting on a number of levels that are 
pertinent to the discussion here. Firstly, it is interesting in its similarities to Peires’ 
work. Both Peires and Dhlomo are interested in interpreting the 1856 – 7 catastrophe 
as a defining moment in the emergence of an African nation, although they have 
differing concepts of the nation and who is included in it. While Dhlomo does afford 
Nongqawuse a little more agency in his play than Peires does in his book, both works 
are similar in the sense that they name the catastrophe through Nongqawuse but 
both effectively exclude her from being truly central to the event. Secondly, Dhlomo’s 
play is interesting in that it is clearly a vehicle for interpellation into a specific political 
ideology. Of course, this promise of the nation which the play draws people into was 
bound to fail (as was argued in the first chapter) and the beginnings of this failure 
could be seen in the 1936 Native Bills which effectively sounded the death knoll for 
any future prospects of African assimilation into what then constituted the South 
African nation (this is reflected in the tone of Dhlomo’s later work). Finally, this play is 
interesting in that it reinforces the notion that not all plays that are based on an 
historical theme will work to re-articulate the discipline of history, as this play clearly 
leaves it intact – both as a discipline and as a national alibi. 
The more recent play titled ‘Nongqawuse: the Truth Commission’ and written 
and performed by the Community Arts Project in Cape Town may prove to be more 
useful in this regard.63 The tone is set by the title of the play which is very provocative 
in terms of the misreadings that it allows. On the one hand, the title could imply that 
                                               
62 Ibid, p 197 and Couzens, (1985: p 271)
63 Tamara Guhrs and Nhlanhla Mavundla, Nongqawuse: the Truth Commission, (Cape Town: 
Community Arts Project, 2002), unpublished
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the event that has come to be associated with Nongqawuse functioned as a Truth 
Commission of sorts – here it would be necessary to view the Truth Commission as a 
means of restoring or curing the nation – a concept that is quite close to Dhlomo’s 
argument.64 On the other hand, the title could intend a juxtaposition between the two 
in which the question would arise ‘which one was/is more effective’. Still further, it 
may imply – and it seems that this is the meaning that the playwrights intended – that 
the play will seek to get to the heart of the Truth about the 1856 – 7 catastrophe.
In any case this play, which draws heavily on Peires’ The Dead Will Arise for 
its historical content – as well as the opening scene of Dhlomo’s play discussed 
above, deals with history – as the title would imply – in a very interesting manner. Set 
in South Africa in 2002, and then modified slightly for its schools tour in 2004, the 
play sets out to ask how a nation is to deal with its painful past.65 A number of high 
school history students are given an assignment for the holidays in which they must 
investigate the stories surrounding the Cattle-Killing movement of 1856 – 7. Two 
students in particular, Lukes and Sparks, travel to the Eastern Cape where they 
encounter a number of elderly people who give them different perspectives on the 
event.66
The stories that they are told are the normal run of the mill theories that 
Peires contends with in his narrative on the event, with one crucial difference. In 
Peires’ account the different contributing factors, meanings and interpretations were 
deliberately maintained in a particular dispersion, which Peires actually policed by 
instructing his readers which parts to read and when to do so. For example, it is clear 
in Peires’ text that the war of Mlanjeni serves as a backdrop to the event and that 
Hintsa’s death was an emotional catalyst for Sarhili, not a current stimulant. 
                                               
64 One thinks here of Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, (London: Rider, 1999), 
where he argues that the purpose of the TRC was primarily the restoration/healing of the 
nation.
65 Community Arts Project, Funding Proposal for Nongqawuse: the Truth Commision, 
February 2003 
66 Guhrs and Mavundla, (2004: scene 3, stanza 1)
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However, in the play these events become blurred into each other, presented almost 
as though they are occurring simultaneously. In scene three, the betrayal and death 
of Hintsa, Harrismith’s derogatory attitude towards the Xhosa chiefs, Grey’s civilizing 
mission, Eyre’s brutality, and Mlanjeni’s prophecy are all presented concurrently – in 
short succession of each other – with the teacher as the conductor between them. 
The blurring of time that occurs in this presentation, through unsettling a key element 
of disciplinary history – namely the chronology of events in time – works, I would like 
to argue, to undermine the disciplinary integrity of the discipline.
Towards the end of this scene, during a freestyle rap (a mode of poetry that is 
consistently used throughout the play in order to ensure that the young audience is 
always involved and, one might say, enrapt by the unfolding drama) that works to 
summarise the story thus far, the Nongqawuse story is tied firmly into the present. 
The characters of Lukes and Sparks ask the question: “2004, what has changed my 
brothers?” this question ties into an earlier statement that is made by one of the 
passengers in the taxi on the way to the Eastern Cape, namely: that Nongqawuse’s 
prophecies are the same as the promises that politicians make during election times 
– they are never fulfilled. Here, in a manner that resonates with the discussion about 
the recent use of Nongqawuse as a marker of the current political situation in South 
Africa that was discussed in the introduction, the story of Nongqawuse is put forward 
as a vehicle for engaging in the political struggles of the present. This question is 
returned to at the end of the play.
In the final scene, the students are back at school and are discussing their 
holiday research project with their teacher. One of the characters, Mzukisi, makes the 
pronouncement that “History is full of pain, blood and tears” as opposed to truth or 
answers and, later, another character, Sabelo, declares that “history leaves us full of 
questions”. These assertions of the limit of history operate on a very different level to 
the comments by Peires towards the end of his account where he suggests that his 
version of the history is not definitive, in the sense that it may be possible to write the 
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history along a different politics.67 The difference between the two expressions of 
limitation is that in Peires the reader is left in no doubt as to the validity of the 
‘historical fact’ that has been presented, whereas in the play the very notion of the 
discipline of history’s recourse to fact is placed under question. As the organisers of 
the play state in their funding proposal: “[the play] encourages people to question the 
very nature of history itself.”68
The final lines of the play return us to the question of the Truth Commission, 
and thereby to the question of the political use of history, which has been 
conspicuously absent from the play since the title. The characters in the play ask for 
a Truth Commission to decide how Nongqawuse should be remembered. 
Interestingly, this question is then turned to the audience who are asked to adjudicate 
the memory of Nongqawuse (the audience generally seems to declare that 
Nongqawuse should be honoured). It may be productive here to think of how this 
question might be phrased differently: in the light of the above reading of the play, the 
return to the question of a Truth Commission and the request of the audience to 
adjudicate the memory of Nongqawuse might be read as an investigation of the 
effectiveness of this story for the future. Not in a simple moralistic notion whereby we 
must learn our apparent lesson from the past, but rather in the sense that the blurring 
of history in its articulation with politics (and the effect of this on nation) might 
productively posit a space where it might be possible to think differently of the future. 
Here Nongqawuse (as sign) might be viewed as a space clearing gesture that may 
create the conditions for an arrival of the ‘other’.
                                               
67 Peires, (2003: p 341)
68 Community Arts Project, 2003
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Hysterical Theatre?
Politics broods over those fields of bones.
Brett Bailey1
Therein consists the difference between hysteria and 
psychosis: hysteria/history is more than a trivial word game –
hysteria is the subject’s way of resisting the prevailing, 
historically specified form of interpellation or symbolic 
identification. 
Hysteria means failed interpellation…
Slavoj Zizek2
The discussion in the previous chapter centred largely on how the Historical Play 
might work to destabilize the discipline of history from within. In other words, through 
looking at Peires, Dhlomo, and a play by the Community Arts Project (CAP), it asked 
the question of the relation of the play to history. This historical play, latent within the 
written discipline and sometimes explicitly performed on stage, works to unsettle the 
discipline’s claims to represent truthful or ‘empirically accurate’ versions of the past. 
As such, I argue, it works to destabilize History’s position as alibi for any claim to a 
constituted whole – whether it is nation, identity, or discipline. Clearly, as was 
demonstrated through the discussion of Dhlomo’s play, not all plays work as 
Historical Plays and, those that do (such as the CAP play) do not do so fully: even 
though in the CAP play the audience was asked to adjudicate Nongqawuse’s 
memory, it was still unable to engage with Nongqawuse as a central figure in the 
actual play, except in her absence.
                                               
1 Brett Bailey, The Plays of Miracle and Wonder, (Cape Town: Double Story Books, 2003), p 
153
2 Slavoj Zizek, For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a political factor, (London; New 
York: Verso, 1991), p 101
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In pursuing the implications of the questions of representation and textuality in 
the discipline of history, this chapter starts with an absence of a different sort. 
Somewhere around the year 1960 George Milwa Mnyaluza Pemba penned and 
directed an amateur play on the story of Nongqawuse. There is very little known of 
this play. Even the script is long lost, compelling us in the absence of the script to 
begin with a brief discussion of Pemba himself. It is clear, when comparing the 
details that are narrated about Pemba’s life in a number of biographies and news 
reports, that the general pattern of this story has been set and followed for a number 
of years.3
According to this story, Pemba was born in 1912, was educated in the 
Mission School system: he attended Van Der Kemp Mission School, where he 
adopted the name ‘George’ to avoid being teased, and then Paterson Secondary 
School on a Grey scholarship. Thereafter he enrolled to study teaching at Lovedale 
Teacher Training College in 1931.4 During this same year he was admitted to Victoria 
Hospital due to an acute case of appendicitis and after his stay at the hospital, was 
granted four months of personal tuition with Austin Winter Moore, a professor of Art 
at Rhodes University.5 Sometime during the period of 1938 – 1941 Pemba met with 
the poet S. E. K. Mqhahi and, while on his “Grand Tour” to view all the various ethnic 
South African cultures in their own setting, Pemba also met H. I. E. Dhlomo – both of 
whom, it is argued by Hudleston, strongly influenced Pemba’s politics.6 The struggle 
that Pemba faced in trying to pursue his painting – he constantly had to work full-time 
and paint part-time, working on one occasion as an officer of the court and, later, 
                                               
3 The biographies that are being used here are Hayden Proud and Barry Feinberg (eds), 
George Milwa Mnyaluza Pemba: Retrospective Exhibition, (Cape Town: South African 
National Gallery and Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape, 1996) and Sarah 
Hudleston, Against All Odds: George Pemba: His Life and Works, (Johannesburg: Jonathon 
Ball Publishers, 1996). A profile on Pemba, published by The African Horizon and reproduced 
in Hudleston (1996: p 36) is written along a very similar outline of the ‘main’ events of 
Pemba’s life.
4 Proud and Feinberg, (1996: pp 20 – 21) and Hudleston, (1996: p 19)
5 Proud and Feinberg, (1996: p 23); this was granted to him on the basis of the portraits that 
he drew while in hospital.
6 Hudleston, (1996: pp 37 and 47)
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running his own “Spaza shop.” These elements of his life story feature quite 
prominently in all of the biographies until, in 1968, the International Defence and Aid 
Fund (IDAF) began to support Pemba as he was housing the children of his brother 
who had joined uMkhonto We Sizwe.7
Pemba was also involved in politics, being both a member of the ANC as well 
as of the Federation of South African Women in Port Elizabeth,8 but was never an 
activist in the strictest sense, preferring rather to laugh at those who would be 
oppressors. Paradoxically however, Pemba’s politics were strongly marked by a 
committment to the British Monarchy while simultaneously proclaiming pride in his 
own Xhosa heritage.9 This apparent conflict may possibly have been managed by 
Pemba through his desire to transform British nationalism into African nationalism.10
However, Hudleston quotes Pemba, writing in his personal diary about the politics of 
being a ‘Bantu’ artist, as stating that it “means offering something completely new to 
the world, something which can only be offered by a native.”11 This comment might 
indicate the extent to which the racial ideologies of Europe had coloured his thinking. 
In accordance with this view, Pemba practiced a moderate politics along lines similar 
to that of Dhlomo. 
Considering Pemba’s stated aim in his production of art, namely “to develop 
an international art form, not one contained by nationalism”12 Jacqueline Nolte 
argues that contained within Pemba’s art is the conflict between his apparent political 
aim of moving beyond nationalism (which probably implied being assimilated into 
British nationalism) and his aesthetic desire for wholeness (indicated in the above 
                                               
7 Proud and Feinberg, (1996: pp 26 – 28)
8 In fact, Pemba was the only male member of this organization for some time, see Proud and 
Feinberg, (1996: p 26); Huddleston, (1996: p 51)
9 Hudleston, (1996: pp 18 – 19)
10 Jacqueline Nolte, ‘ Sources and Style in the Oil Paintings of George Milwa Mnyaluza 
Pemba’ in Proud and Feinberg, (1996: p 36)
11 Ibid, p 42
12 Ibid, p 12
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through his almost obsession with pristine ‘native’ culture).13 According to Nolte, 
Pemba’s paintings cannot simply be viewed as a form of historical commentary on 
township life as, apart from Pemba’s own refusal of a characterization along the 
above lines, the pieces contain too many “ambiguities, contradictions, and 
constructions” to be taken ‘simply’ on any level. Rather, they should be viewed as 
artworks that engage with, emerge out of and, to some extent, constitute the 
historical time in which they were produced.14 Building her argument about the 
contradiction between Pemba’s politics and his aesthetics, Nolte suggests that in 
Pemba’s art the particular becomes very important, as he is concerned with the 
whole, whether in terms of personal relations or the nation.15 In other words, Nolte 
argues that Pemba’s paintings are always balanced and complete in an all 
encompassing and general manner, while simultaneously containing an intensely 
detailed focus on individuals as standing separate from the whole, something which 
she suggests indicates this conflict. A final point, which will allow a return to the 
question of Pemba’s play, is the circumstances surrounding Pemba’s father’s death 
in 1928. According to Hudleston, a sangoma prophesied Pemba’s father’s death six 
years before the event took place and, crucially for the purposes of this discussion, it 
took place in the exact manner and at the exact time that the Sangoma had 
specified.16 This event raises the distinct possibility that Pemba would have had good 
cause to believe that prophecies can be fulfilled.
It is through Pemba’s art that it becomes possible to return to his absent play 
with which this discussion opened. A number of years after the production of his play 
titled ‘The Girl Who Killed to Save’17 – a clear reference to Dhlomo’s play, on which 
his play was apparently based – Pemba produced a number of paintings narrating 
the story of the event. One of these paintings, titled ‘The Dream’, is particularly 
                                               
13 Ibid, p 66
14 Ibid, p 33
15 Ibid, p 38
16 Hudleston, (1996: p 57)
17 Ibid, p 60
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interesting for the current discussion.18 Of immediate interest is the title of the 
painting, ‘The Dream’, which is also the description given of Nongqawuse’s prophecy 
in a review of the play, to which I will return later. The title is interesting in that it 
seems to alter the medium through which Nongqawuse would have received the 
prophecy. Rather than receiving it through a vision at the river’s edge, it is possible to 
read the title as implying that she would have received it while in a state of sleep. If 
this is how Pemba constructed the reception of the prophecy in his play, then it would 
seem to immediately remove any notion that Governor Grey somehow conveyed the 
prophecy to Nongqawuse as an act of deception. Of course, the title might also 
simply imply that the vision was given in a trance-like state and, thus, may not 
altogether alter the possible interpretation.
The painting depicts Sarhili and his councillors sitting on the left of the 
painting filling it from top to bottom. On the right hand side of the painting stands 
Mhlakaza’s entourage, also filling it from top to bottom. In the background there are 
rolling hills, ending in mountains, with a number of huts lining the edge just before the 
mountain. Fixed squarely between Sarhili and Mhlakaza, although hovering in the 
background, are the Xhosa subjects who are watching eagerly for the outcome of the 
meeting. Nongqawuse is depicted here as a young woman in ‘traditional’ clothing, 
she is clasping her hands together in what seems to be a nervous pose – the cause 
of her nervousness (i.e. it could be her being before the king, or that it isn’t her 
prophecy, or that she is scared of the consequences) is not known, and her body 
seems to have been painted red with ochre. Overshadowing her is Mhlakaza, 
reaching out his hand towards Sarhili as if presenting her to him so that she may tell 
him the prophecy or, quite possibly, emphasizing the presence of the people and the 
effect that the prophecy is intended to have for them and Sarhili. Both Sarhili and his 
                                               
18 The Dream (1989), oil on board. Collection of the SA National Gallery, Cape Town, (cat. 
No. 117) reproduced in Proud and Feinberg, (1996: p 104)
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advisor/bodyguard have expressions on their faces that cause them to seem a little 
perturbed by the situation.
If we read this painting along the lines of the above discussion it becomes 
possible to intimate that in the play Nongqawuse was portrayed, not as the cause of 
the prophecy per se, but rather as the tool that was deployed by Mhlakaza and, 
following the general nationalist politics of Pemba, that the prophecy may have been 
for the good of the nation. However, the review of Pemba’s play works to moderate 
this reading somewhat.19 The reviewer is unnamed. I suspect the reviewer to be 
Athol Fugard. Fugard moved to the Port Elizabeth area in the early 1960s and may 
have had an association with Pemba’s play. The reviewer presents the story of the 
play as one of regret since the prophecies led to the eventual demise of the Xhosa 
nation. S/he describes the play as both outstanding, despite Pemba’s self declared 
lack of knowledge about theatre, and shocking to someone used to the high theatre 
life. As s/he states: “He put it there [meaning on the stage] with a crudity and a 
directness that violated just about everyone [sic] of the cherished western theatre 
conventions.”20
Apart from the manner in which the play was put together with no props, no 
lighting, and no subtle or intricate scene changes, it was the response and interaction 
of the audience that most caught the reviewer’s attention. The audience “interjected, 
and laughed at the moments of highest tragedy and at the end listened in absolute 
silence when a local poet jumped onto stage and proposed a vote of confidence in 
the play.”21 From this description it is possible to argue that the reason why the 
audience laughed at “the moments of highest tragedy” is that these were the 
consequences of believing in what Dhlomo would have called superstition. In other 
                                               
19 ‘Review of a play by a black theatre company in Port Elizabeth’, author and date unknown, 
Athol Fugard Collection, The Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Hereafter 
referred to as ‘The Review’. From the review we know that the play took place on the 11th
March in the Crispin Hall in Port Elizabeth.
20 The Review, p 2
21 ibid
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words, the laughter may have signalled that there was no longer room for such 
concepts within the regime of truth in which the audience operated thereby affirming 
Dhlomo’s views.
Although the reviewer indicates that the overwhelming majority in the 
audience approved of the play, including the ANC, s/he also points out that there was 
some criticism levelled as well. This criticism, according to the reviewer, centred on 
the fact that the play did not deal with the prophecy as a deliberate concoction to 
destroy the Xhosa. However, the reviewer does not seem too distracted by these 
different interpretations of the prophecy, asserting rather that “if this beginning can be 
fostered and sustained … then South Africa will see the emergence of a theatre of 
power and significance.”22
While there are various interpretations that may be brought forward about 
Pemba’s play (a play that in its absence seems to both proliferate and resist reading) 
what is clear from the above discussion is that the play was most likely deployed in 
the service of constituting or supporting Xhosa (though possibly extending beyond 
this to ‘black’) nationalism. Quite clearly, as the references to the presence of the 
ANC in the review of the play suggests, one of the reasons for the staging of the play 
was the critiquing and challenging of the emergent system of segregation. However, 
it was also quite clearly not done so strategically, in the sense that was called for in 
the first two chapters of this dissertation and, as such, continues to operate within 
(and implicitly reinforce) that which it attempts to critique.
Reading Differently: Crais after Peires
If we were to continue a discussion of the disagreements between Peires and Crais, 
we might arrive at a different reading of the Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856 – 7 that 
bears on the review of Pemba’s play. As such, in this following section I will discuss 
                                               
22 ibid, p 3
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Crais’ arguments with regard to the prophecies of Nongqawuse through offering a 
reading of his The Making of the Colonial Order: White Supremacy and Black 
Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1770 – 1865.23 I would like to set the tone for the 
reading of his book by drawing from Crais’ introduction where he states that in his 
book he wants to consider “a dialogue between problems of context, causality, and 
agency”, on the one hand, and “power, discourse and representation” (what he terms 
the postmodern critique), on the other.24 Effectively Crais suggests here that in The 
Making of the Colonial Order, through a strategy of reading differently, the problem of 
identity and representation in history may be addressed. The confidence may be 
overstated.
Central to Crais’ argument is the notion that a shift took place during the 
transition from Dutch to British rule at the Cape.25 He argues that the British brought 
with them new techniques of governmentality based on surveillance and the 
disciplining of the body rather than on the paternalism of an earlier Dutch rule. He 
argues for example that there was a necessary move away from slavery and towards 
a wage labour market that was assisted by the “commodification of land”26 and the 
colonization of the mind through mission education.27 Here Crais suggests that an 
inversion took place where the high ideals of emancipation were transformed into the 
ideological construction of the other along race lines; an ideology that he argues 
would become the key driving force of Imperial colonialism.28 Of course, Crais’ 
arguments have not always been well received by South African historians. It may be 
worth considering criticisms of Crais’ representation of the Cattle-Killing movement.
In her review of The Making of the Colonial Order Shula Marks suggests that 
Crais’ book is “in many ways a powerful and persuasive long essay on power and 
                                               
23 Clifton C. Crais, The Making of the Colonial Order: White Supremacy and Black Resistance 
in the Eastern Cape, 1770 – 1865, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992)
24 Crais, (1992: p 2)
25 Ibid, p 2
26 Ibid, p 168
27 Ibid, p 3
28 Ibid, p 149
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culture”.29 However, Marks argues that there are a number of key problems in Crais’ 
book which lead to serious doubts of detail as well as of some of his central 
hypotheses. One of the key areas that she critiques is his application of Foucault’s 
works. Marks suggests Crais does this too mechanically as he does not seriously 
analyze the development of the state even as he argues that corporeal punishment 
(the domination of the body) was a central element of British rule.30 In addition Marks 
suggests that Crais’ understanding of British racism is both contradictory and over 
simple, as she states in relation to the notion that the ideology of the other – which 
Crais says developed out of material self interest – was the driving force behind 
colonialism: “This is to confuse the racist language of difference with the specificities 
of racist laws and practices in different historical contexts”.31 Later Marks suggests 
that Crais has not sufficiently supported his arguments as, in an argument which 
hinges on the emergence of class consciousness and a shift from patriarchy; he has 
not done any serious class analysis or analysis of the construction of gender. In 
short, Marks states that “the cloth is more complex, the pattern more intricate, the 
weave more uneven, than Crais would have us believe.”32
Similarly, Peires argues, apart from attacking Crais for his inability to speak 
Xhosa, that he completely misreads the importance of the arrival of the 1820 settlers 
in the Eastern Cape. Rather than assuming that these settlers were significant as 
producers, Peires suggests that their real importance lies as bringers of mercantile 
capitalism.33 Apart from these criticisms, Peires also takes issue with Crais’ notion 
that the Eastern Cape was significant as an arena for the emergence of white 
                                               
29 Shula Marks, ‘Racial Capitalism: A Cultural or Economic System?’ in South African 
Historical Journal, vol 28, (1993), p 313
30 Marks, (1993: p 314)
31 Ibid, p 315
32 Ibid, p 316
33 Jeff Peires, ‘Pinning the Tail on the Donkey’, in South African Historical Journal, vol 28, 
(1993), 
p 320
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supremacy in Southern Africa when, he argues, its significance is rather the 
emergence of a somewhat problematic and unsustainable Cape liberalism.34
A review that is written in a somewhat less condescending tone is that of 
Susan Newton-King. Newton-King argues that, while Crais’ book is “squarely 
revisionist”, it is so with a difference, namely, it tries to place culture at centre stage.35
While King is more sympathetic in her reading of Crais than either Marks or Peires, 
she does suggest that Crais’ book fails as it doesn’t follow through with any of the 
“hermeneutic devices” that it introduces.36 While many were critical of Peires’ book, 
writers such as Gunther Pakendorf, for example, thought that it was delightful.37
In the light of the above reviews, I want to return to Crais’ narrative at a point 
where it begins to overlap with Peires’ The Dead Will Arise, namely, at the War of 
Mlanjeni. Crais argues that by the time of the War of Mlanjeni the new techniques of 
governmentality, and its effects, were already in full swing: there was an immense 
pressure on ‘natives’ to become wage labourers due to the imposition of fines, taxes, 
rent, and the pound system (and the consequent evictions of those that couldn’t pay); 
land was being organized into manageable units (commodified, as Crais says later); 
and there was a growing emergence of a common class consciousness among those 
that were being evicted or dispossessed of their land.38 A key element in Crais’ 
argument here is the Kat River Settlement. He argues that initially the settlement was 
organized in line with colonial intentions: it was made up of Protestant individuals, 
had a capitalist market, and promoted the ownership of private property.39 However, 
Crais suggests that there was still a class separation and, by the 1850s, the 
                                               
34 Peires, (1993: p 321)
35 Susan Newton-King, ‘Crais’ Narrative History’, in South African Historical Journal, vol 28, 
(1993), p 322
36 Newton-King, (1993: p 323)
37 Gunther Pakendorf, ‘The Eastern Cape Revisited’, in South African Historical Journal, vol 
28, (1993), p 328
38 Crais, (1992: pp 142 – 174)
39 Ibid, p 161
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settlement had become characteristic of the new colonial order, namely, 
dispossession and eviction for those that weren’t wage labourers.
When in 1851 those that were dispossessed in the Kat River Settlement 
heard rumours of the prophecies of Mlanjeni, a hope for resistance began to emerge. 
Crais suggests that, at least among the Xhosa, it was rumoured that the young 
Mlanjeni was in fact Nxele returned from the dead and that he had the power both to 
defeat the British and to break the drought that was ravaging the area. This common 
hope, according to Crais, led to a revolutionary climate in the region. As such, Crais 
elects to read the war of resistance that was fought, both by the Xhosa as well as the 
members of the Kat River Settlement, against the British not simply as that, 
resistance, but rather as a proletarian movement, a class conflict.40 While Crais does 
admit that a historical consciousness may be discerned in the remembrance of the 
past and how it was lost, he argues that it wasn’t simply about this. Rather, drawing 
on a statistic that suggests that most of those that rebelled were either dispossessed 
of their land or were in fear of being dispossessed due to the impending Vagrancy 
Bill, he argues that it was about resisting the new colonial order of wage labour.41
He turns his attention particularly to the ‘Cattle-Killing’ episode by asserting 
that he generally agrees with Peires’ representation of the event but that he holds a 
different interpretation of it than Peires.42 He reiterates the notion that the cause of 
the war of Mlanjeni was not simply a desire for a return to the precolonial but rather 
that it emanated from a reaction to the new colonial order that was characterized by a 
discourse of the other. Crais sets the stage for the arrival of Governor Grey whose 
arrival in 1854 occurs in the midst of a severe drought in the Eastern Cape and in the 
wake of the resettlement of Sandile and Maqoma and the punitive cattle raids that 
Smith led (in which 60 000 cattle were taken) after the end of the war of Mlanjeni.43
                                               
40 Ibid, p 179
41 Ibid, pp 176 – 188
42 Ibid, p 191
43 Ibid, pp 192 – 197
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Being absolutely convinced of his duty to civilize the ‘native’, Grey then set about 
implementing his policies aimed at ensuring both control and labour. As such, Grey 
appointed magistrates (who paid the chiefs and other headmen directly, thus 
breaking the chief’s recourse to patronage), instituted schools and missions, and 
implemented a village system whereby it was only possible to settle in prescribed 
areas.44 The end result of all these measures, according to Crais, was the 
strengthening of the emergence of a Xhosa working class.
In this context Crais suggests that the prophecies of Nongqawuse must be 
understood. With the immanent death of thousands of cattle due to the lungsickness 
that began to spread in 1855, Crais argues that the prophecies were a “single text of 
historical and symbolic production” that promised “an escape into history”.45 Echoing 
Peires’ assertion that the principle reason why some believed and some didn’t was 
class, Crais argues that it was the landless, disenfranchised, and those most 
threatened by the new order – namely the chiefs – that embraced the prophecies as 
an act of class resistance.46 Quite clearly, although Crais asserts that he brings a 
different interpretation to the ‘cattle-killing’, namely one of class, what Crais does is 
actually take what was implicit but absolutely crucial in Peires’ account and make it 
explicit in his.
In the aftermath of the catastrophe, Crais argues that Xhosa society was 
entirely disintegrated through the requirement that individuals become labourers so 
that they could get assistance. A further impact of the ‘Cattle-Killing’ was a greater 
stratification of what remained of Xhosa society as well as a shift in gender roles 
where men began to work the fields and women took on more domestic chores. 
Finally, for Crais, the result of the catastrophe was that the Xhosa began to think in 
terms of national identity. This served as a trigger for resistance about one hundred 
years later against apartheid.
                                               
44 Ibid, pp199 – 202
45 Ibid, p 206
46 Ibid, p 209
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Having provided a brief discussion of the main moves that Crais makes in 
addressing the ‘cattle-killing’ in the discussion above, it is now necessary to engage 
with the question of the implications of Crais’ study – remembering, of course, that he 
claims to deal with problems of representation and identity in it. The first implication 
of his narrative has to do with the degree of agency that is afforded to Nongqawuse. 
Through foregrounding the emergence of a class consciousness as the key 
contributing factor and, almost paradoxically, as a key result of both the War of 
Mlanjeni and the policies of governor Grey, Crais manages to effectively elide 
Nongqawuse almost altogether. She is not present in Crais’ narrative as an agent in 
this whole affair but simply as a point from which a prophecy was uttered. The 
subaltern cannot even attempt to speak. Interestingly, although Crais places much 
emphasis on the reading of the prophecy, it is clear from his analysis that the actual 
content of the prophecy itself was not important. What is important is that it gave a 
strategy for apparent class resistance.
A further point of interest with regard to Crais’ foregrounding of class is the 
affinity that it has with exactly the type of historical work that Ranajit Guha was 
attempting to critique in his ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’, specifically the way in 
which villagers’ own explanation for the event is replaced by a Marxist one.47 Quite 
clearly Crais’ – and for that matter Peires’ – narrative fails when it is made to contend 
with the rigour required of a project of deconstructing historiography, as Spivak 
termed it. 
Throughout Crais’ discussion of prophecy in his narrative, in relation to 
Nongqawuse but also to Mlanjeni, the prophetic is feminised through Crais’ 
references to “uterine wetness” that he associates with the scenes of the prophecies, 
namely rivers. The prophecies, as feminine, through reference to “liminal space”, are 
then revealed as being inadequate in themselves; the prevalence of these terms is 
                                               
47 Ranajit Guha, ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’ in Ranajit Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies II, 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp 1 – 42
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something that Peires also identified in his review of Crais.48 The significance of what 
I have termed the ‘feminisation’ of the prophetic is made apparent when it is recalled 
that all the prophecies in Crais’ narrative fail. Although they serve as catalysts for 
action, the specific actions that they intend are never fully followed and never 
completely fulfilled. As such, the implicit argument in Crais’ narrative is that the 
feminine is not a useful – or, rather, is an inadequate – tool for resistance to power. 
So, in Crais, Nongqawuse is doubly absent. She is absent not simply as an agent but 
also, crucially, as a part of the feminine that is declared unfit. 
Bringing this particular reading of Crais to its furthest conclusion, and in a 
manner that resonates with Spivak’s critique of Foucault and Deleuze, one might 
argue that in the act of writing about these prophecies, Crais has not merely elided or 
refused Nongqawuse the possibility of agency but worked to obscure the work of the 
investigating subject. Writing under the guise of heterogeneity, Crais has unwittingly 
perhaps established and masked a homogeneity which excludes and, in effect, 
banishes the subaltern.
A final implication of Crais’ narrative, and one that has an absolutely direct 
bearing on the discipline of history, is his argument that the prophecy heralded hope 
in the form of a return into history. This raises an interesting question/assertion: 
namely, that a return to history and the attempt to stabilize history and current society 
within its boundaries may or will always lead to death. In any case, it is clear from the 
above that Crais’ attempt at writing a history that would fall within the parameters of a 
postmodern critique is, I would argue, although interesting in a number of the points it 
makes, not successful. Of course, it may be precisely because he engages with what 
was then the somewhat in vogue notion of the postmodern rather than with, what I 
would view as, the somewhat more rigorous demand of thinking the postcolonial that 
his project does not succeed – he fails to read differently.
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110
Intoxicating Vision: Bailey’s Hysteria
What remains absent in practically all of the historical or theatrical dealings with the 
1856 – 7 ‘Cattle-Killing’ movement according to the playwright Brett Bailey is an 
attempt to consider “that Nongqawuse might actually have had visions.”49 In other 
words, the event is always explained through recourse to that which unfolds around 
it, whether in the present day or at the time of its happening. As such, it is explained 
by recourse to concepts such as capitalism, nationalism, or gender politics, none of 
which, in Bailey’s view, actually consider either the prophecies or Nongqawuse as 
such. Of course, this criticism implicitly echoes the functionality of emplotment and 
narrativization that Hayden White proposed, namely that we always impose meaning 
on to the history that we narrativise according to our politics. It does this in such a 
way as to, on the one hand, critique histories that have been written like this (which is 
most history) for not adequately dealing with the subaltern (here signified by 
Nongqawuse) and, simultaneously on the other, unsettling this very critique – these 
histories are untenable precisely due to their politics.
Bailey tries to deal with the dilemma of considering the prophecies 
themselves in his play The Prophet. He proclaims that he is not presenting an 
historical narrative which would need to give meaning, but is rather performing a 
healing ritual.50 Despite these claims to not write history Bailey clearly desires to 
historically ground the play. The handing out of pamphlets to the audience explaining 
the history of the event upon leaving the theatre,51 suggests that Bailey is not 
successful in bypassing history. This has prompted historians such as Helen 
Bradford to respond to his play as a work of history. This paradox of both denying 
history and claiming it is precisely where, as I pointed out in the second chapter, I 
argue that the productivity of the Historical Play is located. 
                                               
49 Bailey, (2003: p 155)
50 Cue Interview, Grahamstown Festival, 1999
51 Ibid
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Before moving on to read the proliferation of responses to Bailey’s play as 
well as the play itself, it is necessary to clarify two points: Firstly, Bailey’s play should 
not be read as an attempt to allow the subaltern to speak. Although not articulated in 
these terms, Bailey does have a concern for the voice of the subaltern. However, the 
play is set against the backdrop of Bailey’s realization that “the girl [Nongqawuse] will 
not speak”52 and, as such, tries to deal with that which she might have said, rather 
than with making her explain those words. Secondly, in order to productively engage 
with The Prophet it is necessary to deny Bailey the meddling rights of an author, 
expressed in his assertion that to read “these plays for their ideas or philosophy 
rather than for their drama would be to miss the boat.”53 And rather to argue that the 
drama is precisely in how their ideas and philosophy are handled on the stage. This 
is not to sideline the “drama” as Bailey intends the word but rather to add to it. 
In his foreword to Bailey’s The Plays of Miracle and Wonder, John Matshikiza 
suggests that the significance of the plays lies in the way that they deal with “the 
wounds and schisms of the past [that] are still painfully present”,54 a sentiment that 
resonates with Bailey’s assertion that his plays “must sanctify the world.”55 The very 
fact that Bailey deals with these wounds – the most sensitive being the wound of the 
‘Cattle-Killing’ – has been the locus of much criticism thrown at him. This criticism 
invariably follows the discourse of race whereby individuals query whether Bailey as 
a ‘white’ male has the right or the ability to engage with a ‘black’ person’s story. 
Rather than responding to these criticisms by claiming to be authentically ‘African’ or 
‘black’, as Matshikiza argues on Bailey’s behalf in the foreword to The Plays of 
Miracle and Wonder56, Bailey responds by narrating his own almost prophetic 
                                               
52 Bailey, (2003: p 150)
53 Ibid, p 10
54 Ibid, p 6
55 Ibid, p 156
56 Ibid, p 6; other reviewers have argued similarly, see for example Kate Stegeman, ‘Art, 
Nongqawuse and the Xhosa cattle killing’, in Sunday Independent, 13 August 2006, where 
she argues that “his work seems more authentically African in his approach than Dhlomo’s 
play The Girl Who Killed to Save”.
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spiritual experience – one that constantly lurks under the surface in The Prophet and 
which might, as will be explored later, allow a different interpretation of the play 
altogether. 
This experience, which Bailey says took place in 2003 when he was camping 
on the edge of a dry river bank while hitchhiking from Zimbabwe to Mozambique, is 
invoked in the opening pages of The Plays of Miracle and Wonder and signals the 
beginning of Bailey’s work in theatre.57 In this vision, Bailey was approached by a 
silver-blue snake-man who he says represents the spirit of Africa. This snake man 
indicated to Bailey that the river of life had run dry in Africa and that as a 
consequence the future of Africa lay in a separation from the land through cities and 
industrialization. In this vision Bailey also felt a calling to, through theatre, create a 
space whereby Africa might be healed and that future avoided.58 In other words, 
Bailey’s response to such criticism is to say that he deals with these issues because 
the spirit of Africa has asked him to.
The second main area in which Bailey draws criticism, namely his fondness 
for inhabiting the interstitial, is largely due to his understanding of theatre as a site of 
healing. Bailey elicits the manner through which theatre might operate in this manner 
from his encounters with various kinds of Sangomas in his travels, backed up with his 
reading of Carl Jung’s experience of the same in Uganda.59 According to Bailey, 
Sangomas mediate the space between life and the collective unconscious through a 
process where “performance [becomes] an act of community”, a process which 
Bailey asserts his plays attempt to mimic.60 As such, Bailey trains his actors with 
exercises that he learnt from studying with Sangomas himself; a method that has led 
                                               
57 Bailey, (2003: p 13)
58 Ibid, p 13
59 See for example a discussion of an interview with Bailey in Dawn Kennedy, ‘Shaman of 
theatre can’t be pinned down’, in Sunday Independent, 3 April 2005
60 Bailey, (2003: p 19)
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some reviewers to claim that he exploits his actors, in a spiritual and physical sense 
as opposed to a financial one.61
The operation of what Bailey refers to as interstitial space is crucial to the 
above as it is in the discomfort of that space, in the collisions between the rational 
and dreams, between theatre and ritual, that he argues people are made to confront 
the problems plaguing the nation and themselves, through which healing might 
occur.62 These antinomies that Bailey creates in order to access the “unconscious, 
primal domain”63 of his audience have not always been viewed as providing healing, 
as the subtitle for a review of one of his plays declares: “In Brett Bailey’s nightmarish 
universe nothing is either/or and everything is both. Divisions between life and death, 
good and bad dissolve.”64 In contrast to this, I would argue that it is this very 
exploitation of the interstitial that, rather than dissolving it, shifts the locus of this 
distinction off the stage and into the audience; the site where according to Bailey 
healing can occur.
The troubling nature of Bailey’s aim to enact healing ceremonies in his theatre 
is reflected in the different ways in which this assertion is misunderstood. On the one 
hand, critics of Bailey argue that his work is entirely spiritual, in other words, his work 
is only religious ceremony. A comment that is typical of this understanding was made 
by the interviewer in the Cue interview at the Grahamstown festival in 1999. Here the 
comment was made that Bailey’s play is about voodoo in a final sense, however, 
Bailey responds to this with an emphatic no: the play The Prophet utilizes voodoo 
ceremony as a style, as a form of celebration that allows the telling of such a dark 
and bloody story.65 Of course, Bailey also holds the position that it is ritual, a position 
that culminated in the literal sacrifice of a chicken on stage during the final night of 
                                               
61 See for example, Chris Dunton, ‘Fusing theatre with ritual, anguish with the absurd’, in 
Sunday Independent, 17 August 2003
62 Comments made in Cue Interview, 1999; see also Kennedy, 3 April 2005
63 Kennedy, 3 April 2005
64 Robert Greig, ‘Horrific and funny product of a darker vision’, in Sunday Independent, 14 
July 2002
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the showing of his play iMumbo Jumbo in the Baxter Theatre in Cape Town.66 This 
sacrifice of the chicken also disrupts the second misunderstanding of Bailey’s style, 
namely that he is producing ritualistic theatre.67 The reality is that, for Bailey, his 
plays are both ritual and theatre which operate together in a sacred space, as he 
states in the introductory piece in The Plays of Miracle and Wonder: “the play is the 
shrine and the character of the play determines – and is determined by – the gods 
we want to visit.”68 A further element which works to unsettle the politics of Bailey’s 
plays is his assertion that he is trying to bring about healing in the nation. This 
assertion brings Bailey quite close to the nationalistic politics of Dhlomo.
The Prophet, Bailey’s third play in the trilogy The Plays of Miracle and 
Wonder, is situated in the third and final part of his book on the plays by the same 
name. The title of this third part, ‘Revelations’, carries a double meaning of, on the 
one hand, indicating that the section deals with the prophetic and, on the other hand, 
through a thinly veiled reference to the last book of the New Testament, it indicates 
the apocalyptic nature if its contents. It is this nature of the event that Bailey found 
resisted narrativisation/dramatization to the point of almost “exploding” him.69 It is 
partly due to this resistance in the event which led Bailey to decide to, rather than 
narrativising the “immensely complicated story, [which is] so convoluted, so 
disturbing and blood-soaked”70, to instead attempt to address to some extent the 
problem as it was articulated by Xola Mda, the actor who plays the character of the 
dark priest in The Prophet, namely that “our [Xhosa] things have lost their 
meaning.”71 Bailey’s use of children to enact the actual unfolding events of the cattle-
                                               
66 For an interesting discussion of this act, see Judith Rudakoff, ‘Why Did the Chicken Cross 
the Cultural Divide? Brett Bailey and Third-World Bunfight’s iMumbo Jumbo’, in The Drama 
Review, vol. 48, no. 2, (New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Summer 2004), the audience – as well as animal rights activists – responded with utter horror 
at this invasion of the sacred space of the theatre.
67 See Stegeman, 13 August 2006
68 Bailey, (2003: p 23)
69 Ibid, p 153
70 Ibid 
71 Ibid, p 155
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killing is, I would argue, a technique aimed at undermining the ability to narrativise 
this event.
In order to shift the focus of the discussion in this chapter specifically on to 
The Prophet it is perhaps useful to take our cue from the words of the Juju, the demi-
gods that control the different stages and meanings within the play when, in the shift 
towards what can be read as the last scene of the play, the Juju make the declaration 
that “the beginning is in the end”.72 The play opens with two voodoo priests, a male 
representing darkness and a female representing light, who are performing a ritual to 
heal the nation of the trauma associated with the cattle-killing. In order to begin this 
ritual the priests awaken the Juju. Towards the end of the play, the intoxication of 
Nongqawuse with the voices of the dead as well as the nation’s intoxication with her 
voice is brought to a climactic ending with the priestess of light intervening and 
silencing the voices of the dead, effectively exorcising their presence from the soul of 
the nation.73
Importantly, recalling Bailey’s comment in the Cue interview where he 
suggests that part of the trauma of this story is that there are thousands of Xhosa 
that died in the catastrophe whose souls are not at rest. The dead that are silenced 
here – who are put to rest, their writhing and moaning is overtaken by sleep – should 
be understood as incorporating those dead as well.74 The Prophet then ends with the 
Juju speaking to the nation, telling them that the “pot of gold is inside you”.75 This 
assertion takes on deeper meaning when understood in a context of South Africa as 
a rainbow nation. In other words, this assertion could be read as declaring to the 
audience that what lies at the end of South Africa as a nation is entirely up to them. 
An alternative reading, however, may suggest that the nation will dissolve into its 
fragments, through a realization that we are at the end of nation.
                                               
72 Ibid, p 188
73 Ibid, p 192; the intensity of this moment is something which, unfortunately, the written script 
of the play cannot adequately convey.
74 Cue interview, Grahamastown, 1999
75 Bailey, (2003: p 193)
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 Although Bailey, in the final instance, might not manage to escape nation, 
The Prophet is the only narrativisation or dramatization of the event that actually 
attempts to deal with Nongqawuse as a central figure. Nongqawuse assumes this 
place, not through an attempt to give her voice, but rather through allowing her 
trauma and her tormenting by the voices of the dead to build to such an extent that it 
threatens to overrun the whole narrative. Central to Nongqawuse fulfilling this role is 
Bailey’s assertion that she must have had a vision, that she did not lie, “not in the 
beginning anyway”.76
A second character around which the play unfolds is that of Sarhili. Towards
the beginning of the play, in a discussion of the possibility of the Russians coming to 
destroy the British, Sarhili makes the assertion that “we must not get lost in our 
dreams. Dreaming wil l  get us nowhere”.77 However ,  the more he hears  
Nongqawuse’s voice, the more he becomes intoxicated (lost) by the prophecy. As the 
play unfolds, it becomes clear that the prophecy has failed; however, at this point 
Sarhili’s intoxication only intensifies until the priestess steps in. A third element in the 
play is the division between believers and non-believers, something which Bailey 
interprets along very similar lines to Peires’ argument in The Dead Will Arise. 
In  The Prophet, the believers and non-believers are clamouring for the 
attention of the king, attempting to sway him to their own respective positions. This 
clamouring, however, only serves to increase Sarhili’s desperation and eventually 
drives him further into his intoxication with Nongqawuse’s voice.78 Intriguingly, 
despite Bailey’s argument that the British were responsible for introducing the 
impurity against which Nongqawuse speaks, the British only occupy a silent and 
peripheral role and only appear twice in the play: once during the failure of the 
                                               
76 Ibid, p 156
77 Ibid, p 173
78 Ibid, pp 182 – 183; it is in the arguing between the two groups that Bailey’s affinity to Peires 
is made apparent.
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prophecy they march around shooting at the starving people, and once at the end of 
the play where they come as scavengers to glean all they can from the calamity.79
Bailey’s assertion that Nongqawuse’s claim to having had a vision must be, in 
the first instance, believed, stems from his own experience of having had a similar 
vision. While Bailey’s recourse to the category of experience makes him vulnerable 
to the critique posited by Joan Scott, it also allows a different reading of the intentions 
of his play which might be more in line with a problematisation of “experience”. It 
might be possible to read The Prophet as an allegory through which Bailey attempts 
to both understand and justify his own ‘calling’ which he received during his vision at 
the river in Zimbabwe. This reading might allow a problematisation of Bailey’s vision 
as a foundational narrative for his work (which is how he uses it) as it demonstrates 
how meaning is attributed to it – it doesn’t imbue meaning – as well as what the 
possible outcomes of a project based on such a ‘foundation’ might be. The project 
might cause people to think, as Bailey puts it, but the final end of that thought is both 
ambiguous and unclear – a notion that is perhaps contained in the ambiguity of the 
final lines of the play.
It is clear from the above discussion that Bailey’s play refuses everything – be 
it conventional history, theatre, religion, or rationality – so as to cause all these 
different elements to collide with each other in the interstitial space between them. 
The possible productivity of such an endeavour is made apparent by Bailey’s 
pronouncement on the effectiveness of The Prophet: “The narrative we have 
constructed is just not strong enough to break through the surface of hysteria.”80 This 
statement resonates strongly with the quote from Zizek with which this chapter 
opened and therefore allows the assertion that Bailey, through writing hysteria which 
was not subsumed within a guiding narrative, has managed to engage with the 
                                               
79 Ibid, pp 153, 184, and 192; in the representation of the British along these lines, Bailey 
again echoes the argument of Peires with regard to the opportunism of the colonisers.
80 Ibid, p 157
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subaltern without simply reproducing its condition of exclusion discernable in the 
absent play of Pemba and the history of Crais. 
 
 
 
 
119
Reading a Textual Politics
Let us confront…
Michel Foucault1
The focus of the previous two chapters has been on reading a number of theatrical 
plays and histories that all deal with the Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856 – 7 
within the rigour of what Spivak calls “a textual politics.” Through reading Peires’ The 
Dead Will Arise, Dhlomo’s ‘The Girl Who Killed to Save’, and the Community Arts 
Project’s (CAP) ‘Nongqawuse’ alongside each other I argued that what I have termed 
the ‘Historical Play’ is already latent inside the discipline of history; having a 
destabilizing effect on it. Further, I proposed that it might be possible to read the 
proper name ‘Nongqawuse’, which is often understood as denoting agency, as rather 
signifying absence. However, while acknowledging the absence of Nongqawuse in 
the CAP play, I also argued that due to the violence which the play does to 
disciplinary history (both through its own narrative and its interaction with the 
audience), it might be possible to read Nongqawuse as signifying a space clearing 
gesture that might allow an arrival in a Derridean sense.
In Chapter 4, I read Clifton Crais’ The Making of the Colonial Order, a 
historical narrative that claims to address the problems of representation inherent in 
the discipline of history, alongside plays by George Pemba and Brett Bailey. I argued 
that Crais’ narrative achieves a double elision of Nongqawuse while affirming his own 
subject position as a male historian that can write/speak for the repressed subject. As 
such, he does not fulfill his own promise of writing a history that effectively contends 
with the problem of representation. Through reading Pemba’s play in its absence, 
                                               
1 The phrase used by Foucault to describe the type of reading he is performing in his critique 
of Derrida’s reading of Descartes, a similar mode to what I intend to perform here; see Michel 
Foucault, ‘My Body, This Paper, This Fire’, in Oxford Literary Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1979: p 
11)
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which I argue both resists and encourages the proliferation of reading, I argued that 
despite these various readings the play seems to unfold and be put to use along a 
similar line to that characteristic of Dhlomo’s nationalist politics. It therefore fails to 
critique something like apartheid – a politics that is in all manner of speaking 
symptomatic of nationalism. In contrast to these, Bailey’s The Prophet works to 
unsettle/interrupt the discipline of history and, therefore, might allow an engagement 
with the subaltern which would allow us to learn from below: a key component of 
Spivak’s textual politics. I suggested that Bailey achieves this effect by deploying a 
strategy of enacting hysteria.
In this chapter it is necessary to shift focus slightly so as to bring this 
argument into relation with two other studies that seek to engage with the plays of 
history, in other words and echoing Foucault in the epigraph, to confront their texts 
with my argument in this dissertation. While these other projects in my view do fall 
short of dealing with the problem of representation and subsequently textuality in the 
discipline of history – something which I have been arguing would require a textual 
politics – I hope to show how their projects may have benefited from utilizing a 
“textual politics”. Bhekizizwe Peterson’s Monarchs, Missionaries, and African 
Intellectuals: African Theatre and the Unmaking of Colonial Marginality and Derek 
Peterson’s Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination 
in Colonial Kenya will form the basis of this discussion.2 Both are quite complex texts 
that are difficult to pin down and, as such, in each case a rigorous reading will be 
offered before a critique is posited.
                                               
2 Bhekizizwe Peterson, Monarchs, Missionaries, and African Intellectuals: African Theatre and 
the Unmaking of Colonial Marginality, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001) 
and Derek Peterson, Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination 
in Colonial Kenya, (Portsmouth: Heineman, 2004)
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Building a New Nation: Reading Bhekizizwe Peterson
In his Monarchs, Missionaries and African Intellectuals the central question that 
Peterson addresses is arguably that of the restoration of African agency in history.3
Focusing on the period 1900 to 1940 (a period in which he argues discipline as a 
technique of governmentality becomes extended to the African body) in the Durban 
Johannesburg corridor, Peterson argues that theatre functioned as a political space 
that enabled such a restoration – what he terms the unmaking of colonial marginality 
– to take place through the working of an indigenous aesthetic voice.4 Central to his 
argument is an understanding of historical plays. His analysis draws on the work of 
Frederic Jameson and Hayden White, especially his view that plays functioned as 
historical allegories. In other words, they are socially symbolic and as such do not 
reduce history to a text. They help us to understand the dynamics of history and vice 
versa.5 Theatre, as a special kind of narrative (understood as an ideological tool), 
then works to articulate and disarticulate different ideological forces as they come to 
bear on the subject,6 which Peterson understands as being superficially fractured –
the subject is whole and chooses various subject positions: a fracturing in 
expression. It is in this apparent ability to choose (similar to Mbembe’s self-styling 
subject discussed in Chapter 1) where Peterson locates an African agency that he 
argues unmakes colonial marginality. 
The plays are read by Peterson as textual encounters in which it is possible to 
see the interstitial/intertextual sites (which he understands as the point where choices 
between texts/bodies are made) in which, he argues, the African intelligentsia had to 
                                               
3 Peterson, (2001: pp 12 and 68)
4 Ibid, pp 9, 64, 86 and 222
5 Ibid. pp 2 and 19; in this understanding history (the reality of the past) is kept separate from 
text (the literary), in other words, the integrity of both disciplines is maintained.
6 Ibid, pp 9 and 17
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operate. 7 One of the key strategies through which these African elites operated the 
interstitial was through recourse to the figure of the monarch, a key figure in all the 
plays Peterson discusses and a symbol of hope for the aspirations of nation.8 The 
interstitial space of the theatre was, however, also deployed as a form of social 
regulation, as an attempt to discipline the African body, to make the African docile 
and amenable to the needs of labour. As such, Peterson argues that the body, 
through its relation to character (it is often over determined by character), became a 
privileged trope in colonial discourse.9 The above arguments are threaded through a 
series of semi-biographical narratives on the lives and politics of various individuals, 
namely: Bernard Huss, Benedict “Bambatha” Vilikazi, Ray Phillips, Herbert I. E. 
Dhlomo, as well as a few members of colonial high society.
Styling the Rural
The emergence of theatre as a pedagogical and evangelistic tool in South Africa, 
according to Peterson, can be located in the convictions of Father Huss who was 
based at the Marianhill mission station a little outside Durban. Stated quite simply, 
Huss was of the opinion that Christianity and imperialism together equated to 
civilization.10 In other words, Huss was concerned not only with the inner or spiritual 
life of his converts (and Africans generally) but also with the outer form of their 
persons. In effect what Huss was asking for was discipline rather than coercion as 
the means for social control.11
 Peterson shows quite convincingly how theatre was developed at Marianhill 
within this greater concern as an attempt to contribute towards the control of the 
                                               
7 Ibid, pp 11 and 87
8 Ibid, p 13
9 Ibid, p 3
10 Ibid, pp 21 – 23
11 Ibid, p 30
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leisure time of Africans.12 At first theatre was only used and propagated by Huss 
within a mission context, as a method of entrenching civilization in their converts 
through effectively demonstrating evangelistic authority. However, the year 1918 saw 
the first public performance of the Marianhill plays and by 1919 drama had become 
generally accepted, due to the advocacy of Huss, as both a pedagogical tool as well 
as a tool for social control in general.13
The success of Huss’ interventions are, according to Peterson, ambiguous to 
the extent that he both assisted and established the colonial order – something 
Peterson argues Huss deemed necessary for proper conversion – and he gave the 
‘Kholwa’ (mission educated African converts to Christianity) the means through which 
to, again in Peterson’s argument, resist their own marginality.14 In order to make this 
argument, Peterson sets his biography of Huss against his biography of Vilikazi, with 
the intention of demonstrating how the Marianhill plays operate in the interstitial 
space between these two apparently iconic individuals. 
Vilikazi, who was named Bambatha by his parents in commemoration of the 
1906 uprising, assumed the baptismal name of Benedict when he joined the 
Marianhill mission and converted to Catholicism in 1919, the same time as the 
Marianhill plays began to go public.15 Peterson reads the tension that is embodied in 
Vilikazi’s names (between ‘traditional’ Zulu and Christian colonial subject) as being 
characteristic of both the divide within Vilikazi’s own politics as well as that of the 
Kholwa in general. This was a tension that, Peterson notes, Vilikazi often exploited 
through signing his work “B. W. Vilikazi” and leaving it up to his reader to decide 
which name he was using. On the one hand, Vilikazi in his attempts to etch out the 
identity of an ‘enlightened’ African made strong recourse to a traditional Zulu heritage 
– one rooted in the Zulu monarch – which was viewed as being pure, virile and 
                                               
12 Ibid, p 29
13 Ibid, pp 33 – 35
14 Ibid, pp 39 – 40
15 Ibid, pp 92 – 95 
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strong. While on the other hand, the characters in his poems often dream to be 
‘white’; expressing a willingness to forego the past in order to be accepted in the 
future.16 The hosting of this apparent contradiction in his politics leads Peterson to 
argue that Vilikazi should be understood as a nationalist poet at the intersection: his 
thought utilizes and transgresses every one of his influences including that of 
nationalism.17
Although Peterson positions Vilikazi in this manner, it is clear from his 
engagements with Dhlomo that Vilikazi was not willing to let go of an essentialist 
(nationalist) Zulu identity. The disagreement between Dhlomo and Vilikazi on the 
classification of ‘Bantu’ literature, where Vilikazi argued that ‘Bantu’ literature must be 
written by ‘Bantu’ in ‘Bantu’ languages for ‘Bantu’ people and Dhlomo argued that 
indigenous languages had become a tool for colonial control and domination as they 
restricted Africans’ ability to assimilate into colonial society, is indicative of this 
tendency.18 This tendency can be further seen in Vilikazi’s poem on Nongqawuse 
where it is effectively argued that the prophecy led to the subjugation of the Xhosa 
and that the Kholwa, if they had been there then, would never have allowed this to 
happen.19
In any case, Peterson uses his reading of Vilikazi (and by extension the 
Kholwa as a whole) as embodying the interstitial to argue that the Marianhill plays, 
many of which may have been translated and transcribed by Vilikazi, should be 
viewed as sites of contestation rather than of one sided instruction.20 As such, 
Peterson argues that the missionaries and the Kholwa had differing intentions and 
                                               
16 Ibid, pp 91 and 96 – 99; Peterson suggests that this recourse to the monarch may have 
been due to the Monarch’s ability to provide land to the Kholwa who were at the time 
effectively the landless elite. 
17 Ibid, p 91
18 Ibid, p 69
19 Ibid, pp 100 – 101; this position becomes incredibly interesting when brought into 
contention with Peires’ assertion that one of the key sources and factors responsible for the 
prophecy and its endurance was precisely this Christian missionary influence that Vilikazi 
asserts would have stopped the catastrophe from happening.
20 Ibid, p 42
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differing interpretations when it came to the plays.21 The Marianhill plays that 
Peterson focuses his discussion on are ‘Joseph in Egypt’, ‘Job’, and ‘Indodana 
Elahlekiyo’ (The Prodigal Son) which was the first play to be originally written in 
isiZulu, each of which he argues reflect the contested meanings and intentions of the 
plays and their participants. Importantly, Peterson suggests, as was mentioned 
above, that the plays need to be understood as historical allegories by which he 
means texts whose contexts are privileged over the texts themselves while 
maintaining their textuality. In other words, Peterson suggests that as historical 
allegories these plays allow an engagement with politics and history without 
becoming over determined by them.22
Each of these plays, according to Peterson, focuses on the dilemma of being 
a part of the Kholwa, of being not quite European and not quite African. ‘Joseph in 
Egypt’, in which Joseph is variously a spy (in the Zulu version) or a dreamer (in the 
English version), is read by Peterson as being somewhat optimistic about both the 
role that the Kholwa and the missionaries had to play in society and the promise of 
assimilation through the vehicle of Christianity. In short, Peterson argues that ‘Joseph 
in Egypt’ was an ideological tool that was utilized to subdue African resentment at 
how they were being treated as well as to argue that it was a necessary evil.23 In 
contrast, ‘Job’ demonstrates a challenge to the dominant missionary discourses. 
Through examining the ambiguity inherent in colonialism, namely that it claims to 
civilize but denies those that it is civilizing the rights associated with being civilized, 
Peterson argues that in ‘Job’ the concept of repentance ‘in itself’ is posited. In other 
words, ‘Job’ suggests that it is enough to convert to Christianity and that the 
concomitant pressure to conform to European ideals is not necessary.24 Of course a 
                                               
21 Ibid, pp 64 and 77
22 Ibid, p 156
23 Ibid, pp45 – 51
24 Ibid, p 52
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key feature of both plays is that the final reward for having endured the suffering is 
always delayed.
If the above plays both work to subdue the Kholwa frustrations as well as to 
challenge the dominance of the missionary and the civilizing discourses within 
colonialism, the ‘Prodigal Son’ explores the negative effects of colonial policy on the 
Kholwa. In the ‘Prodigal Son’ the argument is posited that the city represents all that 
is bad, evil, and corrupting in European society. Rather than heading off to the city to 
work and thereby becoming a part of the city life, the play calls for a return to the 
rural. Importantly however, the play does not call for a return to the precolonial but 
rather to the place of the African within the new order, in other words, a return to the 
reserves.25 The tension between the politics of this last play and Vilikazi’s ultimate 
move to Johannesburg to take up a post at the University of the Witwatersrand, a 
move that would seem to refuse the rural identity imposed on the African, is not 
substantially explored by Peterson.
Peterson suggests that the underlying tensions within these plays resonate 
quite strongly with two language disputes that took place in the 1910s between 
missionaries and the Kholwa. Both these disputes had to do with translations of 
catechisms and, he argues, reflected the growing contestation of the peripheral role 
that the Kholwa were given in these matters.26 Through reading this more overt 
contestation as occurring more subtly in the plays along the lines of Vilikazi’s politics, 
Peterson argues that converts were not simply empty receptacles but actually 
appropriated and contested what they were taught and that, as such, their responses 
(either in the plays or with regard to translation) should not be dismissed as 
secondary.27
                                               
25 Ibid, pp 57 – 61
26 Ibid, pp 73 – 76
27 Ibid, pp 70 and 85 – 86 
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Styling the Urban
Tracking the growing influence and importance of theatre for the purposes of 
education and societal control, Peterson shifts his focus to the Johannesburg area. 
Making this shift from the rural (Marianhill) to the urban (the Rand), he is concerned 
to highlight the continuities and discontinuities that mark such a transition. Peterson 
argues that, while the overall uses of theatre remained similar, the context in which 
‘African’ theatre emerged in Johannesburg was very different. He suggests that in 
Johannesburg it emerged in a context of poverty and crime where there was a 
resultant lack of political rigor. In addition, Peterson argues that the tone of the 
politics and the mode of engagement with religion was very different; particularly 
considering that race and segregation had begun to pose serious challenges to the 
task of evangelism in Johannesburg. Most importantly, however, Peterson argues 
that the greatest discontinuity rests in the fact that the ‘African’ elite were beginning 
to “flex their muscles”.28
Pursuing a similar pattern to his discussion of the Marianhill plays, Peterson 
builds his argument here in the space between two figures: Ray Phillips and Herbert 
I. E. Dhlomo. Both these men, as with Huss and Vilikazi, shared an institutional 
space (the Bantu Mens Social Centre) which, according to Peterson, they operated 
towards differing ends. The Centre was established by the American Mission Board 
(AMB) in 1919 as a means toward controlling the leisure time of, particularly, the 
African elite. Premised on an understanding of the urban dance culture that had 
developed among Africans in the cities – called Marabi – as being debauched and 
leading towards unwholesome living, the AMB suggested that there needed to be 
some form of alternate entertainment for those African’s who were in fact trying to 
attain the ideals of European life.29 Interestingly, both Dhlomo and Vilikazi (upon his 
                                               
28 Ibid, pp 115 – 120
29 Ibid, p 120; for a discussion of Marabi culture see pp 116 – 117
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arrival in Johannesburg) also advocated for a space for the elite, and Dhlomo also 
held a negative view of Marabi; although not due to its apparently inherent sinfulness 
but rather due to its link to tribalism which he viewed as a key component in colonial 
control.30 Despite Dhlomo’s support for the creation of such a space, he was 
suspicious of the political uses that a centre developed in cooperation with the 
colonial authorities would be put to.31
As with Huss, Phillips felt that the best way in which to discipline the leisure 
time of Africans was through the use of the performing arts. However, while Huss 
was largely focused on the use of theatre to this end, Phillips argued for the use of 
film.32 Funded by the Chamber of Mines, Phillips screened a number of ethnographic 
documentaries at the Centre as well as at other sites nearer to the mines.33 Although 
these films were an important development in the social control of Africans, Peterson 
argues that theatre was both more accessible to the African elite as well as more 
useful for interpellating other Africans into specific political consciousness.34 As such, 
the focus of much of his discussion is rather on the plays performed by the Bantu 
Dramatic Society and the British Drama League, culminating in an analysis of 
Dhlomo’s writing. The significance of Phillips in this discussion is that it is against the 
development of these ethnographic films in the 1920s that Peterson argues Dhlomo’s 
plays need to be read as he suggests that Dhlomo resisted including precisely the 
kind of essentialism in his plays that these films were premised on.35
The Bantu Dramatic Society is hailed by Peterson as being the first society for 
Africans by Africans. Although it has often been disregarded as being entirely 
complicit with the colonial project in its adoption of theatre – a criticism that Peterson 
describes as an “ideologically prescribed perception of what forms African cultural 
                                               
30 Ibid, p 31
31 Ibid, p 126
32 Ibid, p 128
33 Ibid, p 127
34 Ibid, p 133
35 Ibid, p 114
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practice should take”36 – Peterson argues that the Society played an important role in 
developing a politics that embraced the urban African as such.37 In other words, 
through deploying a limited nationalist agenda (it was limited precisely because of the 
restrictions on politics that prevailed at the BMSC) the Society managed to create 
what Peterson would refer to as an authentic African aesthetic which did not simply 
lament a lost paradise but rather celebrated the urbanized African. This is not to 
argue that there was no recourse made to a precolonial past, this was in fact one of 
Dhlomo’s favourite strategies; rather, when such recourse was made it was done 
strategically in order to counter African inferiority.38 Despite its intentions in this 
regard, however, Peterson points out that the Society never really worked. Its 
members were always committed elsewhere and they almost never managed to 
perform plays that were written by Africans for Africans. Peterson counters this 
apparent failure by asserting that although the plays themselves were not ‘African’, 
the performance was.39
Alongside the development of the Bantu Dramatic Society Peterson notes the 
emergence of the British Drama League. The League, which reflected the shift from a 
civilizing mission to cultural relativism as the colonial project, aimed to work towards 
the preservation of African traditional society: precisely what Dhlomo was working 
against.40 Peterson suggests that the League was very successful in its attempts at 
nat iv is ing Afr icans through advocat ing benevolent segregat ion and an 
anthropological understanding of African society.41 As such, Peterson argues that the 
League represented the “ethnographic gaze” of colonial society which worked to 
establish a false binary between the rural happy African and the urban corrupted 
                                               
36 Ibid, p 136
37 Ibid, p 155
38 Ibid, p 214
39 Ibid, p 152
40 Ibid, p 160
41 Ibid, pp 163 – 165
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African. It is in the interstitial space between these competing ideals of what it meant 
to be an African that Dhlomo operated.42
Dhlomo’s work and politics was already discussed at length in chapter 3 and 
will therefore not form a substantial part for the discussion here; it will suffice to 
briefly reiterate a number of key issues in his work in the light of the above. Peterson 
argues that Dhlomo’s politics must be viewed as being rooted in the interstitial rather 
than in ideology.43 In other words, it was because of his ambiguous position within 
colonial society that Dhlomo articulated the politics that he did, not due to a 
preconceived ideal. Dhlomo’s politics can be summarized as consisting of an ardent 
belief in the nation combined with disillusionment in the civilizing promise of 
colonialism. As was discussed previously, the beginnings of this politics can already 
be seen in ‘The Girl Who Killed to Save’, and as becoming more explicit in 
‘Moshoeshoe’ – a play particularly about resistance.44 According to Peterson, an 
incredibly important element of Dhlomo’s politics was his understanding of narrative 
as the key to organizing history and identifying subjects, a perspective that Peterson 
argues allowed Dhlomo to privilege African agency in his plays and, we might add, 
positions Dhlomo very closely to Hayden White’s concept of the narrative in history.
Broken Style
Peterson’s argument is both intriguing in its effectiveness and perturbing in its failure. 
It is effective to the extent that Peterson does manage to portray a sense of “agency” 
and thereby resistance in the engagements surrounding the various plays which he 
examines. This agency which Peterson posits is also intriguing in the sense that it is 
not simply one of resistance; it is also profoundly complicit with what he terms “the 
colonial project.” The complicity, however, does not stop with the main biographical 
                                               
42 Ibid, p 174
43 Ibid, p 216
44 Ibid, pp 176 and 211 – 213
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characters in his argument. Rather than undoing the effects of the colonial project, 
Peterson actually recycles the idea of the subject that he sets out to oppose.
A consequence of Peterson’s understanding of the subject is that it authorizes 
an inclusionary response to the problem of writing history after apartheid; a process 
that effectively amounts to identity politics. Furthermore, it also raises the question of 
marginality. In Peterson’s argument this is understood as a simple inside/outside 
delineation, a notion that Mowitt’s and Smith’s (not to mention Scott’s and Spivak’s) 
concept of the subject undoes. Throughout his argument, Peterson makes use of a 
concept of a self-styling subject. In other words in Peterson’s understanding the 
subject seems to style itself: the subject for example consciously selects the different 
positions that it assumes and its agency lies in that selection 
An important element in this understanding of the subject is the notion that 
agency equates to consciousness, in other words, the subject must be able to 
operate consciously to have agency and, consequently, nothing without 
consciousness can have agency. Quite clearly this would fall prey to Smith’s critique 
of the subject, discussed in chapter 2, where he argues that the subject is always 
already multiply interpelated (interstitial) and that its agency arises out of the internal 
competition between these interpellations – a notion that John Mowitt extends and 
alters through his discussion of text into a theory of the subjection of human agency. 
The second area in which Peterson’s argument becomes troubling is that of 
the status accorded to plays within it. In his argument plays work as repositories of 
interstitiality that are readily available as an evidentiary form. In other words, in a 
similar manner to how Hayden White understands the archive as a repository of facts 
that needs to be ordered (see Chapter 2), Peterson views the plays as a resource 
rather than as an episteme. This is perhaps best described in his classification of the 
plays as historical allegories: as allegories, the plays maintain a certain distance from 
that which they describe, whether it is history, identity, or politics and, as such, 
through maintaining this distance the plays do not problematise that which they 
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represent either. While conceding that some historical plays may operate on this 
level, it has been a consistent argument in this dissertation that, rather than simply 
performing as allegories, historical plays through utilizing a strategy of parabasis 
actually disrupt the discipline of history rather than keep it in tact.
Considering the importance that Peterson has placed on the interstitial, it may 
have been more productive if he had posited a notion of the interstitial as a 
disruptive/interruptive space, rather than viewing the interstitial as a meeting space 
between two wholes that their designation as allegory serves to protect. As was 
shown in the discussion of Brett Bailey’s The Prophet earlier, such a space threatens 
to overrun disciplinary reason through the interruptions it authorises and thereby 
might allow an effective engagement with the subaltern. In any case, through his 
failure to comprehend subject constitution and the inclusion of the subject as a 
problem that marks the interstices, Peterson fixes his argument within the realm of a 
nationalist (and at times ethnic) identity politics. This seems to be inadequate as a 
basis for critiquing apartheid. A strategic essentialism, to follow Spivak’s formulation, 
would have enabled the reading of these plays to be doubly productive through 
questioning the role of the African intelligentsia while simultaneously disrupting the 
identities that have been utilized to such ends.
Texts and Contexts: Reading Derek Peterson
The concepts of textuality and historical play that are at work in Derek Peterson’s 
Creative Writing are on some levels very different to those that are at work in 
Bhekizizwe Peterson’s Monarchs, Missionaries and African Intellectuals. For Derek 
Peterson textuality has to do with the blurring between the text and its context that 
occurs when “composition” takes place in a “composing community”.45 In other 
words, Peterson proposes to read both the ‘text’ and its context as objects that are 
                                               
45 Peterson, (2004: p 2)
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crucially related to each other. Through reading texts in this broad sense, Peterson is 
then able to suggest that writing becomes scripting – in a theatrical sense – and that 
as such “political organizers [in Kenya] were also theatre directors”.46 Or, as he 
phrases it later, “textual work was also the work of political imagination. It helped 
uphold communities of principle.”47 It is in this scripting that Peterson then locates the 
appearance of an African agency that he wants to bring to the fore in his work.48
Along with assigning agency to Gikuyu subjects, Peterson is also interested in, to a 
certain extent, salvaging the interventions of missionaries in colonial Africa so as to 
draw out the positive elements of their discourses within a postcolonial critique.  
Peterson’s argument is both rigorous and diffuse and, as such, I will first present a 
close reading of it before I posit a critique in the light of my overall argument.
Peterson builds his argument around three major threads in his text which for 
the purposes of this discussion we might term ‘the politics of governance’, ‘the local 
versus the national’, and ‘missionary ambiguity’. These threads work together in 
Peterson’s text to critique and destabilize the dominant historiographies of Kenya as 
well as the dominant literary interpretations of one of Kenya’s most famous novelists, 
Ngugi Wa Thiong’o. Despite the close proximity between Peterson’s use of textuality 
and the textual politics that I have been calling for, in the following discussion I will 
argue that Peterson runs into trouble through the manner in which he operationalises 
his understanding of textuality and consequent understanding of agency. First, 
however, we need to read Creative Writing.
The Politics of Governance
In order to engage effectively with the Gikuyu experience of colonialism and their 
responses to it, Peterson argues that it is necessary to first understand the nature of 
                                               
46 Ibid, p 242
47 Ibid, p 244
48 Ibid, pp 143 – 144
 
 
 
 
134
Gikuyu society before and in the opening years of colonialism. In other words, he 
argues that it is necessary to understand what he calls the “grammar of ethnic 
debate”.49 This grammar, which is marked by value and form, is threaded throughout 
all the various events that Peterson discusses and is actually the key through which 
he argues for the opposing and contestatory relationship between the local and the 
national. 
According to Peterson, in precolonial Gikuyu society wealth and a resultant 
respectability as well as the right to speak were derived from the experience of 
clearing forests for agriculture, a process called wiathi.50 This often difficult and 
arduous task defined the line between those heads of households who were able to 
provide for the well being of their dependants, and those that were incapable. Quite 
clearly, those that did not have land would fall into this latter category. As such, 
Peterson suggests that poverty should be understood as constituting a “political and 
ontological disaster” for men as it left them without respect, political voice, or a 
culturally valid claim to masculinity within a highly patriarchal society.51 This leads 
Peterson to suggest that in Gikuyu society “culture grew out of horticulture”, in other 
words, Gikuyu valued the cleared space of the town or homestead and were 
therefore loyal to the land and the ability to control it. This loyalty was reflected in 
their religious and cultural practices.52
Having established the element of value in the “grammar of ethnic debate”, it 
is now possible to delineate its form. According to Peterson, the Gikuyu never viewed 
themselves as a unified “tribe” or “nation” led by a chief or king but rather as loosely 
associated groups, linked through kinship ties and other face-to-face verbal 
                                               
49 Ibid, p 10
50 Ibid, pp 11 – 16 and 143
51 Ibid, p 13 and 167 – 168; interestingly Peterson never states explicitly that Gikuyu society 
was patriarchal, even though it is clear from the structure of households and communities that 
Peterson presents that this was the case.
52 Ibid, pp 36 – 38
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agreements that were governed by the preeminence of robust debate.53 Of course, 
the rights to debate were decided according to the values outlined earlier. Peterson 
suggests that there were then two forms of political control that were considered to 
be valid. The first was called mbari (actually the name given to the governing council) 
and related to a slow linear progression of history and debate. This form was 
generally practiced by the older wealthier and more established household heads 
and was focused on maintaining social order as understood through wiathi. The 
second was referred to as ituika and consisted of a sudden, almost revolutionary, 
change in leadership that was undertaken for the future posterity of the Gikuyu – the 
events that Peterson discusses as evidence of this all occurred during massive 
famine. This process was often coupled with a buying off of the current community 
elders.54 This double form of political control clearly created the potential for 
generational conflict, something that Peterson argues all generations attempted to 
avoid.55
Thus the value of the “grammar of ethnic debate” was that of wiathi within the 
form of mbari and ituika. A further point of Peterson’s analysis, which will be made 
clear later, is that mbari became to be associated with the local whereas ituika
became associated with the national. Having established the nature of the “grammar 
of ethnic debate”, Peterson then utilizes this to posit the notion that writing, and 
particularly the debates on writing, reflected the debate between mbari and ituika. 
The understanding of writing as reflecting and constituting political positions in a 
debate (what he terms “creative writing”) forms a central part of much of Peterson’s 
argument, as the title of his book makes explicit. As such, in Peterson’s argument 
creative writing becomes the web that connects the various points of Gikuyu and 
colonial society. 
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The two main areas in which Peterson argues that this creative writing occurs 
are bookkeeping and bible translation. The second of these, bible translation, was 
utilized in very interesting ways by Gikuyu converts so as to open up possible lines of 
argument to contest their colonial marginality.56 In addition, the issue of bible 
translation, and later bureaucracy, caused a number of debates surrounding Gikuyu 
orthography, which, considering that in Peterson’s argument literacy became the 
basis for polity building, became quite heated. The strength of this debate leads 
Peterson to assert that orthography and the politics of writing and reading are at an 
intersection between language and politics.57 In other words, writing becomes an 
interstitial zone.
The heated nature of these debates over orthography was due to the political 
faith that the Gikuyu had placed in the notion of assimilation; a possibility that the 
Gikuyu argued was being squashed by particularly Protestant attempts to alter the 
number of vowels and to institute a prescriptive nature of grammar so as to 
concretely establish meaning within the sentence – a move that was particularly 
helpful for bible translation but which the Gikuyu argued made their language look 
primitive.58 The Catholic approach to Gikuyu orthography was, on the surface, much 
less restrictive. However, their orthography was designed so as to lead the individual 
to recall the spoken word of the Catholic Church.59 In other words, meaning is 
derived from the church not from your own readings. Following closely behind these 
attempts to transform the orthographic practice of individuals was an attempt in 1928 
to replace the theological basis of writing with a broadly scientific one that would 
homogenize grammar for the entire sub-Saharan Africa.60 All these attempts 
necessarily met with resistance from Gikuyu who felt that their possibilities of being 
                                               
56 ibid, pp 66 and 85; a position that brings Derek Peterson’s and Bhekizizwe Peterson’s 
narrative very close to each other.
57 ibid, pp 118 and 135
58 ibid, pp 117 – 122
59 ibid, pp 122 – 125
60 ibid, p 126
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treated as equals were being undermined. In other words, writing was never simply 
about keeping records or communication; it had to do with political strategy. Although 
the missionary project was an integral element in colonial conquest, it is also clear 
from Peterson’s argument that their interactions with local communities also authored 
the possibility of resistance.
Missionary Ambiguities
One of Peterson’s aims in Creative Writing, I argue, is to rescue the missionary 
project from a totalizing characterization as being entirely complicit with colonialism. 
Through positing a notion of creative writing as occurring in bible translation, 
Peterson opens the possibility of making such an argument. Particularly, one of his 
key moves is to suggest that the debates that occurred around biblical translation 
offer a possibility of reading the contours of Gikuyu generational debate, a debate 
that was fraught with tensions between the local and the national.61
Peterson begins his discussion of the missionary project through highlighting 
the manner in which missionaries ‘translated’ what they viewed as Gikuyu religion 
into a doctrinally premised theology, a translation that was done so as to draw the 
Gikuyu into religious debate and towards conversion. Through this process of 
translation, missionaries sought to link Christian doctrine to Gikuyu practice in such a 
way as to make Christianity the natural fulfilment of Gikuyu religion.62 As such, this 
translation into the grammar of comparative religion, which often entailed deliberate 
mistranslations, was really a form of “political and intellectual control”. 63 The 
missionary project began in the Nyeri District in July of 1908 when missionaries 
secured the rights to build a mission station on Tumutumu hill.64 Among the earliest 
                                               
61 Ibid, p 81
62 ibid, pp 45 and 49
63 Ibid, pp 34 and 65
64 Ibid, pp 42 and 50
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concerns of missionaries were the issues of translation and of controlling the leisure 
time of their converts. In order to control leisure time, missionaries introduced a wage 
labour system at the mission station ensuring that they could buy the leisure time of 
their converts and thus keep them at the mission.65 It was this move, according to 
Peterson, that began the commodification of time and labour in Nyeri District. This 
commodification of labour and time, extended through the colonial project, was to 
have important political consequences for Nyeri District and the rest of Kenya.
Education was also an important part of the missionary project. Peterson 
argues that through the establishment of mission schools the Gikuyu were introduced 
to the rules of bureaucracy and to the intricacies of biblical translation and Christian 
morality.66 As such, mission schools and Christian marriage became interesting 
points of contest as they posited new standards for judging character, standards 
which were to a certain extent opposed to those derived from wiathi.67 One 
manifestation of this contest was found in debates over cleanliness. The missionaries 
taught their converts to use soap and linen clothing so as to demonstrate their 
cleanliness; however, in Gikuyu tradition it was occasionally necessary to wash with 
animal fat so as to protect yourself from ceremonial uncleanness – a state entered in 
to through contact with unproductive and wild elements in nature.68 Through adopting 
missionary techniques of cleanliness, converts were effectively arguing that these 
new techniques were as effective in ensuring wiathi as the traditional methods.69 In 
addition, these “lessons in hygiene” were utilized as a vehicle through which to 
challenge the older generation. 70 Coupled with the biblical narrative of the coming 
kingdom, young men used mission education as a form of ituika, a way to prepare for 
a different future.
                                               
65 ibid, p 43
66 ibid, p 149
67 ibid, pp 55 and 59
68 ibid, pp 36 and 73 – 76 
69 ibid, p 80
70 ibid, pp 79 – 80
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This is one of the main reasons why in Peterson’s argument, although the 
missionaries are indicted by him on their complicity – expressed through their 
adoption of English language policies and vocational training schemes propagated by 
the colonial government and their essentialising of Gikuyu religion and culture – with 
the colonial project, they are generally viewed favourably. Peterson argues that, 
through their impartation of the English language, bureaucratic technique, and use of 
the bible translation to support specific ends, missionaries should actually be viewed 
as “grammar teachers”.71 It was through utilizing this political grammar that 
resistance to colonial authority was developed.
A Nationalism Undone
The contestation between mbari and ituika that was reflected in the debate over 
orthography and marriage forms the interpretative principle that threads Peterson’s 
discussion of a number of key ‘events’ in the history of resistance in Kenya. The first 
of these ‘events’ that Peterson discusses is the move away from missionary schools 
and churches towards independent ones. According to Peterson, the increasing 
levels of commodity farming and wage labour, and the subsequent hoarding of land 
by more senior members of households, led many Gikuyu (particularly from Nyeri 
District) to move away and find employment on white owned farms.72 The increase in 
wealth due to wage labour and the distance from mission stations then contributed to 
the founding of a number of independent schools. According to Peterson, these 
independent schools taught wiathi and the contribution of money towards the 
founding of these schools were considered to be ituika.73 In other words, the founding 
of these schools fitted perfectly within the “grammar of ethnic debate”.
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Independent schools were, in Peterson’s argument, about “training moral 
agency” in the colonial world. Part of this agency was the decision to take back the 
responsibility of raising their children away from the missionaries.74 As such, the 
schools had a twofold approach to education. On the one hand, the students were 
taught English, trained in bureaucratic form, and encouraged to assume Christian 
names through baptism, and on the other hand, this training was to be turned 
towards a negotiation with the colonial government.75 In order to lend these 
independent schools credibility apart from the missionary project, Bishop Daniel 
Alexander of the African Orthodox Church in South Africa was invited to train and 
ordain a number of clergy for an independent church.76 He came to Kenya and 
performed this function; however, when he then tried to make the new churches send 
a tithe to him in South Africa he was instructed in no uncertain terms that no such 
tithe would ever be sent.77
Through looking at the establishment of an independent school at Kabiruini 
and the establishment of an independent Kenya Teachers College, Peterson 
demonstrates how this education strategy enabled Gikuyu to “contract the reach of 
colonial power, opening up government rules for negotiation.”78 In both cases the 
colonial government, largely at the behest of the missionaries who felt that 
independent schools and churches would undermine their effectiveness, was 
opposed to the establishment of these institutions. And, in both cases, through 
playing the bureaucratic game of government by inviting the responsible party in 
government to an opening ceremony without their knowledge, the institutions were 
sanctioned by government.79
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Around the same time that Bishop Alexander was refused his request for a 
tithe to be sent to him, the independent schools and churches went through a split. 
Whereas in the official historiography this split is generally understood as revolving 
around a clash in personalities, Peterson argues that this split occurred as a reaction 
to the attempt to impose a national politics at the expense of local values.80 In other 
words, in line with the “grammar of ethnic debate”, this split marked the impossibility 
of asserting the national over the local. There are many other instances that Peterson 
discusses which can be read against the dominant mode of historiography in Kenya 
as actually revolving around the “grammar of ethnic debate”, two notable examples 
would be what he terms the “garden affair” and the “East African Revival”.81 In the 
former instance, what began as a national movement with the backing of the KCA 
was eventually condemned by them, as it became clear that it was really an 
expression of local debate that threatened the process of establishing a national 
identity. In the case of the latter, it was opposed nationally from within the 
independent church movements as it enflamed local tensions, resulting in an 
increase in regional discord that undermined the establishment of a national identity. 
To the extent that these acts all unsettled the drive towards a national unity, a drive
that was justified under the framework of ituika, Peterson considers them to be 
deconstructive in nature.82
The Mau Mau movement in Kenya is, according to Peterson, probably one of 
the few ‘events’ that is actually treated in terms of its local expression rather than as 
a unified national movement. However, Peterson suggests that it is necessary to 
investigate how Mau Mau managed to achieve a form of national solidarity.83 To this 
end he argues that writing in Mau Mau was the key element in transforming it into a 
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national war of independence.84 Particularly through the practice of record keeping, 
or bookkeeping, Peterson argues that Mau Mau was able to recruit soldiers and 
supporters from across diverse local polities. This worked through imbuing a sense of 
national fatherhood on those who were giving their lives for Mau Mau – a significant 
factor considering that the ability to ensure the health of your household (here 
equated to the nation) was what decided your masculinity – and it allowed those who 
were investing money to be assured of a return in their investment.85 Importantly, 
Peterson places the Mau Mau movement within a context in which, through the 
Beecher Report, the government was going to limit Gikuyu access to education, 
thereby squashing their educational strategy of resistance. In addition, there were an 
increasing number of Gikuyu after World War II that were forced to become 
proletarians due to the extent of commodity farming and its effects on Gikuyu 
communities. In short, Peterson argues that Mau Mau was about restoring social 
order and responsibility in a time of increasing chaos.86
The movement practiced government procedure in the forest so as to contest 
the legitimacy of the colonial government. Peterson suggests that there were two 
reasons why this bureaucracy was practiced: on the one hand, it helped establish a 
partisan polity through the promise of future reward, while on the other, it helped to 
establish the form of an independent state, the effect of which was to “provincialise” 
the colonial government through making them appear to be disturbers of the peace 
as opposed to the upholders of law.87 Interestingly Peterson argues that Mau Mau 
was only a violent movement when it came into contact with strong expressions of 
local politics, such as the East African Revival.88
It is clear that in Peterson’s argument literacy – by which I mean the ability to 
understand the grammar of governmentality – is the basis for polity building, as 
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writing becomes the interpellative tool through which individuals become part of 
imagined communities.89 As such, Peterson locates African agency in the practice of 
grammar (a technique first imparted by the missionaries) as it allowed the Gikuyu to, 
in some form, speak to the colonial government.90 However, this process of nation 
building that Peterson has shown to have been variously undone through the 
assertion of the local was, in his argument, not finally established through Mau Mau. 
He clarifies this through his discussion of Ngugi Wa Thiang’o’s novels in Gikuyu. 
Noting how Ngugi re-wrote Gikuyu orthography so as to effectively convey his 
meaning, Peterson argues that Ngugi is attempting to interpelate a new imagined 
community through a call to moral and national unity.91 As such, Peterson locates 
Ngugi within the strategies of ituika that he has been discussing throughout his 
book.92 It is in relation to this call for the nation that Peterson suggests Ngugi is 
making that, I would like to argue, Peterson’s Creative Writing as an assertion of the 
disruptive effect of the local on the national must be read.
Agents of Autochthony
Although Peterson’s approach to the question of nationalism through the disruptive 
positionality of the local is interesting and, I would argue to a limited extent, 
productive, it is precisely this privileging of the local in his writing that I think 
undermines the potential productivity of his text. Through privileging the local, 
whether it is in terms of an “ethnic grammar” or familial relations, as an effective 
means of disrupting the national, Peterson’s argument tends to make itself available 
to a politics of autochthony. The difficulty that such a politics authors – problems of 
geographic essentialism, local exceptionalism, etc. – has been made clear by 
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Alessandro Triulzi in his discussion of postcolonial ( in a temporal sense) 
Cameroon.93 As such, while it might dispel a claim to identity politics on a broader 
scale, it simply reinforces such a politics in the local.
A second element in Peterson’s text that I would argue is not problematised 
enough is the emphasis that he places on context. While Peterson argues that text 
and context are blurred due to creative writing, it is interesting that the context that he 
provides is only focused on the local. In other words, he does not contextualize the 
missionary text (or for that matter colonial governmentality) as originating from 
Europe and, as such, the context into which the text would seem to blur is decidedly 
limited. Of course, the special hermeneutic value that Peterson attributes to context 
may be a possible reason for this narrow contextual focus. In other words, while 
Peterson argues for a blurring between text and context, in his narrative it is always 
the context that allows a correct interpretation of the text, rather than the other way 
round.
In addition to the difficulty of the relationship between text and context, in 
Peterson’s text the status of agency is also unclear. Although Peterson locates the 
subject as being constituted in the interstitial space of writing, it is not clear whether 
Peterson views agency as coming from consciousness or as imbuing it. The 
implications of this are that if Peterson understands agency as coming from 
consciousness then the subject in his text becomes a self styling one; however, if he 
views agency as authoring consciousness then ‘the subject’ can only be deployed 
strategically in his text. The latter interpretation would place Peterson’s text 
productively close to the concept of “textual politics” that has been argued for in this 
dissertation. Linked into this question of agency is the question of the status of 
Peterson as writer. The politics of his writing, his conditions of possibility, are left 
elided in his text, thereby masking the constituted nature of his own identity as 
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scholar and author – an interrogation of which Peterson’s narrative appears to be 
perfectly poised to undertake.
Finally, in the light of the above criticisms it becomes necessary to query the 
status of text and historical play in Creative Writing. The status of the text in Peterson 
is subsumed within his allegorical understanding of society as theatre. What occurs 
in this moment of subsumation is that the disruptive effect of text on the disciplines of 
history and literary studies is contained. While both disciplines are implicated in the 
constitution/interpellation of subjectivities, they are implicated on an interdisciplinary 
level. In other words, they work together they do not  interrupt each other. 
Consequently, historical play in Peterson denotes this interaction between disciplines 
rather than, what I have been arguing, the productively disruptive nature of an object 
that forces the discipline of history to face its own textuality.
Political Difference
While in my above criticisms of both Bhekizizwe Peterson and Derek Peterson’s 
works, I argued that both of their arguments fall short of a textual politics in significant 
ways; it is perhaps necessary to return to this question of politics in order to close this 
chapter. Both Bhekizizwe Peterson and Derek Peterson (the former perhaps more 
explicitly than the latter) write their work within what I would term an inclusionary 
politics. In other words, starting from the premise that what we might call the 
subaltern has been excluded from historical discourse, they both attempt to depict 
them as being active agents through their resistance to the process of colonialisation 
and, more particularly, through their ability to appropriate different techniques of 
governmentality to their own end. 
While these strategies are interesting and to some extent productive in how 
they are used to challenge dominant modes of historical discourse, I would suggest –
echoing Helen Bradford’s argument in Chapter 1 – that their arguments falter 
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precisely at this point of inclusion. Stated simply, in their arguments they ignore that 
the category of the subaltern is always already included as a subordinate clause in 
the discourse of history.94 As such, they miss the productive possibilities that exist in 
a “textual politics” as a result of its disruption of the discourse of history and rather, 
through effecting an inclusion, maintain the discourse of history and thereby the 
position of the subaltern within it. In other words, theirs does not offer a politics of 
difference but of maintenance.
                                               
94 This is similar to the argument in Premesh Lalu, ‘The Grammar of Domination and the 
Subjection of Agency: Colonial Texts and Modes of Evidence’, in History and Theory, vol. 39, 
No. 4, 2000, pp 45 – 68
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Writing History after Apartheid
My aim in writing this dissertation has been to delineate the possible productivity of 
the concept of the historical play for the writing of history in a postapartheid South 
Africa. As I argued in the introduction, the task of writing a history after apartheid 
would need to contend with the problematic nature of the relationship between the 
discipline of history and the politics of nationalism and identity. In other words, I 
argued that it is necessary for the discipline of history to confront its status as alibi to 
a politics of identity and nationalism, an argument that becomes especially pertinent 
when it is recalled that apartheid can be characterized as an outworking of just such 
a politics. Building on Michel Foucault’s discussion of the political implications of his 
own project, I suggested that the writing of a history along these lines would enable a 
progressive politics.
In the first part of this dissertation I set out to argue in relation to a number of 
debates between leading Eastern Cape historians that an effective engagement with 
this problem of the politics of identity and nationalism would require a confrontation 
with the question of representation in the discipline of history and within academic 
discourse in general. Working with Gayatri Spivak’s concept of a strategic 
essentialism as an effective method through which to interrupt the discourse of 
history, particularly its reliance on the foundational category of representation, I 
posited the notion through discussing the playwright Brett Bailey’s iMumbo Jumbo
that the historical play might allow the use of just such a strategic essentialism in the 
writing of history. Using a review of Brett Bailey’s work, written by Helen Bradford, I 
posited the argument that the historical play in deploying a strategic essentialism 
simultaneously requires the discipline of history to encounter its own textuality. 
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Exploring the dynamics of such an encounter through reading what has been 
termed the linguistic and literary turns in history, I argued that these responses to the 
problem of textuality did not adequately deal with the question of representation that 
was raised in my first chapter due to their respective withdrawals into disciplinarity: a 
move that can be identified in John Toews’ utilisation of experience as a foundational 
category for the writing of history and in Hayden White’s shifting of the writing of 
history out of the discipline of history and into that of literature studies. Through 
reading the critique of these responses to textuality by Joan Scott and Spivak 
respectively, I suggested that a “textual politics” that draws on Paul de Man’s concept 
of “irony” as constituting “a permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes”, a position 
similar to Spivak’s strategic essentialism, allowed an effective engagement with the 
question of representation in the discipline of history.
By reading Paul Smith’s discussion of the construction of agency and John 
Mowitt’s discussion of the socio-genesis of the text, I refined the concept of the 
historical play within the frame of a “textual politics”. Through this discussion I argued 
that the historical play operates in a similar manner to that of, following Mowitt, the 
text as an antidisciplinary object. The historical play, as an antidisciplinary object, 
disrupts the discipline of history’s repressed dynamic by making it face its own 
textuality and, thereby, allowing a textual politics of the sort that Spivak calls for. As 
such, the historical play as object disrupts the discipline of history (and thereby its 
position as alibi) and allows a politics of what Spivak calls “learning to learn from 
below” (see Chapter 2). 
Having established the status and productivity of the historical play in part one 
of this dissertation, in part two I sought to read out its implications for the discipline of 
history. Through reading a number of historical narratives and plays that deal with 
Nongqawuse and the Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856 –7, an episode whose 
present political relevance was posited in my introduction, I argued that the historical 
play is both latent within the discipline of history as a kind-of internalised parabasis 
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that continuously works to unsettle the discipline, and that the historical play is 
deployed as a strategy within theatre to deal with the demands of the discipline of 
history. Further, I argued in chapter 4 that the historical play allows the prophetic as 
such to be taken seriously in the writing of history, something which the majority of 
historical narratives and plays that were read completely dismissed. In performing 
this reading it was also made apparent that not all historical theatre works as 
historical play. 
Of course, this is not the only project that has sought to utilise a concept of 
historical play for the writing of history. As such, in the final chapter of this 
dissertation I provided a serious reading of two similar projects: that of Bhekizizwe 
Peterson and Derek Peterson, with the intention of confronting their arguments with 
mine in this dissertation. As a result of this reading I argued that through failing to 
contend with what I have been terming the problem of representation, both 
Bhekizizwe and Derek Peterson’s projects offer a politics of maintenance rather than 
of difference.
 In the light of the above I would argue that the historical play, as an object 
that destabilises the discipline of history and, through performing a textual politics 
that allows it to engage with the problem of representation, allows the writing of a 
history after apartheid, in the sense that it seeks to destabilise apartheid’s condition 
of emergence. Through destabi l is ing this condit ion of emergence (and 
simultaneously the historian’s ability to write the past) the historical play enables a 
progressive politics that might work to clear the space for, as I argued in chapter 3, 
an arrival in the Derridean sense.
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